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The concept of asset price bubble has drawn a large amount of academic atten-
tion. A bubble is commonly defined as where the asset price is not justified by
expectations of the fundamentals. The empirical characteristics of a bubble are
widely regarded as a dramatic rise in asset prices in the early periods along with
a sudden collapse, which have been observed in a wide range of financial markets
including commodity, real estate and stock.
This thesis attempts to examine several well-noticed bubble episodes in history,
for example, the Mississippi Bubble in 1719, the South Sea Bubble in 1719-20,
Japan’s asset price bubble during the 1980s and the more recent US real estate
bubble in the early 2000s. One of the greatest contribution of this thesis is that
it has provided econometric-based evidence to support the existence of these fa-
mous episodes for the first time using recently developed econometric tests. The
origination and collapse dates for these identified episodes are coincided with the
traditional view of famous bubbles.
This thesis not only tests for the existence of bubbles but also seeks to provide
some empirical evidence to support the existence of bubble spillovers/contagion
using the most-documented bubble episodes. The first example considered in
this thesis is whether financial bubbles/crises spill-over to housing markets in
Amsterdam, Norway and France. The second example is considered for a number
of British financial organisations during the South Sea episode in 1719-20 (e.g.,
the South Sea Company, the Bank of England, East India Company, London
Assurance, Million Bank, the Royal African Company and the Royal Exchange
Assurance). The South Sea Bubble seems to migrate to other organisations as
the British share market was speculative for that period. The timings of some
identified episodes can be viewed as possible evidence of spillovers or contagion
for this important period in England. The third example looks at the Japan’s
real estate and stock markets during the 1980-90s. Based on econometric tools,
the findings indicate signs of bubble migration from Japan’s stock market to its
real estate market for the first time. Even if this phenomenon has been observed
in the literature, none of existing studies provide any solid evidences to support
this claim.
This thesis investigates the long-run equilibrium relationship between house prices
and economic fundamentals in the US based on quantile cointegration approaches
for the first time. The presence of cointegration between house prices and fun-
damentals would imply convergence to a stable equilibrium relationship, suggest-
ing a temporary run-up or drop in house prices would eventually come back to
the equilibrium. By making use of quantile autoregressive distributed lag model
(QARDL), this research explores the cointegration relationship across the whole
conditional distribution.
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“if the reason that the price is high today is
only because investors believe that the selling
price is high tomorrow-when ‘fundamental’
factors do not seem to justify such a price-then
a bubble exists.”
— (Stiglitz, 1990, p.13)
1.1 Overview
Bubbles are one of the most beautiful concepts in economics and finance (Garber,
2001). Stiglitz (1990) introduces a simple definition of the bubble that may arise
when asset prices in a market deviate from underlying fundamental values. The
presence of an asset price bubble is not new to history despite a growing recent
interest since the Global Financial Crisis. Dating back to as early as the 17th
century in Netherlands, Tulipmania (1636-7) is commonly regarded as the earliest
example of a bubble, where the contract prices of tulip bulbs were astonishingly
high from 1636 and suddenly collapsed in 1637.1 For example, Thompson (2007)
reports that the contract price of tulips in February 1737 was 20 times higher
than the price in November 1636 and May 1737. Furthermore, according to The
Economist, a very rare tulip, Semper Augustu bulb, was initially valued at around
1A detailed review of the Tulipmania can be found at Garber (1989).
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1,000 guilders in the 1620s and later valued at 5,500 guilders per bulb, which was
equal to the cost of a luxurious house in Amsterdam.2
Shortly after the Dutch Tulipmania, the Mississippi Bubble in France and South
Sea Bubble in England during 1719-1720 are regarded as next famous episodes
of bubbles.3 Both bubble episodes are some of the most influential stock price
bubbles in history. The share prices of the Mississippi and South Sea Company
achieves remarkable growth in values during the earlier period, however, both
collapsed drastically and suddenly. Other than these two closely related episodes,
the British Railway Mania of the mid-1840s is another well-known example of
stock price bubbles in history, which resulted in a boom of railway construction
in England and a financial panic in share prices. The Economist simply describes
such an episode as ‘arguably the greatest bubble in history’ based on the scale
of investment as a proportion of national income.4 The railway shares peaked in
the mid-1840s. By 1850, railway shares had fallen from their peak over 85%, see
Chancellor (2000, p.149). These three historical bubble episodes during the 17th-
19th centuries are still considered as the most famous examples and are frequently
mentioned. As part of this thesis, I will consider the Mississippi Bubble and South
Sea Bubble episodes in some detail.
Not only do the 17th-19th century highlight the presence of asset price bubbles,
but also more recent experience reminds us of the existence of several other bub-
bles including but not limited to the German stock price bubble in 1927, the Wall
Street Crash of 1929, Japanese asset price bubble of the 1980s-90s, the Dotcom
bubble and the more recent US housing bubble during the 2000s. There have been
some excellent studies on two bubble episodes during the 1920s, for example, see
Voth (2003) for the German stock price bubble in 1927, Romer (1990), White
(1990) and Rappoport and White (1994) for the Wall Street Crash of 1929. His-
2The Economist, “Economic history: Was tulipmania irrational?”, 4 Oct, 2013.
3For a literature review on Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles, see Neal (1990), Murphy
(1997), Temin and Voth (2004) and Frehen et al. (2013).
4The Economist, “The beauty of bubbles”, 18 December 2008.
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tory seems to suggest that the global financial system is more fragile after 1980
as several devastating bubbles occurred then. This thesis will look at some re-
cent examples of bubbles including Japan’s bubble period and the US real estate
bubble.
During the second half of the 1980s, Japan’s real estate and stock markets expe-
rienced their most severe episode of speculation. The dramatic and unsustainable
rise in asset prices drew a lot of attention, while the collapse of asset prices has led
to serious consequences. Two myths existed relating to Japan’s exuberant stock
and real estate markets. Firstly, that land prices could never fall; secondly, that
stock prices could only rise (Malkiel, 2003). The economic losses from Japan’s
financial system during Japan’s bubble economy were at least 20% of Japan’s
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) based on a conservative estimate from Hoshi and
Kashyap (2004).
The Dotcom bubble of the 1990s or the NASDAQ bubble is a very recent example
of speculation in stock prices, see Ofek and Richardson (2003), Ljungqvist and
Wilhelm (2003), Pástor and Veronesi (2006) and Perez (2009). Perhaps the most
famous phrase-‘irrational exuberance’ introduced by Alan Greenspan in 1996 is
used to describe the significant surge in the stock market of the 1990s. According
to Shiller (2005), the famous Greenspan speech in 1996 was given at the beginning
of the most speculative growth in the US stock market history. The Dow Jones
Industrial Average was 3600 at the beginning of 1994 but reached 10000 in March
1999 and peaked at 11722 in early 2000. The unusual rise and fall in the stock
prices of technology stocks has led many academics and practitioners to describe
such a phenomenon as a ‘bubble’.
Several prominent economists acknowledged that the US experienced a specula-
tive bubble in the housing market during the 2000s. Baker (2002) claimed no
obvious explanation for the rapid rise in house prices and concluded the presence
of a housing bubble in August 2002. In June 2005, Robert Shiller warned that
“The market is in the throes of a bubble of unprecedented proportions that prob-
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ably will end ugly”.5 He also argues that house prices could drop by up to 50%
in the next decade. In August 2005, Paul Krugman pointed out the existence
of a housing bubble in the coasts-areas due to a combination of high population
density and land-use restrictions.6 During the Economic Club Meeting of New
York in 2005, Alan Greenspan concluded that: “we don’t perceive that there
is a national bubble, but it’s hard not to see that there are a lot of local bub-
bles”. However, Ben Bernanke argued that “house price increases largely reflect
strong economic fundamentals including robust growth in jobs and incomes, low
mortgage rates, steady rates of household formation, and factors that limit the
expansion of housing supply in some areas”.7
The majority of studies in the literature focus on some recent bubble episodes
using short time series. In particular, most house price indices exist for a few
decades. This thesis attempts to investigate explosive behavior using very long
historical house price series for Amsterdam (1649-2010), Norway (1819-2014) and
Paris (1650-2012). There are several financial bubbles and crises associated with
these house price data, for example, the Amsterdam Banking Crisis of 1763, the
Credit Crisis of 1772, the Kristiana Crisis of 1899-1905 and the Scandinavian crisis
of 1984-1992 in Norway, the Crises of 1763 and 1772 in French. Theses house price
series are therefore ideal candidates to apply recent bubble detection procedure
to search for housing bubbles and potential contagion across different financial
markets.
It has been shown that the Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015, PSY) procedure can
effectively detect the presence of multiple bubbles. There have been no empirical
studies that make use of the PSY testing procedure to test for historical bubbles in
the 18th century. It is not clear whether the PSY test can offer evidence to support
the existence of those well-known bubble episodes. The question may arise here:
5Laing, Jonathan R, “The Bubblels New Home,” Barron’s, 20 June, 2005.
6Krugman, Paul, “That Hissing Sound,” The New York Times, 8 August, 2005
7Bernanke, Ben S., “The Economic Outlook,” Testimony before the Joint Economic Com-
mittee, 20 October, 2005.
4
can the recently developed right-tailed unit root tests detect historical bubbles
during 18th centuries? Hence this thesis will attempt to apply the right-tailed
unit root tests of PSY to seek econometric evidence to support the existence of
the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles. In addition, the share prices of a number
of British financial organisations are also considered during the South Sea episode
in 1720 as these shares also exhibit bubble-like behaviour.
Testing for bubbles in exchange rates is not new to the literature. Several well-
published papers examine the presence of exchange rate bubbles including Huang
(1981), Evans (1986), Meese (1986) and West (1987). For example, Huang (1981)
finds evidence of bubbles in the US Dollar-Sterling, US Dollar-Mark, and Sterling-
Mark exchange rates from March 1973 to March 1979 using the variance bounds
test of Shiller (1980) and Leroy and Porter (1981). Evans (1986) presents ev-
idence to support the presence of bubbles in the Sterling-Dollar exchange rate
between 1981 and 1984. Similarly, Meese (1986) provided evidence of bubbles for
the Dollar-Deutsche Mark and Sterling-Dollar exchange rate using the monthly
data between 1973 and 1982. However, the conclusions drawn from West (1987)
indicate no evidence of bubbles in the US Dollar-Mark exchange rate during the
period 1974 to 1984. These classic studies on exchange rate bubbles focus on
developed countries only. This thesis will, therefore, seek to identify the existence
of bubbles in some G10 and a range of emerging markets countries (including
some Asian and the BRICS). By selecting such a wide range of countries, this
thesis consider whether exchange rate bubbles might be more likely to arise in
certain countries (perhaps those with less well developed trading relationships or
those where governments retain a role in trading behavior), rather than in the
developed countries including the UK and US.
The US house price bubble during the 2000s is also considered in this study as
it is one of the most recent bubble episodes. This thesis finds that the PSY
testing procedure seems to identify false-positive bubbles under the regression
model specification with an intercept. Empirical results from the US regional
5
house prices seem to be in agreement with the talk given by Alan Greenspan in
2005, who argued that there was no sign of a nationwide housing bubble but a lot
of local bubbles.
Financial bubbles are often related to spillover effects. Another key area to analyse
is therefore market migration. This thesis will examine the existence of Japan’s
asset price bubble in its most inflated stock and real estate markets of the 1980s-
90s. A a two-step testing procedure is adopted in this thesis to consider bubble
migration effects. The PSY method is complemented by a new time-varying
regression methodology of Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016) for analysing
market contagion across markets. A striking feature of this great bubble is that
Japan experiences at least two types of asset bubbles involving stocks and real
estate, unlike most financial bubbles, which seem to relate a single type of asset
bubble. As Japan experience speculative growth in stock and real estate markets,
it seems an ideal candidate to examine evidence of bubble spillovers. This thesis
demonstrates, for the first time in the literature, signs of bubble migration from
Japan’s stock market to its real estate market. We show this by using two new
econometric tools.
Another area closely related to bubbles is to examine the long-run equilibrium rela-
tionship between asset prices and fundamentals. There have been many empirical
studies on the US housing market based on cointegration analysis, for example,
Gallin (2006), Mikhed and Zemč́ık (2009), Zhou (2010), Clark and Coggin (2011)
and Duca et al. (2011). Cointegration between house prices and fundamentals
is also important for understanding house price dynamics. The presence of coin-
tegration between house prices and fundamentals would imply convergence to a
stable long-run equilibrium relationship. In other words, cointegration would in-
dicate whether a temporary run-up or drop in house prices can eventually back
to the equilibrium. Many studies attempt to explore whether US house prices
reflect their economic fundamentals using cointegration analysis. However, the
existing studies are mainly based on conditional mean based cointegration anal-
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ysis and do not reach a firm conclusion. This thesis will re-visit the hypothesis
between US house prices and the relevant economic fundamentals using the re-
cently proposed linear and non-linear quantile cointegration models. Conventional
cointegration approaches focus on the conditional mean behaviour. Apart from
the mean, other locations in the distribution affect the cointegration analysis.
The estimated relationship from conventional cointegration approaches assumes
to be held at the mean and even in the tails. This thesis will formally test for the
long-run cointegration relationship at each of the quantiles by using formal test-
ing procedures of the linear and non-linear quantile ARDL based models for the
first time in the literature. By applying the linear and non-linear quantile autore-
gressive distributed-lag models of Cho et al. (2015) and Greenwood-Nimmo et al.
(2011), quantile cointegration models allow us to study the entire conditional dis-
tribution of the dependent variable (US housing market) compared with those of
conditional mean-based cointegration models. As the housing market is the core
focus, we may interpret the conditional distribution of housing market with lower
quantiles (at a relatively low price level) as a bear market, the median quantiles
as the normal phase of the market, and the upper quantiles (at a relatively high
price level) as a bull market.
1.2 Background and Research Questions
Speculation in the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles seem to behave in a similar
way. In particular, speculation in these historical events involved a company (the
Mississippi Company and the South Sea Company) that expanded its balance
sheet through corporate takeovers or acquisition of government debt, financed by
successive issues of shares (Garber, 1990). The motivation of the Mississippi and
the South Sea schemes was to refinance the national debts accumulated during
the War of the Spanish Succession, see Hamilton (1947) and Dickson (1967). The
Mississippi bubble is an economic bubble that resulted from John Law’s ‘system’.
Law developed and adopted a ‘system’ to take over the French national debt
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accumulated by the wars of Louis XIV by using equity. The share price of the
Mississippi Company soared to more than 10,000 livres per share by December
1719 and dropped significantly in 1720.
The South Sea Company was first founded in 1711. The South Sea Bubble also
involved the South Sea Company that acquired some outstanding British gov-
ernment debt in 1720. However, the South Sea Company was not involved in
takeovers of commercial companies. According to Garber (1990), the British debt
in 1720 was worth approximately £50 million and £18.3 million of the debt was
held by three of the largest companies: the Bank of England (£3.4 million), East
India Company (£3.2 million) and South Sea Company (£11.7 million). In 1720,
the South Sea Company had monopoly rights on British trade with the Spanish
colonies of South America. The South Sea Company, Bank of England, and East
India Company played a major role in the South Sea Bubble as they engaged in
the debt-for-equity swap. The Bank of England was founded in 1694. The Bank
was the first permanent stock and the longest-lived security in the London Stock
Exchange (Neal, 1990). According to Carlos et al. (2006), Bank of England shares
were one of few publicly available securities, and shares are reorganised as a sta-
ble asset as they are the least speculative during 1720. The original East India
Company was founded in 1600 with a royal charter, and it became a permanent
joint-stock company in 1657. The new East India Company was established in
1698. The old and new companies were merged by 1709.
In this thesis, I will also consider those British companies that were not involved
in the debt-equity swap (e.g., London Assurance, Million Bank, the Royal African
Company and the Royal Exchange Assurance). The Million Bank was founded
in 1695 and held a large number of securities. A review of the Million Bank is
provided by Scott (1911). The Royal African Company received a Royal charter
in 1672 and then became the second largest of the joint-stock companies after
the East India Company (Carlos et al., 2002). The company had the monopoly
of English trade in Africa and engaged in the slave trade, but was not involved
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in the financing of the national debt. In 1720, the company issued stock that
rose quickly in value. One of the innovations in 1720 was the establishment of
marine insurance companies-Royal Exchange Assurance and London Assurance.
The early growth of the British insurance industry is completed by the establish-
ment of two insurance companies in 1720 along with their powers to include fire
and life insurance in 1721 (Supple, 1970). Both insurance companies founded in
1720 are a major innovation in sharing-risk for foreign trade. The creation of the
Royal Exchange Assurance is important not only in the development of insur-
ance in the British history but also the share market in Britain. Such a company
was needed to provide a secure service for the marine trade. The growth of the
London insurance market was associated with the marked expansion of English
foreign trade during the second half of the seventeenth century; and forms part of
that remarkable period of financial activity culminating in the South Sea Bubble
(John, 1958). Marine insurance played a vital role in facilitating the expansion of
trade during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Kingston, 2007).
One of the most researched topics in bubbles is the US real estate market. There
are two periods of extreme movements in US house price during the 1980s and
2000s as suggested by Mayer (2011). House prices firstly rose and later plum-
meted in many US regions during the 1980s. Consequently, the boom-bust cycles
occurred in California, Boston, Hawaii and New York, for example, Case (1986),
Case and Shiller (1988), Case (1994) and Case and Shiller (1994). The second pe-
riod of boom-bust cycles in the 2000s seems to be more widespread. The real US
house prices increased by 5% per year between 1996 and 2006, and then dropped
by 6.4% per year from 2007 to 2012 (Glaeser et al., 2017). A falling interest rate,
income growth and reduced lending standards are generally considered as causes
of the recent cycles, see Case and Shiller (2003) and McCarthy and Peach (2004).
There has been considerable debate over the existence of a housing bubble in the
2000s by several prominent economists. Therefore, a number of studies investi-
gate the US housing bubbles during the 2000s, for example, see Case and Shiller
(2003), McCarthy and Peach (2004), Himmelberg et al. (2005) and Martin (2011).
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Japan’s asset price bubble is commonly referred as one of the greatest bubble
episodes in recent history. There has been an unprecedented rise in Japan’s land,
real estate and stock prices. According to Malkiel (2003, p.77), the value of real
estate and stocks increased over 75 and 100 times from 1955 to 1990. There
are two ’myths’ attributed to the inflated Japanese real estate and stock market
that are of particular interest. These myths formed during a period where these
markets were undergoing extraordinary increases in price levels. The first myth
been that land prices could never fall; the second that stock prices could only rise.
Both myths were fuelled by large amounts of cash savings (Malkiel, 2003, p.78).
It is widely accepted that both markets are characterised by bubble-like be-
haviours, see, for example, Hardouvelis (1988), Lee (1995), French and Poterba
(1991), and Chirinko and Schaller (2001). As discussed in Okina et al. (2001), the
Nikkei 225 reached a historical high of 38,130 in December 1989 from a start of
12,598 in September 1985, and then dropped sharply to 14,309 in August 1992,
which represented a more than 60% decline from the peak. When we consider
land prices in September 1990, they were around four times higher than the level
in September 1985, only to drop in 1999 by approximately 80% from the peak in
1990. The bursting of ‘double bubbles’ in Japan’s stock and real estate markets
led to a decade of economic stagnation with large amounts of government debt.
The aftermath of economic stagnation in the 1990s after the bursting of Japanese
asset price bubble is commonly referred to as “the Lost Decade”. Consequently,
Japan experiences slow economic growth, deflation and output persistently below
potential during “the Lost Decade”, see Kuttner and Posen (2001), Hayashi and
Prescott (2002), Hoshi and Kashyap (2004) and Horioka (2006).
In summary, the thesis will consider the following research questions:
1. Are there bubbles in exchange rates?
(a) Are exchange rate bubbles more likely to arise in emerging countries
or developed countries?
(b) Are results sensitive to model specification of methods used?
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2. Do historical house prices in Amsterdam, Norway and Paris exhibit bubbles
or explosive behavior?
(a) Can long memory models detect the presence of bubbles or explosive
behavior?
(b) Do financial bubbles/crises spill-over into local or national markets?
(c) Do housing bubbles coincide with major financial crises in Norwegian
history?
3. Is there evidence of real estate bubbles in the US during the 1980s and
2000s?
(a) Does the US experience a national housing bubble during the 2000s?
(b) Is the 2000s housing bubble more widespread than the 1980s housing
bubble?
4. Can the recently developed right-tailed unit root test identify historical stock
market bubbles - the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles?
(a) Do a number of other 18th century financial organisations in Britain
also experience bubble-like behaviour during the South Sea Bubble?
(b) Do bubbles spill-over?
5. Did bubbles exist in Japan’s stock and real estate markets in the 1980-90s?
(a) Do Japanese asset price bubbles migrate from the stock market to the
housing market or vice versa?
6. Do US house prices reflect economic fundamentals?
(a) Is there a linear or non-linear long-run equilibrium relationship between
house prices and economic fundamentals at the national and regional
levels based on conventional cointegration tests?
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(b) Is there a linear or non-linear long-run equilibrium relationship between
house prices and economic fundamentals at the national and regional
levels based on recently developed quantile cointegration models?
1.3 Significance and Contribution to the Research
This thesis has made several key contributions to the literature.
 Firstly, this thesis provides econometric-based evidence of several well-known
bubble using the recent econometric tests.
– This thesis first revisits the existence of exchange rate bubbles in both
developed and emerging market countries using newly developed bub-
ble detection methods due to Phillips et al. (2015). The main findings
seem to suggest that newly emerging countries are more likely to ex-
hibit exchange rate bubbles due to shallow markets or loose monetary
policy. Moreover, there is little evidence to support exchange rate bub-
bles in G10 countries.
– This thesis tests for housing bubbles or explosive behavior in historical
house price series of Amsterdam, Norway and Paris. Little evidence
of exuberance is found in the Amsterdam and Paris data. Of particu-
lar interest is that, evidence of exuberance is identified in Norwegian
house prices. The identified episodes coincide with major financial
crises in Norwegian history at the national and city levels. Both the
long memory models and PSY approaches are used for identifying ex-
plosive behavior or bubbles.
– The US real estate market is generally believed to be contain a bub-
ble episode especially during the 2000s. This thesis concentrates on
the US regional housing market between 1975 and 2014 with several
aims. First, a major focus is to examine evidence for housing bub-
ble(s) during the 1980s with particular emphasis on the States of Cal-
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ifornia, Hawaii, Massachusetts and New York. Several other studies,
for example, Case and Shiller (1988), Case and Shiller (1994), Case
and Shiller (2003), Wheelock et al. (2006) consider US house price
booms and busts or bubbles during the 1980s. However, most of these
studies describe or graphically inspect some house price measure (e.g.,
house price, price-income ratio or price-rent ratio) without applying
any econometric tests. Thus this study aims to fill the gap by provid-
ing econometric-based evidence of housing bubbles during the 1980s.
This research also provides evidence to support the well-documented
housing bubbles in the 2000s. Empirical results present evidence of a
housing bubble in more than 20 states and the District of Columbia,
during a period of speculation from the early 2000s to mid-2000s. It
seems that the bubble of the 2000s is not a national phenomenon, but
is more widespread than the 1980s. This conclusion seems to be the
first empirical study to make a comparison in terms of their magnitude
and coverage between the regional housing bubbles in the 1980s with
the recent regional bubbles in the 2000s, which also contributes to the
novelty of this study. Third, the importance of regression model formu-
lation highlighted in Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2014) is also demonstrated
by exploring the role of the intercept in the regression model of Phillips,
Shi, and Yu (2015). Based upon the model specification with an in-
tercept, the testing procedure can identify ‘collapse’ episodes, ‘collapse
and recovery’ episodes and the potential bubbles. Whereas without an
intercept in the regression model leads to identification of no ‘collapse’
episodes and ‘collapse and recovery’ episodes. An important finding
under the regression model specification without the intercept in this
thesis is that several States do not exhibit any bubble-like behaviors
for the whole sample period.
– The most important findings is that for the first time in the literature,
robust and powerful econometric-based evidence is found to support
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the existence of a South Sea bubble, using the right-tailed unit root
tests of PSY. A number of other 18th century financial organisations
in Britain are also considered during the South Sea episode and several
significant results are presented. The South Sea Company experiences
the first bubble-like behaviour in the British market. Furthermore,
the South Sea episode is not the first one to burst and it lasts the
longest period. Several other British share prices also exhibit bubble-
like behaviour (e.g., East India Company, London Assurance, Million
Bank, the Royal African Company and the Royal Exchange Assurance).
There is little evidence of bubble-like behaviour for the Bank of England
as it is widely treated as the least speculative stock among the major
joint-stock companies. These results seem to suggest that the British
share market was generally much more speculative during the South
Sea episode than was previously thought, as the South Sea Company
was not the only one experiencing bubble-like behaviour in its share
prices. It seems to suggest that the South Sea episode does spillover
to other British share prices.
– This thesis revisits the well-documented Japanese asset price bubble
period with a particular focus on its irrationally exuberant stock and
real estate markets using an appropriate bubble detection test. Em-
pirical results present significant evidence of bubbles in Japan’s stock
price-earnings and house price-rent ratios. The timing of the origina-
tion and collapse dates of both stock and real estate bubbles coincide
with the traditional view of Japan’s asset price bubble for the pe-
riod 1980s-90s. Such a finding is a useful addition to the literature
for the most remarkable financial events in Japan’s history, as it pro-
vides, for the first time, econometric-based evidence to support the
existence of bubbles in Japanese asset prices from the late 1980s to
early 1990s, which rose to extraordinary heights. Furthermore, using a
recently developed time-varying regression based contagion methodol-
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ogy of Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016) to examine evidence of
bubble spillovers between Japan’s stock and real estate markets during
the Japanese bubble economy period for the first time in a rigorous
approach. The contagion results clearly show signs of migration from
a stock price bubble to a real estate bubble, which is an addition to
the literature. This finding may help to understand why the real estate
bubble bursts after the stock price bubble as the bubble-like behaviour
from the stock market not only migrates to, but fuels, the booming
real estate market as well.
 Secondly, this thesis provides empirical guidelines for practitioners using the
most popular PSY tests based on two model specifications (e.g., intercept
vs. no intercept).
– This thesis explores the relationship between model specification and
the probability of a false positive, and discusses the advantages and
disadvantages of the two specifications. Phillips et al. (2014) argue
that without an intercept from the ADF regression inflates the prob-
ability of a false positive. They, therefore, recommend the regression
specification with an intercept in practice. Under the assumption of
an intercept in the regression, this specification certainly works well in
many situations. A number of empirical papers follow this suggestion.
However, in some cases, this specification also leads to a false positive
identification of bubbles. The following section describes the pros and
cons of the two approaches.
Advantage of “with an intercept”
* Under the specification with an intercept, the PSY procedure has
shown great power in detecting multiple bubbles by a wide range
of empirical studies.
Disadvantage of “with an intercept”
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* The PSY approach could detect some collapse episodes rather than
a (positive) bubble. On page 156, Figure 1 in Chapter 5 presents
the date-stamping outcomes based on the model “with an inter-
cept”. An example of ‘collapse episode’ and ‘collapse and recovery
episode’ can be seen in Figure 1(a) and Figure 1(b). As can be
seen from both figures, the PSY approach cannot distinguish be-
tween a ‘collapse episode’ or a ‘collapse and recovery episode’ and
a genuine ‘bubble’.
* The PSY approach is also applied to the Mississippi share prices
and results are presented as Figure 2a on page 189 in Chapter 6.
The null hypothesis of no explosive behaviour is rejected at the 1%
level. However, upon closer inspection, the rejection is caused by
a ‘collapse and recovery’ episode.
* Overall, the inclusion of an intercept could increase the probability
of an incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis (false positive) by
detecting a collapse episode or a collapse and recovery episode.
Advantage of “without an intercept”
* The PSY approach is applied to a house price-income ratio in
Nevada based on two specifications, see Figure 6(e) on page 162
and Figure 7(e) on page 163 in Chapter 5. The results from Fig-
ure 6(e) based on the model with an intercept are spurious as
some collapse episodes are identified. It seems that the specifica-
tion “without an intercept” works well if data exhibits a steady
downward trend like Figure 7(e) as the PSY approach does not
detect collapse episodes any more.
Disadvantage of “without an intercept”
* It seems that the specification “without an intercept” does not
work well if data exhibits an upward trend, for example see Fig-
ure 11b on page 91 and Figure 13b on page 94 in Chapter 3. This
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specification does not always provide “correct” results as the re-
sults may be spurious.
General comments of the two approaches
* Both the two approaches could increase the probability of an incor-
rect rejection of the null hypothesis. Neither of the two approaches
uniformly dominates the other in terms of inflating the risk of a
false positive. More importantly, it is necessary to carry out post-
test checking for collapse episodes/ collapse and recovery episodes.
 Thirdly, this thesis shows how to formally test for quantile coinetgration
using two ARDL models.
– This thesis employs both conditional mean- and quantial-based coin-
tegration models to examine a long-run equilibrium relationship be-
tween US house prices and economic fundamentals at the national and
selected state levels. A key contribution to the literature is that for-
mal cointegration testing procedures for two quantile ARDL models
of Cho et al. (2015) and Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2011) are utilised.
Cho et al. (2015) extends Pesaran and Shin’s (1998) autoregressive
distributed-lag approach into quantile regression, resulting in a new
quantile autoregressive distributed-lag (QARDL) model. Similarly,
Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2011) also develop a non-linear autoregres-
sive distributed-lag quantile (NARDL-Q) regression model, which is
extended from the non-linear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL)
model by Shin et al. (2014). However, a formal cointegration testing
mechanism that could address the existence of the long run cointe-
gration relationship at each quantile is not provided by Cho et al.
(2015) and Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2011). The research presented
here makes use of the t-test and Wald test to jointly test for quantile
cointegration at each of the quantile. The first testing procedure of
Banerjee et al. (1998) is to carry out a t-test. The second testing pro-
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cedure is a Wald test, which is used to test for quantile cointegration
based on asymptotic theory. This research formally tests for the long
run cointegration relationship at each of quantiles by two formal test-
ing procedures of linear and non-linear quantile ARDL based models
for the first time in the literature. Several interesting findings are pre-
sented using the US evidence. The US national house prices are not
cointegrated with economic fundamentals using both conditional mean-
and quantile ARDL based models. The empirical results also suggest
that the cointegration relationship may be absent at the conditional
mean-based model, but it may be established at the quantile based
model. Under some instances, the cointegration may be established
based on the conditional mean model, but there is no overwhelming
evidence of cointegration based on a quantile model. Additionally, it is
also possible to identify a cointegration relationship at the conditional
mean and the relationship may also be held for the whole conditional
distribution by quantile models.
1.4 Thesis Outline
This section overviews the outline of this thesis, which is made up of nine chapters.
Each of the chapters in this thesis is briefly described as follows.
Chapter 1 provides the overview of this thesis and discusses background and
research questions, and the major contributions of the study.
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework and existing studies of financial
bubbles. This chapter begins with a definition and description of a financial
bubble. A particular focus of this chapter is to re-visit empirical studies on US
stock market based on various approaches as the US stock market is one of the
most researched topics on bubbles.
Chapter 3 examines exchange rate bubbles for some G10 and a range of emerging
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markets countries including some Asian and the BRICS. The selection of sample
countries considers whether exchange rate bubbles might be more likely to occur
in certain countries (perhaps those with less well developed trading relationships
or those where governments retain a role in trading behavior), rather than in the
developed countries. Of particular interest to financial market trading, is that
newly emerging countries, with relatively shallow financial markets, may be more
likely to exhibit bubbly behavior in foreign exchange markets than more mature
G10 countries.
Chapter 4 explores evidence of explosive behavior in several historical housing
price indices, in particular, the Herengracht index for Amsterdam (1649-2010),
Norway (1819-2014) and Paris (1650-2012) using the PSY procedure and long
memory models of Geweke and Porter-Hudak (1983), Robinson (1995) and Shi-
motsu (2010). In particular, this chapter also tests whether historical bubbles/crises
spill-over to local or national housing markets. In addition, several major Nor-
wegian cities are considered in this study including Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim and
Kristiansand.
Chapter 5 examines the presence of bubbles in the US real estate markets at the
state level for the period 1975-2014. One of the most empirically investigated
economic phenomena on the subject of bubbles has been the potential bubble-like
behavior in the US housing markets. A number of empirical studies in the litera-
ture suggest that the US market is widely regarded as one of the most speculative
housing markets in the world as the US market experienced several period of spec-
ulation in history. This chapter makes a comparison in terms of their magnitude
and coverage between the regional housing bubbles in the 1980s with the recent
regional bubbles in the 2000s.
Chapter 6 investigates bubble-like behaviour in historical stock prices during the
Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles in the 18th century. Of particular interest is
that, these two bubbles are widely believed to be most speculative episodes and
earliest examples in stock markets. In addition, this chapter also investigates a
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number of other 18th century financial organisations in Britain during the 1719-
20, for example, Bank of England, London Assurance, Million Bank, East India
Company, the Royal African Company and the Royal Exchange Assurance. The
timings of these bubble episodes show signs of possible contagion during South
Sea episode.
Chapter 7 investigates Japan’s asset price bubble during its most inflated stock
and real estate markets during this period in history. This chapter also uses
the recently developed time-varying regression based contagion methodology of
Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016) to examine evidence of bubble spillovers
between Japan’s stock and real estate markets during the Japanese bubble econ-
omy period for the first time in a rigours approach. This chapter reviews the
existing empirical work on Japanese bubbles and bubble contagion using various
approaches.
An important question that has been researched extensively in the literature,
is whether US house prices reflect economic fundamentals. Chapter 8 explores
a long-run equilibrium relationship between US house prices and economic fun-
damentals based on both conventional cointegration and quantile cointegration
models. Conventional cointegration approaches focus on the conditional mean
behaviour, which is perhaps not informative (Cho et al., 2015). It is assumed
that the estimated relationship holds at the mean and even in the tails. Apart
from the mean, other locations in the distribution also affect the cointegration
analysis, which is well demonstrated by several empirical studies in the literature
based on quantile regression model of Xiao (2009). Conventional cointegration
tests focus on the conditional mean relationship between variables while quantile
cointegrating models concentrate on a long-run relationship in a range of quan-
tiles. The quantile-based cointegration tests are more informative as they provide
additional information not only at the mean but also in the tails. This chapter
will review the existing quantile cointegration models of Xiao (2009), Kuriyama
(2016), Cho et al. (2015) and Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2011) and the revelent em-
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pirical studies based on these models. Previous studies between US house prices
and fundamentals based on cointegration analysis is also provided. The highlight
of this chapter is that it applies linear and non-linear quantile based cointegration
models to examine a quantile-varying cointegration relationship between house
prices and fundamentals. Two testing procedures for a long-run relationship are
also utilised and described in this chapter. The conclusion drawn from this chap-
ter provides further evidence of a cointegration or non-cointegration relationship
for the national and several key states, which is an additional contribution.
Chapter 9 provides the overall findings of this thesis by way of a concluding
chapter. This chapter also suggests several avenues for future research.
1.5 Note on Publications
A number of journal articles have been produced from this thesis.
1. Hu, Y., & Oxley, L. (2017). Are there bubbles in exchange rates? Some new
evidence from G10 and emerging market economies. Economic Modelling, 64,
419-442.
(This publication is presented as Chapter 3.)
2. Hu, Y., & Oxley, L. (2018). Bubbles in US regional house prices: Evidence
from house price-income ratios at the State level. Applied Economics, 50,
3196-3229.
(This publication is presented as Chapter 5.)
3. Hu, Y., & Oxley, L. (2018). Do 18th century ‘bubbles’ survive the scrutiny of
21st century time series econometrics? Economics Letters, 162 , 131-134.
(This publication is presented as Chapter 6.)
4. Hu, Y., & Oxley, L. (2018). Bubble contagion: Evidence from Japan’s asset
price bubble of the 1980s-90s. Journal of the Japanese and International
Economies, 50, 89-95.
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(This publication is presented as Chapter 7.)
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This chapter reviews the theoretical literature on bubbles; several different types
of bubbles; the key econometric methodologies and the relevant empirical studies
related to bubbles.
2.1 Theoretical Literature on Asset Bubbles
This section briefly summary of the theoretical aspects of bubbles. A summary
of economic theory of asset bubbles can be found in Miao (2014).
Asset bubbles can be generated in overlapping generations models, see Samuelson
(1958). The seminal work of Tirole (1985) studied conditions for the existence
of asset bubbles using an overlapping generations model with inelastic labor sup-
ply. Tirole (1985) showed that asset bubbles can occur only if the economy is
dynamically inefficient if there is an overaccumulation of capital. The criterion of
dynamic efficiency in Tirole’s (1985) work is introduced by Cass (1972).
Similarly, Weil (1987) suggested a model of stochastic bubbles using the same
framework as Tirole (1985), and derived even stronger conditions for the existence
of bubbles. If the economy is dynamically inefficient, stochastic bubbles exist only
if the probability that they will persist next period is high. Weil (1987) also proved
that the smaller the size of the inefficiency, the higher the required probability that
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the bubble would persist. Apart from the above mentioned studies, Several other
studies on overlapping generations models of bubbles are worth of special mention
here including Caballero et al. (2006), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), Arce
and López-Salido (2011) and Gaĺı (2014).
Santos and Woodford (1997) also provided an intertemporal competitive equilib-
rium framework and established conditions for the non-existence of bubbles. Asset
bubbles cannot exist in equilibrium with agents facing borrowing constraints if as-
sets are in strictly positive supply and the present value of total future resources
is finite.
Apart from the literature on overlapping generations models of bubbles, infinite-
horizon models are also utilised to study bubbles. Kocherlakota (1992) and
Kocherlakota (2008) are two excellent papers on bubbles based on infinite-horizon
models. In particular, asset bubbles cannot be eliminated if some portfolio con-
straints can be introduced to limit the agents’ arbitrage opportunities. Both
papers study endowment economies to understand the asset pricing bubbles. Sev-
eral papers study infinite-horizon models of production economies with bubbles,
see Miao and Wang (2012), Wang and Wen (2012) and Miao and Wang (2014).
2.2 Types of Bubbles
2.2.1 Rational Bubbles
The following section draws on Campbell et al. (1997). The net return on a stock
may be given as:
Rt+1 =
Pt+1 − Pt +Dt+1
Pt
, (2.1)
where Rt+1 denotes the return on the stock held from time t to time t + 1; Pt
denotes the price of a share of stock measured at the end of period t, or equivalently
an ex-dividend price; Dt+1 is the next period’s dividend.
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It is important to assume that the expected stock return is equal to a constant R:
Et(Rt+1) = R, (2.2)
where Et denotes expectations conditional on information at time t.
Taking the expectation of Equation (2.1) based on available information at period





Taking expectations of Equation (2.1), imposing Equation (2.2), and re-arranging,








Equation (2.4) is also known as an “expectational difference equation”. It can be
solved forward by repeatedly substituting out future prices and using the Law of
Iterated Expectations - Et [Et+1 [X]] = Et [X] to eliminate future-dated expecta-



















The second term on the right-hand side of Equation (2.5) is the expected dis-
counted value of the stock price K periods from the present. Assuming that this











Letting K increases in Equation (2.5), and the convergence assumption of Equa-
tion (2.6) holds. Then the expected present value, which is also the stock funda-
mental price (P ft ), may be expressed as the expected discounted value of future
dividends, discounted at a constant rate, which is presented as Equation (2.7):












Equation (2.7) shows that the stock price must be equal to the expected present
value of future dividends.
If the convergence assumption of Equation (2.6) does not hold, there is no unique
solution to Equation (2.4). In other words, if we relax this assumption, then the









. The second term Bt in Equation (2.8) is often called a
rational bubble. In rational bubble models, the price, therefore, includes the fun-
damental component (P ft ) and the bubble component (Bt). Several key empirical
studies related to rational bubbles are summarised as Table 2.1 below.
2.2.2 Periodically Collapsing Bubbles
A very important class of rational bubbles is known as periodically collapsing
bubbles. Evans (1991) defines the following rational bubbles that are always
positive but periodically collapse:
Bt+1 = (1 + r)Btut+1, if Bt ≤ α (2.9)
Bt+1 =
[
δ + π−1(1 + r)θt+1 × (Bt − (1 + r)−1δ)
]
ut+1, if Bt > α (2.10)
where δ and α are positive parameters with 0 < δ < (1+r)α, ut+1 is an exogenous
independently and identically distributed positive random variable with EtUt+1 =
1, and θt+1 is an exogenous independently and identically distributed Bernoulli
process (independent of u) which takes the value 1 with probability π and 0 with
probability 1− π, where 0 < π ≤ 1.
When Bt ≤ α, the bubble grows at mean rate 1 + r. When Bt > α, the bubble
shifts into a phase in which it grows at the faster mean rate (1 + r)π−1 while the
bubble collapses with probability 1 − π. When the bubble collapses, it falls to a

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Periodically collapsing bubbles are not detectable by conventional unit root and
cointegration tests. Table 2.2 below summaries several empirical studies related
to the periodically collapsing bubbles of Evans (1991).
2.2.3 Intrinsic Bubbles
Froot and Obstfeld (1991) argue that US stock prices may be explained by the
presence a specific type of rational bubble that depends exclusively on dividends
(fundamentals). An intrinsic bubble solely relies on fundamentals alone, these
bubbles will remain constant over time for a given level of fundamentals. Froot
and Obstfeld (1991) also state that these intrinsic bubbles can cause asset prices
to overreact to changes in fundamentals.
The following section is based upon Froot and Obstfeld (1991). Suppose that log
dividends are generated by the geometric martingale:
dt+1 = µ+ dt + ξt+1, (2.11)
where µ is the trend growth in dividends. dt is the log of dividends at time t, and
ξt+1 is a normal random variable with conditional mean zero and variance σ
2.
Assuming that period-t dividends are known when Pt is set, the present-value
stock price is directly proportional to dividends:
P pwt = κDt, (2.12)
where κ = (er − eµ+σ2/2)−1 and r is a real interest rate.
Equation (2.12) is essentially a stochastic version of Myron Gordon’s (1962) model
of stock prices, where P pwt = (e
r − eµ)−1Dt. Equation (2.12) also requires r >
µ+ σ2/2.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































where λ is the positive root of the quadratic equation λ2σ2/2 + λµ− r = 0 and c
is an arbitrary constant.
The basic stock price equation is now given as:
P (Dt) = P
pw
t +B(Dt) = κDt + cD
λ
t , (2.14)
Equation (2.14) contains a bubble B(Dt) (for c 6= 0). P (Dt) is a function of
dividends only and does not depend on time or any other extraneous variable.
B(Dt) is an example of an intrinsic bubble. Several empirical studies related to
the intrinsic bubbles of Froot and Obstfeld (1991) are reported in Table 2.3 below.
2.2.4 Speculative Bubbles
Flood and Garber (1982) consider a persistent deviation of stock prices from
the path determined by these fundamentals. Such deviations, if induced by self-
fulfilling expectations, are called speculative bubbles. Harrison and Kreps (1978)
argue that “investors exhibit speculative behavior if the right to resell a stock
makes them willing to pay more for it than they would pay if obliged to hold






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.3 Bubble Detection Methods
This section discusses existing bubble detection approaches in the literature. Var-
ious bubble testing procedures have been developed, see Gürkaynak (2008) for a
survey.
2.3.1 Variance Bounds Tests
The earliest work on testing for a bubble is the variance bounds test introduced
by Shiller (1981) and Leroy and Porter (1981). Such tests were initially designed
for assessing the reliability of the present value model. The market fundamental





































The variance bounds test relies on the assumption of:














Equation (2.18) places an upper bound on the variance of the observed price and
suggests that the variance of the ex post rational price should be no smaller than
the variance of observed prices. A violation of the variance bound indicates the
presence of bubbles.
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2.3.2 West’s Two-Step Tests
West (1987a) proposed a simultaneous test for both model specification and bub-
bles by using a three-equation model. The first equation is related to Euler equa-
tions with no-arbitrage condition, which yields the discount rate. The second
equation describes the dividend process by an ARIMA model. The third is used
for checking the existence of bubbles. When such a procedure is applied to US
stock data for 1871-1980, the test rejects the no bubble hypothesis.
The following notation is adopted from Gürkaynak (2008). Suppose that dividends
are exogenous and follow a stationary AR(1) process of the form:
Dt = φDt−1 + u
D
t , (2.19)
















The actual price may consist of a bubble Bt. Pt is the sum of the market funda-
mental price, which is given as:
Pt = βDt +Bt. (2.21)
If a bubble exists, which is correlated with dividends, the estimate of β in Equa-
tion (2.21) is biased. If dividends can be represented by an autoregressive (AR)
process, the relationship between dividends and stock prices can be estimated us-
ing Equation (2.19) and Equation (2.21). This is a test under the null hypothesis
that when there are no bubbles, the actual relationship will not differ from the
constructed fundamental prices, i.e., β = β̄.
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If a Hausman coefficient restriction test rejects the equality of β̄ and a estimate
of β indicates the presence of a bubble.
2.3.3 Unit Root/Cointegration Based Tests
Cointegration tests also play an important role in detecting bubbles. Many dif-
ferent cointegration based tests have been applied to examine the phenomenon of
bubbles. One way of detecting bubbles is to use the residual-based cointegration
tests to investigate the presence of bubbles. These approaches commonly apply
the unit root tests to the residuals from the regression of the stock prices and
dividends. If the residual has a unit root, then the stock prices and dividends are
not cointegrated. In other words, the occurrence of bubbles implies that there is
no long run relationship between stock prices and dividends. Hence, if stock prices
and dividends are cointegrated, which may be taken as evidence of the absence
of bubbles. Similarly, another approach to examine the existence of bubbles is to
investigate the dividend-price ratio by unit root tests. A unit root of the dividend-
price ratio implies the existence of bubbles. Such a test may be interpreted as a
way to explore the long-run relationship between stock prices and dividends.
As discussed in Lim and Phoon (1991), the following relationship between stock




where Pt is the real stock price, Ft is the fundamental valuation of the stock at
time t, Bt is the rational bubble.
The fundamental valuation of P ft is based on the anticipated stock dividend
stream. P ft can be written as βdt + θt + υt, where β is the discount factor on
an infinite series of constant expected dividend at time t, θt is a discounted sum
of expected dividend changes, and υt is the present value of other unobserved
market fundamentals. Then the cointegrating model of stock price and dividends
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can then be written as:
Pt − βdt = Bt + θt + υt (2.22)
If the unobservable variables in the market fundamentals are stationary in lev-
els, and dividends are stationary in first-difference, then the linear combination
Pt − βdt is stationary if the bubble Bt does not exist. Pt and dt are cointegrated
with cointegrating vector (1,−β) if θt and υt stationary and Bt is zero. There-
fore, a long-run cointegration relationship between asset prices and fundamentals
indicates the existence of (rational) bubbles.
2.3.4 Long Memory Models
A number of studies apply long memory models to test for stock price bubbles,
for example see Koustas and Serletis (2005), Cuñado et al. (2005) and Cuñado
et al. (2012). The presence of long memory in a series can be estimated by the
long memory parameter d. Different semi-parametric and parametric methods
have been proposed to estimate d in the literature.
Inferences on bubbles are based from the estimated value of persistence parameter,
d, of the price-fundamental ratio. The bubble-like behavior in asset prices can be
tested using the estimated values of the fractional integrating parameter, d, of the
(log) price-fundamental ratio.
 If 0 ≤ d ≤ 0.5, the series is covariance-stationary and mean reverting,
implying no rational bubbles.
 If 0.5 ≤ d ≤ 1, the series is non-stationary and mean reverting process,
implying no rational bubbles.
 If d ≥ 1, the series is a non-stationary explosive and not mean-reversion
process, implying rational bubbles.
Hence, the value of d then shows the presence or absence of a bubble in the series.
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2.3.5 Phillips Type Right-tailed Unit Root Tests
The recent development in right-tailed unit root tests of Phillips, Wu, and Yu
(2011, PWY) and Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015, PSY) has shown great power in
detecting financial bubbles.
PWY approach
A highlight of the Phillips, Wu, and Yu’s (2011) approach is the ability to capture
the characteristics of periodically collapsing bubbles by Evans (1991), and the
PWY is effective in detecting a single bubble episode. The testing procedure is
known as the SADF test and is implemented as follows. For each time series
xt, we apply the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for a unit root against
the alternative of an explosive root (right-tailed). The following autoregressive
specification for xt is estimated by least squares:
xt = µx + δxt−1 +
J∑
j=1
φj∆xt−j + εx,t, εx,t ∼ NID(0, σ2x), (2.23)
for some given value of the lag parameter J, where NID denotes independent and
normally distributed. The null hypothesis of this test is H0 : δ = 1 and the al-
ternative hypothesis is H1 : δ > 1. The above equation is estimated repeatedly
using subsets of the sample data incremented by one additional observation at
each pass in the forward recursive regression. Thus the SADF test is constructed
by repeatedly estimating the ADF test. Let rw be the window size of the regres-
sion. The window size rw(rw = r2 − r1) expands from r0 to 1, where r0 is the
smallest sample window width fraction and 1 is the largest window fraction (the
full sample). The starting point r1 is fixed at 0, and the end point of each sample
(r2) equals rw and changes from r0 to 1. The ADF statistic for a sample that runs
from 0 to r2 is therefore denoted by ADF
r2
0 . The SADF statistic is defined as the
sup value of the ADF statistic sequence:
SADF (r0) = sup
r2∈[r0,1]
ADF r20 .
The SADF test statistic cannot locate the ordination and collapse dates of a
bubble. To identify the origin and the collapse dates, we can compare the recursive
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test statistic ADFr against the relevant right-tailed critical values. If re is the


















The ADF statistic and its corresponding critical value are used for dating the
origination and termination dates of a bubble.
Rolling-window approach
Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011) also mention an alternative testing method to detect
the presence of of bubbles-the rolling window approach. The rolling window ap-
proach is used as a robustness check compared with the PWY approach in Phillips,
Wu, and Yu (2011). The feature of this new testing method is that a rolling win-
dow of fixed length is chosen for the whole sample. The ADF test statistic is
calculated over a fixed size rw =r0 for all estimations. The stating point r1 and
ending point r2 are incremented by one observation at each time, yielding an ADF
statistic denoted as ADF r2r1 . The corresponding rolling ADF (RADF) statistic can
be defined as the supremum ADF r2r1 statistic cross all possible windows.
Bubble origination dates (re) and collapse dates (rf ) estimated under the rolling-


















The Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015, PSY) is also extended from an early bubble
detection test of Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011). The PSY test has great power in
detecting the presence of multiple bubbles. The martingale null with an asymp-
totic drift is specified as:
H0 : yt = dT
−η + yt−1 + εt, εt ∼ NID(0, σ2), (2.24)
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where d is a constant, the localizing coefficient η is greater than 1/2 and T is the
sample size. The alternative hypothesis is a mildly explosive process:
H1 : yt = δTyt−1 + εt,
where δT = 1 + cT
−θ with c > 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1).
The following regression model is estimated:
∆yt = α̂ + β̂yt−1 +
k∑
i=1
γ̂i∆yt−i + ε̂t, (2.25)
where α̂ is an intercept and k is optimum lag length.
The generalized sup ADF (GSADF) test relies on repeated estimation of the
ADF test regression model on subsamples of the data in a recursive fashion. The
window size rw expands from r0 to 1, where r0 is the minimum window size. The
end point r2 varies from r0 to 1 and the starting point r1 varies from 0 to r2− r0.
The GSADF statistic is the largest ADF statistic over the range of r1 and r2:




The GSADF test is used for assessing explosive behavior for the entire sample
period, however, it does not provide the origination and termination dates of
identified bubble episodes. In order to provide a real-time monitoring of market
exuberance, we will use the backward SADF (BSADF) test. The BSADF statistic





The BSADF statistic and its corresponding critical value are used for dating the


















2.4 Previous Empirical Studies of Bubbles
Section 2.4 overviews the existing empirical studies testing for bubbles in several
key financial areas including stock, housing and exchange rate markets.
2.4.1 Stock Price Bubbles
There has been increasing interests in exploring the presence of bubbles in stock
markets with the majority of studies concentrating on US evidence.
The Mississippi Bubble and the closely related South Sea Bubble in 1719-20 are
the two most famous and earliest example of stock price bubbles in history. Em-
pirical studies have tested the Mississippi Bubble or the South Sea Bubble as these
episodes have generated considerable interest in the literature. Neal (1990) car-
ries out a statistical analysis using the method of Blanchard and Watson (1982)
and concludes that the Mississippi share price contains a rational bubble from
mid-July 1719 to the end of November 1719 and the South Sea share price con-
tains a rational bubble between 23 February 1720 and 15 June 1720 only. Carlos
et al. (2002) examine the Royal African Company share prices during the South
Sea episode and find no significant evidence to support the existence of a bubble.
They call into question the arguments by Chancellor (2000) that the South Sea
Bubble was the result of mania and speculative excesses. However, Garber (2001)
claims that he provides market fundamental explanations for the three most fa-
mous bubbles: Tulipmania, the Mississippi Bubble and the South Sea Bubble,
which seems to provide no evidence of bubbles for these historical episodes. Velde
(2009) concludes that the Mississippi Company is overvalued.
Japan’s stock market bubble during the 1980-90s is an interesting recent example.
One of the earliest studies on Japan’s stock market is by Hardouvelis (1988), who
uncovers evidence of rational bubbles in stock markets of Japan and the United
States before the October 1987 crash. Ueda (1990) also reports that the sharp
rise in the Japan’s stock market in the 1980s is due to one of the following three
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causes: bubbles, declines in risk premium, and expectation of land price inflation.
An early study of French and Poterba (1991) suggests that accounting differences
cannot explain the doubling of the Japanese price-earnings ratio in 1986 and its
decline in 1990. An empirical model is also suggested by Lee (1995) which de-
composes asset prices into fundamental and non-fundamental bubble components,
which finds significant deviations of the Japanese stock and land prices from the
fundamentals (Japan’s GNP) between 1955 and 1992. Sato (1995) argues that
the low nominal interest rate caused by loose monetary policy contributed to the
1980s stock bubble in Japan. Additionally, Ito and Iwaisako (1996) explore the
behaviour of stock and land prices during Japan’s bubble economy. They argue
that asset price increases from mid-1987 to mid-1989 are in line with the changes
of fundamentals, and the remarkable rise in stock prices in the latter 1989 and
land prices in 1990 are not explained by either fundamentals or rational bub-
bles. Chan et al. (1998) show no overwhelming evidence of bubbles in Japan’s
stock market using the duration dependence and conditional skewness tests of
McQueen and Thorley (1994) based on weekly and monthly stock market index
from January 1975 to April 1994. The findings from Chung and Lee (1998) also
suggest that the deviations from Japanese stock market fundamentals are quite
substantial in the late 1980s, suggesting the existence of a bubble. An influential
paper on Japan’s asset price bubble by Chirinko and Schaller (2001) also provides
evidence to support the existence of a bubble in Japan’s stock market based on
orthogonality tests. Binswanger (2004) also argues that real activity shocks ex-
plain a small proportion of the variation in Japan’s stock price in the 1983-1999.
A Bayesian approach proposed by Asako and Liu (2013) identifies speculative
bubbles in Japan’s stock market from the period May 1979 to January 2010 and
more interestingly, concluding that Japan’s stock market around 1990 was truly
a bubble.
There has been increasing interests in exploring the presence of bubbles in stock
market with the majority of studies focusing on the US stock market. Campbell
and Shiller (1987) test for cointegration relationships between stock price and div-
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idend using US S&P stock index from 1871 to 1986, given that both variables are
stationary in first difference. The proposed cointegration tests used in their paper
are ambiguous as results are mixed. They also find that the choice of discount
rate may have an influence on the cointegration test results, which violates the
assumption of a constant discount rate.
Diba and Grossman (1988) find that there is insufficient evidence to support the
existence of rational bubbles in stock prices. Based on their empirical results,
they conclude that the stock price and dividends are cointegrated and they rule
out the rational bubble in US stock prices.
Craine (1993) applies a standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to the log
dividend-price ratio of S&P 500 data ranging from 1876 to 1988. He found a unit
root in the log dividend-price ratio, which violates the restriction of no rational
bubble.
Han (1996) applies the Canonical Cointegration Regression (CCR) procedure and
Johansen’s maximum likelihood method to investigate the long-run relationship
between the stock price and dividends of US market by testing the present value
model. The results obtained from the CCR procedure are in line with the Jo-
hansen’s ML results and in favour of the presence of rational bubbles.
Lamont (1998) finds evidence in favor of the existence of bubbles of the log
dividend-price ratio in US data using Dickey-Fuller tests. However, the Horvath
and Watson (1995) cointegration tests produce strong cointegration relationship
between prices and dividends. The results obtained from the unit root tests are
not consistent with the results from the cointegration tests.
Koustas and Serletis (2005) utilise an autoregressive fractionally integrated mov-
ing average model (ARFIMA) with volatility modelling (ARCH, GARCH) to
investigate the degree of persistence of the log dividend yield. Instead of using in-
teger orders of integration, they use fractional integration techniques, which allow
more flexible modelling. A good feature of this approach is that it is not sensitive
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to data frequency. They find strong evidence of rejections of a unit root in the
log dividend yield and this result supports the non-existence of bubbles of null
hypothesis.
Cuñado et al. (2005) analysis the NASDAQ stock market index between 1994
and 2003 by utilizing fractional integration techniques based tests of Robinson
(1994) and Robinson (1995). They obtain evidence to suggest that the sampling
frequency adopted in the analysis is crucial to determine the existence of bubbles.
In their paper, they use monthly, weekly, and daily data of the NASDAQ index to
examine the presence of bubbles. Based on empirical evidence, they are in favor of
the presence of bubbles only when using the monthly data on the price-dividend
ratios.
Chang et al. (2007) have re-investigated the presence of rational bubbles in the US
stock market by applying both the Johansen cointegration test and the Bierens
nonparametric cointegration test for the period from 1871 to 2002. Most of em-
pirical studies in the literature have employed cointegration tests as a measure to
check the existence of bubbles. The results from the Johansen cointegration test
support the presence of rational bubbles while the results from Bierens nonpara-
metric cointegration test favour the absence of rational bubbles in the US stock
market.
Time series based analysis has been widely adopted to investigate the evidence
of bubbles phenomena, but the empirical results remain mixed. Cerqueti and
Costantini (2011) utilise a panel data approach that combines panel unit root
and panel cointegration tests with the flexibility of allowing multiple structural
breaks in each series to examine the phenomena of rational bubbles. They present
empirical evidence of a rational bubble hypothesis in international stock markets
for 18 OECD countries using the model proposed by Campbell (2000). The key
feature of their approach is that the panel data approach gives a global analy-
sis of rational bubble in international stock markets. Perron (1989) finds that
the existence of structural breaks could strongly influence the ability of rejecting
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the unit root null hypothesis. The intuition behind this is that many empirical
studies could lead to biased results by simply ignoring the structure breaks in the
data. Empirical results from Cerqueti and Costantini (2011) are in favour of the
existence of bubbles in all 18 OECD countries.
Similarly, Frömmel and Kruse (2012) also test for rational bubbles for the S&P
500 stock index using the fractional integration technique by Sibbertsen and Kruse
(2009) that allows both long memory and changing persistence and the unit root
tests of Demetrescu et al. (2008). They find a changing long memory parameter
of the dividend-price ratio during the whole sample period. Their results confirm
that there is a structure break in July 1991 in the log dividend-price ratio. The log
dividend-price ratio has significant long memory before July 1991 while it contains
a rational bubble after that as the unit root test suggests non-stationarity.
Many studies utilise the PSY tests to stock markets and some selected studies are
summarized here. Chen et al. (2015) investigated the health care sector of the
US, UK, and German stock markets. The identified bubbles corresponded to the
Dotcom and pre-subprime crisis periods. Bohl et al. (2013) tested for bubbles in
German renewable energy stocks between 2004 and 2011. Almudhaf (2017) also
explored explosive behaviour for a group of African stock markets. In addition,
Escobari and Jafarinejad (2016) adopted the PWY and PSY tests to test for
the existence of bubbles in various Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) indices
including Equity REITs, Mortgage REITs and Hybrid REITs. Similarly, Chang
et al. (2016) make use of the PSY bubble detection test to the BRICS stock
markets during the 1990-2013. Homm and Breitung (2012) applied the PWY
tests to the Nasdaq composite, the S&P 500, the Nikkei225, the Hang Seng and
the Shanghai stock indices.
2.4.2 Housing Bubbles
There is a large literature examining the existence of house price bubbles especially
for the US. For example, Malpezzi (1999) find no evidence of bubbles in US
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Metropolitan areas as house prices and income are cointegrated. Case and Shiller
(2003) argue that fundamentals play a crucial role in explaining much of the
rapid increase in the housing market. In particular, income growth explains the
house price appreciation in most areas and a low interest rate also contributes
to the recent increase in house prices. Similarly, McCarthy and Peach (2004)
and Himmelberg et al. (2005) conclude that economic fundamentals such as low
interest rates and high income growth could explain house prices growth in the
early 2000s. Therefore, Case and Shiller (2003), McCarthy and Peach (2004) and
Himmelberg et al. (2005) deny the existence of a bubble in the US housing market.
However, there is other empirical evidence that supports the existence of a housing
bubble in the US in the literature. Gallin (2006) finds no evidence of a long-run
cointegration relationship between house prices and income in US using 27 years
of US national-level data. As standard cointegration tests are known to have low
power in small samples, Gallin (2006) applied several panel cointegration tests to
a panel of 95 US Metropolitan areas over a 23 year period at the city-level and also
found no evidence of cointegration. In both cases, a finding of no cointegration
relationship indicates the presence of bubbles. Zhou and Sornette (2006) inves-
tigated the existence of US housing bubbles at the regional and national levels
using quarterly data between 1993 and 2005 and concluded that 22 States exhib-
ited evidence of a bubble based on a definition as a ‘faster-than-exponential price
growth’. Mikhed and Zemč́ık (2009) also applied a panel test for the price-rent
ratio in 23 US Metropolitan areas from 1978 to 2006 and concluded that there
was evidence of a bubble.
Holly et al. (2010) used Moon and Perron (2004) and Pesaran (2007) panel tests to
consider the relationship between real house prices and real per capita disposable
incomes in the US at the State level using annual data 1975-2003 and found little
evidence of house price bubbles with a few exceptions (e.g., California, New York,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Oregon and Washington). Empirical
results from Kivedal (2013) suggest that there was a bubble in the US housing
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market prior to the 2007 subprime financial crisis. Nneji et al. (2013) examined
the presence of intrinsic bubbles of a Froot and Obstfeld (1991) type or rational
speculative bubbles of a Blanchard and Watson (1982) type in the residential
property market in the US between 1960 and 2011. They split the data into two
periods (1960-1999) and (2000-2011) and found an intrinsic bubble for the first
period and a rational speculative bubble for the second period only. In this paper,
they tested to see if house prices are driven solely by changes in fundamentals
(rents) for the intrinsic bubble model. Escobari et al. (2015) proposed a new test
to identify house price bubbles, which explored a specific feature of the market
such that low tier house prices should appreciate more during the upswing of a
growing boom and fall faster during the bust, and found evidence of bubbles in
15 US Metropolitan Statistical Areas.
A number of recent studies apply the popular PSY tests to housing markets.
Yiu et al. (2013) applied the multiple bubble detection test to identify real es-
tate bubbles in the Hong Kong residential property market including the overall
market, the mass segment and the luxury segment. In particular, they found
the existence of the well-known real estate bubble in 1997 for all three markets.
Pavlidis et al. (2016) examined the explosive behaviour of three housing market
indicators (real house prices, price-to-income ratios, and price-to-rent ratios) for
22 countries. They also proposed a panel version of the PSY test to exploit large
cross-sectional dimension of the dataset. Engsted et al. (2016) also conducted
an econometric analysis of housing bubbles for 18 OECD countries from 1970
to 2013. Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016) and Shi et al. (2016) investi-
gated the presence of bubbles across various regional markets in New Zealand and
Australia, respectively.
2.4.3 Exchange Rate Bubbles
A number of studies have tested for bubbles in the exchange rates using differ-
ent econometric methodologies. Of the existing studies, most apply the variance
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bounds, unit root or cointegration tests. Using a monetary model approach,
Huang (1981) applied the variance bounds test of Shiller (1980) and Leroy and
Porter (1981) to test for the presence of bubbles in the US Dollar-Sterling, US
Dollar-Mark, and Sterling-Mark exchange rates from March 1973 to March 1979
and rejected the no bubble hypothesis. Evans (1986) found evidence to sup-
port the presence of bubbles in the Sterling-dollar exchange rate between 1981
and 1984. Similarly, Meese (1986) provided evidence of bubbles for the Dollar-
Deutsche Mark and Sterling-Dollar exchange rate using the monthly data between
1973 and 1982. However, the analysis from West (1987b) seemed to provide no ev-
idence of bubbles in the US Dollar-Mark exchange rate during 1974 to 1984. Woo
(1987) studied the bilateral exchange rate of the US Dollar with the currencies
of Germany, France, and Japan using a portfolio balance approach. Kearney and
MacDonald (1990) adopted a similar approach with Huang (1981) and concluded
no bubbles in Australian/US dollar exchange rate over the period January 1984 to
December 1986. Kaskarelis (1995) examined the presence of bubbles in the franc-
mark exchange rate covering the period January 1981 to December 1992 and the
obtained results which seemed to support the existence of bubbles. Wu (1995) ap-
plied the Kalman filter technique to estimate and tested for exchange rate bubbles
between the US Dollar, the British Pound, the Japanese Yen and the Deutsche
Mark using the monthly data over 1974-1988. However, Wu (1995) found no
significant evidence of bubbles in these exchange rates. The empirical analysis
from Charemza (1996) seemed to suggest the evidence of a rational bubble in the
foreign exchange rate in Poland during the period 1988 to 1990. Elwood et al.
(1999) made use of state-space models and Monte Carlo experiments to explore
the presence of a stochastic rational bubble in the Japanese and German exchange
rates over the period December 1984 to November 1998. According to the theory
of uncovered interest parity, a series under rational expectation is supposed to be
white noise. Elwood et al. (1999) therefore inspected this condition for evidence
of bubbles. A finding of a deviation from white noise implies the existence of a
stochastic rational bubble. Their results suggest a bubble burst between the end
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of March and the end of April of 1990, which coincides with economic turmoil in
Japan and Germany.
Many studies have tested for evidence of price bubbles during hyperinflation using
Cagan’s (1956) model. These studies access the validity of the Cagan model and
interpret deviations from the fundamental as evidence of bubbles. However, those
deviations may be caused by model misspecification and the possibility of model
misspecification is frequently ignored. Chan et al. (2003) suggested and extended
a testing procedure of Durlauf and Hooker (1994) and Hooker (2000) to differenti-
ate between model misspecification and the presence of bubbles. They examined
the presence of price and exchange rate bubbles during the interwar European hy-
perinflation of Germany (September 1920-May 1923), Hungary (September 1921
- February 1924) and Poland (September 1920 - December 1923), and concluded
that no evidence of price and exchange rate bubbles can be found in these three
countries. Jarrow and Protter (2011) developed a new model for exchange rate
bubbles using the martingale based bubble approach of Jarrow et al. (2010). This
new model provides new insights into exchange rate bubbles and can be used for
testing for bubbles.
In theory, a finding of a cointegrating relationship between exchange rate and
fundamentals may be interpreted as the evidence of no bubbles. MacDonald and
Taylor (1991) used cointegration tests to investigate the validity of the monetary
model. If both the no bubbles hypothesis and the monetary model are valid,
fundamentals and exchange rates must be cointegrated. Using this fact MacDon-
ald and Taylor (1991) find evidence which supports the joint hypothesis. The
empirical results from MacDonald and Marsh (1997) lent support to a long run
cointegration relationship between exchange rate (the UK pound, German mark
and Japanese yen against the US dollar) and fundamentals based on a modified
version of PPP. Based on a panel cointegration test, Mark and Sul (2001) found a
cointegration relationship between the nominal exchange rate and monetary fun-
damentals in 19 countries during January 1973 to January 1997. Jirasakuldech
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et al. (2006) examined the existence of rational speculative bubbles in the bilat-
eral exchange rates of the British pound, the Canadian dollar, the Danish krone,
the Japanese yen and the South African rand against the US Dollar covering the
period from January 1989 to December 2004. Three different bubble detection
procedures have been used: the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-
Perron (PP) unit root tests, the Johansen’s multivariate cointegration test and
the duration dependence test of McQueen and Thorley (1994). All three tests
provide firm evidence of no rational speculative bubbles in theses currency pairs.
Chang and Su (2014) explored the long run relationship for several Pacific Rim
countries using the Johansen (1988) cointegration test and cointegration tests with
structural breaks of Hansen and Seo (2002). The Johansen cointegration test fails
to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration except Taiwan-US while the coin-
tegration test with structure breaks rejects the null hypothesis of cointegration
for Canada, Japan, Korea, and Thailand, with respect to the US.
A number of studies attempted to explore the evidence of nonlinear cointegra-
tion relationship between nominal/real exchange rate and economic fundamen-
tals using the Alternating Conditional Expectation (ACE) algorithm (e.g., Chinn
(1991), Meese and Rose (1991), Ma and Kanas (2000), Torres (2007) and Tang
and Zhou (2013). Granger and Hallman (1991) suggested and developed a two
stage testing procedure to test for a nonlinear cointegration relationship using the
ACE algorithm and the ACE was firstly introduced by Breiman and Friedman
(1985). Both Chinn (1991) and Meese and Rose (1991) found a nonlinear coin-
tegration relationship between the nominal exchange rate and fundamentals and
the results may be interpreted as non-existence of bubbles. Similarly, Ma and
Kanas (2000) employed a nonparametric nonlinear cointegration approach and
a nonlinear Granger causality methodology to test for a nonlinear cointegration
relationship between fundamentals and exchange rates for Netherlands-Germany
and France-Germany. For Netherlands-Germany, they find a nonlinear cointegra-
tion relationship which indicates no bubbles. For France-Germany, they find no
evidence of a nonlinear cointegration but do find a nonlinear Granger causality
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from French money to the exchange rate. Results from a fractional ARIMA model
suggest that these nonlinearities are not due to bubbles. Torres (2007) also studied
the potential nonlinear cointegration relationship between three ERM exchange
rate (French Franc/Deutsche Mark, Belgian Franc/Deutsche Mark, Danish Kron-
a/Deutsche) and fundamentals. Instead of using nominal exchange rate, Tang and
Zhou (2013) assessed nonlinear aspects in the determination of the real exchange
rate. They investigated the nonlinear relationship between the real exchange rates
of Chinese Yuan and Korean Won, and economic fundamentals over the period
1980Q1-2009Q4 and they find no evidence to indicate the presence of bubbles.
A series of papers have adopted a regime switching approach to examine the pres-
ence of bubbles in exchange rates. Van Norden (1996) investigated the existence of
speculative bubbles in exchange rates of the Japanese yen, the German mark and
the Canadian dollar from 1977 to 1991 by applying a new regime switching test.
The presence of bubbles displays a particular kind of regime-switching behavior
by implying some coefficient restrictions on a simple switching-regression model
of the exchange rate. Empirical results are sensitive to the choice of exchange rate
fundamentals and measurement of exchange rate innovations. Ferreira (2006) ap-
plied the Markov-switching ADF test of Hall et al. (1999) to explore the presence
of bubbles in exchange rates for Canada, France, Germany and the UK and re-
jected the null hypothesis of bubbles. Maldonado et al. (2012) proposed a new
bubble model to the exchange rate of the Brazilian real to the US Dollar during
March 1999 to February 2011. The new model is an extension of the Van Norden
(1996) approach which allows for a non-linear specification between the innovation
and the bubble size in the survival regime. This allows them to test for rational
expectations. Using the same model, Maldonado et al. (2014) further examined
the occurrence of bubbles in the exchange rate of Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa (“BRICS” countries) against the US Dollar. Panopoulou and Pante-
lidis (2015) also developed two and three-state regime switching models based on
the work of Van Norden (1996) and provided evidence of periodically collapsing
bubbles in the Sterling-Dollar exchange rate from January 1973 to January 2011.
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More recently, several studies apply the PSY tests to exchange rates. For example,
Bettendorf and Chen (2013) and Jiang et al. (2015) empirically examined the
explosive behaviour in the Sterling-dollar and Chinese RMB-dollar exchange rates
at the monthly frequency, respectively. Steenkamp (2018) tested for explosiveness
in G11 currencies at a daily frequency. The volatility of daily exchange rates
tend to vary over time. Non-stationary volatility could cause a size distortion in
unit root tests. Therefore Steenkamp (2018) utilised a wild-bootstrap approach of
Harvey et al. (2016) to take into account the possibility of non-stationary volatility
to a range of highly traded exchange rates.
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Cuñado, J., L. Gil-Alana, and F. P. de Gracia (2012). Testing for persistent devi-
ations of stock prices to dividends in the Nasdaq index. Physica A: Statistical
Mechanics and its Applications 391 (20), 4675–4685.
Demetrescu, M., V. Kuzin, and U. Hassler (2008). Long memory testing in the
time domain. Econometric Theory 24 (1), 176–215.
Dezhbakhsh, H. and A. Demirguc-Kunt (1990). On the presence of speculative
bubbles in stock prices. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 25 (1),
101–112.
Diba, B. T. and H. Grossman (1988). Explosive rational bubbles in stock prices?
American Economic Review 78 (3), 520–530.
Dickey, D. A. and W. A. Fuller (1979). Distribution of the estimators for au-
toregressive time series with a unit root. Journal of the American Statistical
Association 74 (366), 427–431.
Driffill, J. and M. Sola (1998). Intrinsic bubbles and regime-switching. Journal
of Monetary Economics 42 (2), 357–373.
Durlauf, S. and M. Hooker (1994). Misspecification versus bubbles in the cagan
hyperinflation model. In Nonstationary Time Series Analysis and Cointegra-
tion, pp. 257–282. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Elwood, S. K., E. Ahmed, and J. B. Rosser (1999). State-space estimation of
rational bubbles in the Yen/Deutsche Mark exchange rate. Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv 135 (2), 317–331.
Engle, R. F. and C. W. Granger (1987). Co-integration and error correction:
representation, estimation, and testing. Econometrica 55, 251–276.
Engsted, T., S. J. Hviid, and T. Q. Pedersen (2016). Explosive bubbles in house
prices? Evidence from the OECD countries. Journal of International Financial
Markets, Institutions and Money 40, 14–25.
61
Escobari, D., D. S. Damianov, and A. Bello (2015). A time series test to identify
housing bubbles. Journal of Economics and Finance 39 (1), 136–152.
Escobari, D. and M. Jafarinejad (2016). Date stamping bubbles in real estate
investment trusts. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 60, 224–230.
Evans, G. (1991). Pitfalls in testing for explosive bubbles in asset prices. American
Economic Review 81 (4), 922–930.
Evans, G. W. (1986). A test for speculative bubbles in the Sterling-Dollar ex-
change rate: 1981-84. American Economic Review 76 (4), 621–636.
Ferreira, J. E. d. A. (2006). Periodically collapsing rational bubbles in exchange
rate: A markov-switching analysis for a sample of industrialised markets. De-
partment of Economics Discussion Paper, University of Kent, UK .
Flood, R. P. and P. M. Garber (1982). Bubbles, runs, and gold monetization. In
P. Wachtel (Ed.), Crises in the Economic and Financial Structure, pp. 275–294.
Lexington Books.
Fraser, P., M. Hoesli, and L. McAlevey (2008). A comparative analysis of house
prices and bubbles in the UK and New Zealand. Pacific Rim Property Research
Journal 14 (3), 257–278.
French, K. R. and J. M. Poterba (1991). Were Japanese stock prices too high?
Journal of Financial Economics 29 (2), 337–363.
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Addendum
In this paper, ‘the intercept in the null hypothesis’ should be interpreted as ‘the
intercept in the regression model’. We apologize for this mistake.
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Emerging markets & BRICS countries
A B S T R A C T
The existence, or otherwise, of bubbles has become a topical issue in economics and finance, particularly
following the Global Financial Crisis. Using the generalized sup ADF (GSADF), unit root tests of Phillips et al.
(2015a, PSY) we investigate evidence for exchange rate bubbles in some G10, Asian and BRICS countries from
Mar.1991-Dec.2014. We conclude that the US$-Mexican Peso crisis of 1994–95 was a bubble. Of particular
interest to financial market trading, is that newly emerging countries, with relatively shallow financial markets,
may be more likely to exhibit bubbly behavior in foreign exchange markets than more mature G10 countries.
1. Introduction
Despite theoretical arguments against the existence of bubbles for
finitely lived assets in rational markets, experiences from the Global
Financial Crisis have once again put the possibility that financially
driven bubbles exist, at least empirically, back into the spotlight where
a simple and straightforward definition of a bubble is a deviation of the
market price from (the asset's) fundamental value. With the advent of
the ‘unit root’ revolution of the 1970 s, testing for bubbles using time
series data has, until recently, typically focused on cointegration-type
methods, testing for the existence of a single, long-run, linear
cointegrating relationship between the ‘price’ and its ‘fundamental’
value. Early applications of such methods e.g. Kearney and MacDonald
(1990), have recently been extended see, for example, Maldonado et al.
(2016), to consider periodically collapsing bubbles.
It is, however, the recent developments in ‘right-tailed only’ unit
root tests (e.g., Phillips et al., 2011, PWY, Phillips et al., 2015b, Phillips
et al., 2015a, PSY) which have been designed to specifically test for the
presence of bubbles (where several bubble episodes may exist and be
identified within a timeline, punctuated by ‘no-bubble’ periods), that
have become one of the most popular and most thoroughly researched
tests for bubbles. Applications of the PSY approach have been broad
e.g., housing markets, agricultural prices and energy prices and
extensive (see e.g., Phillips and Yu, 2011, Homm and Breitung, 2012,
Etienne et al., 2014, Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips, 2015, Harvey
et al., 2016, Shi et al., 2016)1. Bettendorf and Chen (2013) and Jiang
et al. (2015) used the PSY method to test for the existence of bubbles in
exchange rates, but their examples involved only one each of a bilateral
rate with the US dollar, i.e., the Sterling-US Dollar and Chinese RMB-
US Dollar exchange rates, respectively. Their results suggest that the
explosiveness identified in the nominal exchange rate is likely driven by
either exchange rate fundamentals (the relative prices of traded goods
or nontraded goods) or the formation of ‘rational bubbles’.
The results of three other studies; Jirasakuldech et al. (2006);
Maldonado et al. (2012); and Maldonado et al. (2016), are worth
emphasizing here as their results, bear some comparison with ours.
Jirasakuldech et al. (2006) investigate the existence of bubbles in
bilateral exchange rates between the US Dollar and five currencies
including the South African Rand using three different approaches and
provide no evidence of bubbles in all currency pairs2. Maldonado et al.
(2012) apply a model, which is extended from Van Norden (1996)
model, to the exchange rate of the Brazilian Real to the US Dollar
during March 1999-February 2011. Maldonado et al. (2016) also
examine the bubbles in the exchange rate of the BRICS countries
currency relative to the US Dollar using the bubble model developed in
Maldonado et al. (2012) and conclude the presence of rational bubbles
for all countries.
This paper has two main aims and contributions. Firstly, we apply
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the generalized sup ADF (GSADF) test of Phillips et al. (2015a, PSY) to
investigate the presence of exchange rate bubbles in a very wide range
of countries, in particular, some G10 and a range of emerging markets
countries (including some Asian and the BRICS). This allows us to
consider whether exchange rate bubbles might be more likely to arise
in certain countries (perhaps those with less well developed trading
relationships or those where governments retain a role in trading
behavior), rather than in the highly developed countries of for example,
the UK and US. The second aim is to study the importance of model
formulation issues highlighted by Phillips et al. (2014) in right-tailed
unit root tests. In particular, the model specification for constructing
the null hypothesis with/without an intercept is considered. By
comparing two model formulations, our results show the inclusion of
the intercept term for model specification under the null hypothesis
affects the theory and date-stamping strategy of the PSY approach. This
also allows us to show, quite clearly, situations where the typical use of
the PSY approach fails to distinguish (without further analysis) periods
of collapse from periods of recovery, where it is only the former case
that relates to the growth and ultimate collapse of a bubble.
The importance of the results presented here are significant and
messages of the paper multi-faceted. We have applied the popular and
well-researched method of PSY to the widest and most extensive range
of exchange rates currently undertaken. Readers can ascertain, in one
single paper, the current evidence on explosive behaviour in both/
either of the nominal exchange rates, and exchange rate fundamen-
tals. Using the examples and time periods identified here, researchers
can try and ascertain the particular, perhaps idiosyncratic reasons why
bubbles arose. The paper presents, for the first time, empirical evidence
on the importance of how the PSY test might/should be applied in
practice, in particular, the importance of identifying genuine bubbles
from the often observationally equivalent periods of ‘collapse and
recovery’ and also the need to consider whether the conclusions of the
test should be based upon ‘with’ or ‘without intercept’ results. This
message goes beyond the particular example of this paper and
constitutes a potential pitfall for both (some) published papers and
(if ignored) future research.
The paper is therefore organized as follows. Section 2 provides a
review of the theory of the role of fundamentals in determining the
nominal exchange rate. This section summarises a well known theore-
tical literature and no claims for novelty are made here. To aid
exposition, we follow the notation and terminology of Bettendorf and
Chen (2013) and Jiang et al. (2015). Section 3 provides a brief
description of the GSADF and SADF tests of Phillips et al. (2015a)
and Phillips et al. (2011). Section 4 describes the data. Section 5
provides empirical results for G10 and emerging markets countries and
Section 6 concludes.
2. Exchange rates: theoretical background
Following the work of Bettendorf and Chen (2013) and Jiang et al.
(2015), we also define the economic fundamental for the nominal
exchange rate as the price differential ( ft):
f p p= − *,t t t (1)
where pt and p*t denote the domestic and foreign price indices in
logarithm. Engel (1999) shows that the price index for a domestic
country can be expressed as a combination of traded and non-traded
goods as following:







N denote the traded and non-traded goods price indices
in logarithm, respectively. The foreign price index can be defined in a
similar way:





The price differential ( ft) therefore can be decomposed into the traded
goods component ( ft
T ) and the non-traded goods component ( ft
N ):













The producer price index (PPI) is adopted here to measure the price
level of traded goods and the traded goods component is constructed
from following Engel (1999):
f PPI PPI= ln( ) − ln( *).t
T
t t (5)
The relative non-traded goods component is constructed from the
aggregate consumer price indices (CPI) relative to aggregate PPI:
f CPI PPI CPI PPI= ln( ) − ln( ) − (ln( *) − ln( *)).t
N
t t t t (6)
3. Method
Phillips et al. (2011) proposed a sup ADF (SADF) test based
procedure that can test for evidence of price exuberance and date
stamp its origination and collapse. Homm and Breitung (2012)
conducted simulation studies to show that the SADF test is an effective
bubble detection algorithm. One highlight of this new approach is the
ability to capture periodically collapsing bubbles of Evans (1991).
However, as discussed in Phillips et al. (2015a), the SADF test has
limited ability to detect the presence of multiple bubbles. The SADF
test is recursively applied to the sample data and is implemented as
follows. We apply the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to a time
series xt for the null of a unit root against the alternative of explosive
behavior. The following autoregressive specification for xt is estimated
by least squares:
∑x μ δx ϕ x ε ε σ= + + Δ + , ∼ NID(0, ),t x t j
J
j t j x t x t x−1 =1 − , ,
2
(7)
for some given value of the lag parameter J, where NID denotes
independent and normally distributed. The null hypothesis of this test
is H δ: = 10 and the alternative hypothesis is H δ: > 11 . Eq. (7) is
estimated repeatedly using subsets of the sample data incremented
by one additional observation at each pass in the forward recursive
regression. The window size rw expands from r0 to 1, where r0 is the
smallest sample window width fraction. The starting point r1 is fixed at
0, and the end point of each sample (r2) equals rw and changes from r0
to 1. The SADF statistic is therefore defined as the sup value of the ADF
statistic sequence:








Unlike the SADF test, the GSADF test is extended by using a more
flexible window size and has great power in detecting the presence of
multiple bubbles. The end point r2 varies from r0 (the minimum
window size) to 1. The start point r1 is also allowed to vary from 0 to
r r−2 0. The GSADF statistic is the largest ADF statistic over range of r1
and r2. The key difference between the SADF and GSADF is the window
size of starting point r1. The GSADF statistic is therefore defined as:












In general, a number of factors can affect the bubble detection
results for example, the full sample/subsample, the minimum window
size r0, the lag length, and model specification under the null hypoth-
esis. Firstly, the bubble detection results may differ if the GSADF test is
applied to a subsample of (truncated) data rather than the full sample.
This phenomenon is more obvious for the SADF test. Secondly, as
stated in Phillips et al. (2015a), the asymptotic GSADF distribution
depends on the smallest window size r0. The minimum window size r0
needs to be large enough to allow initial estimation, but it should not be
too large to miss the chance of detecting an early bubble period. We
therefore follow Phillips et al. (2015a) and let r T= 0.01 + 1.8/0 ,
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where T is number of observation3. They recommend this rule for
empirical use as it provides satisfactory size and power performance.
Thirdly, the choice of the lag length is also crucial. If the lag order is
over-specified, then the size distortion would be more severe for the
GSADF test than the SADF test. A small fixed lag order approach is
used in this study as suggested by Phillips et al. (2015a). The finite
critical values are obtained from Monte Carlo simulation with 2000
replications. Finally, the model specification under the null hypothesis
plays an important role in assessing the evidence of bubbles. Phillips
et al. (2014) have investigated different formulations of the null and
alternative hypothesis in the right-tailed unit root test of Phillips et al.
(2011). These formulations use various specifications of the regression
models (e.g., with/without an intercept or with/without a trend) for
constructing the empirical tests to assess the evidence of explosiveness.
Model specification was shown to affect both the finite sample and the
asymptotic distributions and they suggested an empirical model
specification with an intercept only for practical use. The model
specification issue is not discussed in either Bettendorf and Chen
(2013) or Jiang et al. (2015).
A number of studies have followed Phillips et al.'s (2014) suggestion
to include an intercept in the right-tailed unit root test. Hence, many
empirical papers have reported rejections of the null suggesting periods
of rapid increase in prices associated with a growing bubble, when in
fact the data identifies a ‘collapse’ or a ‘collapse and recovery’ phase and
not a bubble. Visual inspection can usually resolve these cases,
although it also seems that false (positive) bubbles also seem to be
reported when an intercept is included. An example of ‘collapse
episode’ and ‘collapse and recovery episode’ can be seen in Fig. 1
below. The backward SADF statistic (blue line) and its 95% critical
value (red line) for Fig. 1a suggests a number of ‘bubbles’ as the test
statistic exceeds the relevant critical value. However, the plot of the
actual data (green line) shows that the data is continuously declining (a
collapse period and not a series of bubbles). Fig. 1b presents data and
test results consistent that relate to a ‘collapse and recovery’ episode
and a genuine ‘bubble’. In this paper, we consider two different model
specifications for the null hypothesis in the right-tailed unit root tests
(a model without an intercept as in Eq. (8) and a model with an
intercept in Eq. (9)) to explore the evidence of bubbles and compare
the results obtained from both formulations. The model specification is
explained as follows. In PWY of Phillips et al. (2011), the null
hypothesis is:
H y y ε ε σ: = + , ∼ NID(0, ).t t t x t01 −1 , 2 (8)
The second specification for the null is obtained from Diba and
Grossman (1988):
H y α y ε α: = + + , where is the constant.t t t02 −1 (9)
4. Data
The monthly exchange rates for some G10, Asian and BRICS
countries are obtained from Quandl (https://www.quandl.com/) and
the IMF International Financial Statistics, and these exchange rates are
the end of period rates. We consider the following G10 currencies (e.g.,
British Pound (GBP), Canadian Dollar (CAD), Japanese Yen (JPY),
Norwegian Krone (NOK), Swedish Krona (SEK), Swiss Franc (CHF))
and test for the existence of exchange rate bubbles. We also consider
the US Dollar against several emerging market exchange rates in Asia
including the Indonesian Rupiah (IDR), Korean Won (KRW),
Malaysian Ringgit (MYR), Philippine Peso (PHP), Singapore Dollar
(SGD) and Thai Baht (THR). In addition, we test for the existence of
exchange rate bubbles in the US Dollar against several other emerging
markets currencies: Brazilian Real (BRL), Indian Rupee (INR), South
African Rand (ZAR), Colombian Peso (COP) and Mexican Peso (MXN).
The CPI and PPI are obtained from the IMF International Financial
Statistics. The monthly sample data used for our analysis are from
March 1991 to December 20144. All series have been transformed into
logarithms.
5. Results
We present our results in four sections. Sections 5.1, 5.2 5.3 and 5.4
provide the empirical results for G10, Asian, BRICS and other
emerging markets countries, respectively.
5.1. Results for G10 countries
Results for the G10 exchange rates are presented in Tables 1, 2, 3
using different model specifications (with/without an intercept) under
the null hypothesis5. Under the model specification ‘without an
intercept”, no strong evidence of explosiveness is detected in these
currency pairs. If the model specification allows an intercept term, we
do not find significant evidence of explosive behavior in these
currencies except for the Sterling-Swiss Franc (GBP/CHF) and
Sterling-Japanese Yen (GBP/JPY) based on the test statistic. We
therefore only discuss the bubble-detection results for these two
exchange rates.
5.1.1. GBP/CHF
The left panel of Fig. 2 compares the backward SADF statistic with
the 95% critical value sequences for the nominal exchange rate st, the
relative ratio of the exchange rate to the traded goods fundamental
s f−t t
T and the relative ratio of the exchange rate to the non-traded
goods fundamental s f−t t
N using a model specification with an inter-
cept for assessing the evidence of bubbles, respectively. The right panel
of Fig. 2 presents bubble detection results for st, s f−t t
T and s f−t t
N
using a model specification without an intercept. Table 1 suggests the
existence of explosive behavior in the nominal exchange rate st at the
1% significance level, which indicates the existence of explosive
subperiods. Fig. 2a compares the backward SADF statistic with 95%
critical value sequences for the nominal exchange rate st. Multiple
episodes can be identified in Fig. 2a including 1995M05-1995M07,
2008M02-2008M04, 2008M09-2009M01 and 2011M05-2011M08,
and most of these episodes are just ‘collapse’ episodes.
Fig. 2c and e display the backward SADF statistic sequences for
s f−t t
T and s f−t t
N , respectively. We find a ‘collapse and recovery’
episode between 2008M09 and 2009M01 in both figures. In addition, a
‘collapse and recovery’ episode from 2011M04 to 2011M09 and a
‘collapse’ episode from 1995M02 to 1996M01 are also identified in
Fig. 2e. On a close inspection of the date-stamping outcomes using a
model specification with an intercept, we find little evidence of bubble.
One of the take home messages is that the rejection of the null
hypothesis under the assumption ‘with an intercept’ in the PSY
approach could lead to false positive identification of bubbles. In this
example, the PSY approach identifies several ‘collapse’ episodes but not
bubbles.
However, under the null hypothesis without an intercept term, we
find no significant evidence of explosiveness in all three series (st,
s f−t t
T and s f−t t
N ) as the null hypothesis of explosive behavior cannot
be rejected at the 10% significance level. Moreover, the backward SADF
statistic sequences no longer detect the ‘collapse and recovery’ episode
3 We use this rule for choosing r0 for most exchange rates except the US Dollar against
the Mexican Peso.
4 The modern Brazilian Real was introduced in 1994. The sample data for Brazil from
June 1994 to December 2014 is used for our analysis. The data for Mexico and the
Philippines ranges from January 1993 to December 2014.
5 The critical values for the null hypothesis with an intercept: 1.8569 (90%), 2.0977
(95%), 2.6217 (99%). The critical values for the null hypothesis without an intercept:
3.1247 (90%), 3.5343 (95%), 4.2359 (99%).
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in 2008-2009. These results suggest that the intercept term can
potentially affect the asymptotic distributions of the PSY approach.
5.1.2. GBP/JPY
Under the null hypothesis ‘with an intercept’, Table 1 provides
strong evidence of explosive behavior in the nominal exchange rate st
for GBP/JPY at the 1% significance level. As shown in Fig. 3a, there is
an episode between 2008M10 and 2009M03 and st remains explosive
even if both exchange rate fundamentals are accounted for. If we look
at all three series (st, s f−t t
T and s f−t t
N ) in Figs. 3a, c and e, all three
series are declining and then recovering between 2008M10 and
2009M03 and rather than growing are collapsing. We may regard this
special type of episodes as a ‘collapse and recovery’ episode but not a
bubble. There is a short-lived bubble during 2013M11-2014M01 in
Fig. 3a. Both the relative prices of traded goods ft
T and the relative
prices of non-traded goods ft
N play no role in explaining the explo-
Fig. 1. Examples of the collapse episode, the collapse and recovery episode and the bubble. (a) Collapse episode. (b) Collapse and recovery episode and bubble. (For interpretation of the
references to color in this figure, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 1
The GSADF test for exchange rate in G10 countries.
Exchange rate Test Stat under H0 with an
intercept







N 1.8906* 13M12-14M05 2.1902 98M07-99M01, 14M01-
14M04
s f−t t
T 1.7400 13M12-14M03 2.0057
GBP/CHF
st 2.9084




N 2.3762c** 95M02-96M01, 08M09-09M01 11M04-11M09 2.0789 07M05-07M08
s f−t t
T 2.6425*** 96M10-97M08, 08M11-09M01 2.6425 97M11-98M07, 99M10-
00M05
GBP/JPY








T 2.8423*** 96M10-97M04, 98M03-98M09 3.3178* 96M10-97M05, 97M10-
98M10
08M09-09M02, 13M11-13M12 06M12-07M10, 14M04-
14M12
GBP/NOK
st 1.2835 97M05-97M08 1.9141
s f−t t
N 0.9729 97M06-97M08 2.1358 00M08-00M11
s f−t t
T 1.3922 97M06-97M08, 08M04-08M09 2.2619
10M01-12M04
a* indicates significance at the 10% level.
b*** indicates significance at the 1% level.
c** indicates significance at the 5% level.
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Table 2
The GSADF test for exchange rate in G10 countries.
Exchange rate Test Stat under H0 with an intercept Episodes Test Stat under H0 without an intercept Episodes
GBP/SEK
st 1.1704 95M10-95M11, 08M02-08M04 2.2646 98M06-98M12, 99M03-99M06
99M01-00M04, 00M08-02M04
s f−t t
N 0.5572 2.6073 98M07-98M12, 99M11-02M10
s f−t t
T 1.6099 95M10-95M11 2.6115 98M05-00M01
CAD/JPY
st 0.6021 2.3830 97M11-98M09, 07M04-07M11
s f−t t
N 0.8551 94M02-94M08, 95M02-95M06 2.6121 97M12-98M08, 05M10-08M01
s f−t t
T 0.6871 2.6392 97M11-98M09, 05M09-07M12
CAD/NOK
st 1.6490 02M07-03M01 1.9936
s f−t t




st 0.5654 2.3567 01M05-01M08
s f−t t
N 0.8100 2.6194 01M02-02M01
s f−t t








The GSADF test for exchange rate in G10 countries.
Exchange rate Test Stat under H0 with an intercept Episodes Test Stat under H0 without an intercept Episodes
CHF/JPY
st 0.5931 2.2867 03M03-03M07, 06M11-08M08
s f−t t
N 0.3783 2.3967 03M03-03M07, 06M04-08M09
s f−t t
T 0.7452 2.5739 02M12-03M09, 06M06-08M08
CHF/NOK
st 1.5892 96M12-97M03 2.5214 94M07-96M09
s f−t t
N 1.3422 93M11-94M03, 95M02-95M05 3.1743a* 94M07-96M10, 10M11-12M11
10M11-12M04 13M06-14M12
s f−t t
T 3.0592b*** 96M10-97M04 2.0150 94M06-96M01
CHF/SEK
st 1.8713* 93M11-94M01, 01M08-01M11 2.6662 93M11-95M10
08M11-09M03
s f−t t
N 1.8988* 93M11-94M03, 95M02-95M06 3.0832 93M11-96M05, 00M08-03M05
01M09-01M10, 08M11-09M03 05M04-06M09, 08M09-12M06
s f−t t
T 1.0940 08M11-08M12 1.7937 95M02-95M05
NOK/JPY
st 1.0718 08M11-09M01 2.4754 02M11-03M07, 07M01-07M11
s f−t t
N 1.2103 08M10-09M01 1.7607
s f−t t








a* indicates significance at the 10% level.
b*** indicates significance at the 1% level.
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siveness, suggesting evidence of rational bubbles during this period.
Overall, we find no significant evidence of bubbles in st although the
test statistic suggests explosive bubble-like behaviors.
By comparing the left panel of Fig. 3 and right panel of Fig. 3, we
obtain different date-stamping strategies for GBP/JPY using the two
model specifications. Under the model specification of the null
Fig. 2. Dating strategy for GBP/CHF nominal exchange rate st, the relative ratio of the exchange rate to the traded goods fundamental s f−t t
T and the relative ratio of the exchange rate
to the non-traded goods fundamental s f−t t
N . (a) GBP/CHF st with an intercept. (b) GBP/CHF st without an intercept. (c) GBP/CHF s f−t t
T with an intercept. (d) GBP/CHF s f−t t
T
without an intercept. (e) GBP/CHF s f−t t
N with an intercept. (e) GBP/CHF s f−t t
N without an intercept.
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hypothesis ‘without an intercept’, the null hypothesis of no explosive
behavior cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level for st and
s f−t t
N while the null hypothesis of no explosive behavior in s f−t t
T is
rejected at the 10% level. Three episodes have been identified from st in
Fig. 3b: 1997M10-1998M09, 2007M05-2007M07 and 2014M04-
2014M12. All episodes identified from the right panel of Fig. 3
Fig. 3. Dating strategy for GBP/JPY nominal exchange rate st, the relative ratio of the exchange rate to the traded goods fundamental s f−t t
T and the relative ratio of the exchange rate
to the non-traded goods fundamental s f−t t
N . (a) GBP/JPY st with an intercept. (b) GBP/JPY st without an intercept. (c) GBP/JPY s f−t t
T with an intercept. (d) GBP/JPY s f−t t
T without
an intercept. (e) GBP/JPY s f−t t
N with an intercept. (f) GBP/JPY s f−t t
N without an intercept.
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correspond to a ‘genuine’ bubble. The episode between 2014M04 and
2014M12 suggests that the Sterling-Japanese Yen exchange rate is
experiencing a bubble. The nominal exchange rate series remains
explosive after both traded and non-traded goods components are
taken into account in Figs. 3d and f. We do not detect the ‘collapse and
recovery’ type of episodes between 2008M10 and 2009M03. Our
findings indicate some evidence of rational bubbles in st as they are
not explained by exchange rate fundamentals.
5.2. Results for Asian countries
In this section, we consider the existence of exchange rate bubbles
in several Asian currencies with particular interest during the 1997
Asian Financial Crisis period. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis origi-
nated in Thailand in July 1997 when the Thai Baht was allowed to float
and soon spread to most Southeast Asian countries including
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and South Korea.
5.2.1. Thai Baht (THB)
The Baht was pegged at 25 to the US Dollar between 1986 and
1995. In May 1997, a major speculative attack took place against the
Baht. Due to the lack of foreign currency to defend the currency, the
Thai government was forced to float against US Dollar in July 1997.
The Baht depreciated to 55 to the US Dollar by the end of January of
1998 losing more than 50% of its value.
According to Table 4, the null hypothesis of no explosive behavior
for USD/THB is rejected at the 1% significance level under the
assumption of model specification with an intercept. As shown in
Fig. 4a, there is a bubble during 1997M07-1998M02 and a ‘collapse
and recovery’ episode in 2008. However, the explosiveness in 1997–
1998 is driven by neither the relative prices of traded goods nor non-
traded goods. As indicated in both Figs. 4c and e, the exchange rate st is
still explosive even if ft
T and ft
N are considered, respectively. We
therefore conclude that neither the relative prices of traded goods nor
non-traded goods could explain the explosive behavior during 1997–
1998, which suggests the existence of rational bubbles. A ‘collapse and
recovery’ episode in 2008 can be found in the left panel of Fig. 4, which
is likely related with the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). An additional
‘collapse and recovery’ episode is observed during 2010 in Fig. 4c.
The right panel of Fig. 4 provides the date-stamping strategy under
the model specification without an intercept. All three series (st, s f−t t
T
and s f−t t
N ) are no longer explosive as the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected at the 10% level. We no longer find any collapse episodes in
Figs. 4b, d and f. However, we observe a bubble from 1997M09 to
1998M02 in all three figures, which is related to the Asian Financial
Crisis.
5.2.2. Indonesian Rupiah (IDR)
Following the collapse of the Baht, Indonesia widened the Rupiah
currency trading band from 8% to 12% in July 1997. In August 1997,
the managed floating exchange rate was abandoned and the Rupiah
was allowed to float freely. The nominal exchange rate remained almost
constant before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis but it had some initial
falls immediately after the crisis occurred. The Rupiah traded at 2600
to the US Dollar in July 1997 and it depreciated to 14900 per US Dollar
in June 1998. The Indonesian Rupiah was one of the most volatile
currencies during the East Asian currency crisis as it depreciated to
near one-sixth of its pre-crisis level (Ito, 2007).
Under the model specification with an intercept, the null hypothesis
of no explosive behavior in the Dollar-Indonesian Rupiah exchange
rate is rejected at the 1% significance level as listed in Table 4. We find
multiple bubbles in st including 1994M08-1996M08, 1996M11-
1998M09 and 2013M07-2014M02 from Fig. 5a. The first episode in
st is driven by the relative prices of traded goods ft
T as st is no longer
explosive once ft
T is taken into account. On the other hand, ft
T also
contribute to explaining some explosiveness in 1998 and 2013. These
results seem to suggest that the relative prices of traded goods have
explained the majority of the movements in the nominal exchange rate.
Additionally, a ‘collapse and recovery’ episode is observed in Fig. 5c
between 2008M03 and 2008M08.
Bubble detection results under the model specification ‘without an
intercept’ are provided in the right panel of Fig. 5. We find significant
Table 4
The GSADF test for exchange rate in emerging markets countries.
Exchange rate Test Stat under H0 with an intercept Episodes Test Stat under H0 without an intercept Episodes
USD/THB
st 7.9539
a*** 97M07-98M02, 08M01-08M05 2.8066 97M09-98M02
s f−t t
N 8.1865*** 97M08-98M02, 08M02-08M04 2.7707 97M09-98M02
s f−t t
T 4.6063*** 95M03-95M07, 97M07-98M02 2.4169 97M10-98M02
08M01-08M05, 10M08-10M12
USD/IDR
st 9.1720*** 94M08-96M08, 96M11-98M09 15.7484*** 93M11-98M02, 98M05-98M08
13M07-14M02 13M08-14M12
s f−t t
N 11.0643*** 95M04-98M09, 13M08-14M02 4.6668*** 94M06-98M02, 98M05-98M08
13M09-14M12
s f−t t
T 8.6602*** 97M07-98M02, 08M03-08M08 2.0424 97M10-98M01
13M08-13M09
USD/KRW
st 9.9778*** 95M03-95M08, 96M12-98M02 4.5216*** 93M11-95M04, 96M05-98M02
08M08-08M11, 09M01-09M02
s f−t t




T 9.9778*** 95M03-95M08, 97M09-98M02 2.9672 93M11-94M11, 97M08-97M12
08M08-08M11 08M09-08M11
a*** indicates significance at the 1% level.
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evidence of bubbles in st at the 1% significance level with three
explosive subperiods including 1993M11-1998M02, 1998M05-
1998M08 and 2013M08-2014M12 in Fig. 5b. The most recent episode
(2013M08-2014M12) suggests that USD/IDR exchange rate is experi-
encing a bubble. The ratio of s f−t t
N is also significant at the 1% level,
which indicates strong evidence of explosive subperiods in Fig. 5f (e.g.,
1994M06-1998M02, 1998M05-1998M08 and 2013M09-2014M12).
On the other hand, the null hypothesis of no explosive bubbles for
Fig. 4. Dating strategy for USD/THB nominal exchange rate st, the relative ratio of the exchange rate to the traded goods fundamental s f−t t
T and the relative ratio of the exchange rate
to the non-traded goods fundamental s f−t t
N . (a) USD/THB st with an intercept. (b) USD/THB st without an intercept. (c) USD/THB s f−t t
T with an intercept. (d) USD/THB s f−t t
T
without an intercept. (e) USD/THB s f−t t
N with an intercept. (f) USD/THB s f−t t
N without an intercept.
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s f−t t
T cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level. Unlike ft
N, the
relative prices of traded goods component ft
T plays an important role
in explaining the volatility of exchange rates as suggested in Fig. 5d.
Our empirical results from USD/IDR exchange rates suggest that the
relative prices of traded goods ft
T have explained the majority of the
movements in st, which are in line with conclusions drawn from Engel
(1999) and Betts and Kehoe (2005).
Fig. 5. Dating strategy for USD/IDR nominal exchange rate st, the relative ratio of the exchange rate to the traded goods fundamental s f−t t
T and the relative ratio of the exchange rate
to the non-traded goods fundamental s f−t t
N . (a) USD/IDR st with an intercept. (b) USD/IDR st without an intercept. (c) USD/IDR s f−t t
T with an intercept. (d) USD/IDR s f−t t
T
without an intercept. (e) USD/IDR s f−t t
N with an intercept. (f) USD/IDR s f−t t
N without an intercept.
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5.2.3. Korean Won (KWR)
The exchange rate between the Korean Won and US Dollar was one
of the most affected pairs during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The
null hypothesis of no bubbles in USD/KWR under the model specifica-
tion with an intercept is rejected for st, s f−t t
T and s f−t t
N at the 1%
level and the corresponding bubble detection results are shown in
Fig. 6. Dating strategy for USD/KRW nominal exchange rate st, the relative ratio of the exchange rate to the traded goods fundamental s f−t t
T and the relative ratio of the exchange rate
to the non-traded goods fundamental s f−t t
N . (a) USD/KRW st with an intercept. (b) USD/KRW st without an intercept. (c) USD/KRW s f−t t
T with an intercept. (d) USD/KRW s f−t t
T
without an intercept. (e) USD/KRW s f−t t
N with an intercept. (f) USD/KRW s f−t t
N without an intercept.
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Table 4. Figs. 6a, c and e show the date-stamping outcomes in st, s f−t t
T
and s f−t t
N under the model specification with an intercept, respec-
tively. Four episodes are identified from Fig. 6a including 1995M03-
1995M08, 1996M12-1998M02, 2008M08-2008M11 and 2009M01-
2009M02. Firstly, a collapse and recovery episode is identified between
March 1995 and August 1995 in all three series under the model with
an intercept. Secondly, both st and s f−t t
N detect the explosiveness
from the late 1996 or early 1997 to the early 1998 while s f−t t
T
suggests a bubble episode starting from September 1997 until the early
of 1998. It appears that ft
T has partially explained the explosive
behaviour from the early to mid 1997. These bubble episodes corre-
spond to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis where the Korean Won has
depreciated sharply from the pre-crisis level of 800 per US Dollar to
1700 per US Dollar at the end of 1997. In order to avoid the worst case
scenario of a sovereign default, the IMF provided a $ 58.4 billion
bailout plan to South Korea in December 1997 (Koo and Kiser, 2001).
Thirdly, two more short-lived bubbles in 2008-2009 are likely related
to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Both f and ft
T
t
N have no effect in
explaining the explosive behavior in st in 2008 while ft
T can explain the
explosiveness in early 2009. Our empirical results seem to suggest that
the relative prices of traded goods ft
T play little role in explaining the
exchange rate movements and the relative prices of non-traded goods
ft
N contribute little in explaining the explosiveness in st .
As suggested in Table 4, the nominal exchange rate series st remain
explosive with two explosive subperiods (1993M11-1995M04 and
1996M05-1998M02) even if the intercept term is removed from the
model specification under the null hypothesis. However, s f−t t
T and
s f−t t
N series are non explosive as both series are not significant at the
10% level. Both ft
T and ft
N could not explain the majority of the
explosiveness. We are more convinced by the fact that the episode
between 1996M05 and 1998M02 is a bubble, which is caused by the
Asian Financial Crisis. A short-lived bubble is also detected in Fig. 6f.
These results are consistent with the early findings under the assump-
tion of the inclusion of an intercept. The exclusion of an intercept for
constructing the hypothesis affects the date-stamping strategy of the
PSY approach.
5.2.4. Malaysian Ringgit (MYR)
For USD/MYR, we identify explosive behavior in st, s f−t t
T and
s f−t t
N at the 1% level based on the model specification under the null
hypothesis in Table 5. As indicated in Fig. 7a, multiple episodes can be
observed in st including 1997M08-1998M08, 2003M03-2003M06,
2006M02-2006M06 and 2006M11-2008M08. The Malaysian Ringgit
traded at 2.5 US Dollar before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and it
depreciated sharply to 3.8 US Dollars by the end of 1997. There is a
bubble episode between August 1997 and August 1998 in both Fig. 7a
and e while a shorter bubble episode from August 1997 to February
1998 is detected in Fig. 7c. Such a bubble corresponds to the 1997
Asian Financial Crisis. The relative prices of traded goods ft
T have
partially explained the explosiveness in st while such an explosive
behavior is not driven by the relative prices of non-traded goods ft
N.
It is perhaps noteworthy to compare findings from the GSADF test
using the two model specifications. First, we find a spurious episode in
2003 for the nominal exchange rate st in Fig. 7a. The Malaysian Ringgit
was pegged to the US Dollar in September 1998 keeping the exchange
rate around 3.8 per US Dollar until the end of 2005. Thus we would not
expect any explosive behavior during this seven-year period. However,
as shown in Fig. 7a, there is a spurious episode dated from March 2003
to June 2003 in the series. We could not explain the reason behind this
‘collapse’ episode. Second, we notice two ‘collapse and recovery’
episodes (2006M02-2006M06 and 2006M11-2008M08) in Fig. 7a for
st. This spurious ‘collapse’ episode in 2003 and two ‘collapse and
recovery’ episodes (2006M02-2006M06 and 2006M11-2008M08) are
likely caused by the inclusion of an intercept in the model specification
under the null hypothesis as seen by comparing Fig. 7a and b. Overall,
under the assumption ‘with an intercept’, the PSY approach could lead
to the false positive identification of bubbles as it cannot distinguish
between ‘collapse’ type of episodes and bubbles.
However, we obtain different results if the intercept is excluded in
the model formulation. The null hypothesis of no bubbles under model
specification ‘without an intercept’ for st and s f−t t
N are rejected at the
5% significance level, which indicates strong evidence of bubbles. We
find two explosive episodes (1997M09-1998M02 and 1998M05-
1998M08) from st in Fig. 7b and s f−t t
N in Fig. 7f. The test statistics
for s f−t t
T is slightly lower than the 10% significance level. As exchange
rate fundamentals (ft
T and ft
N) could not explain the bubble in 1997–
1998, we may conclude the evidence of rational bubbles. When the
intercept term is removed from the model specification for the null
hypothesis, the backward SADF statistic sequences and 95% critical
value sequences do not “detect” the ‘collapse’ episode in 2003 and
‘collapse and recovery’ episodes any longer in the right panel of Fig. 7.
5.2.5. Philippine Peso (PHP)
Table 5 suggests that the null hypothesis of no explosive behavior in
the nominal USD/PHP exchange rate st is rejected at the 1%
significance level based on the GSADF test. As shown in Fig. 8a, there
is a bubble during 1997M08-1998M10 and a ‘collapse and recovery’
episode during 2006M12-2008M05 for st. The first explosive bubble is
clearly related to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. It seems that ft
N
could not explain this explosiveness while ft
T explains some move-
ments in exchange rates. As can be seen in Fig. 8c, we find no evidence
of explosiveness in the s f−t t
T series for the second explosive period in
2007–2008, which is likely associated with the 2008 Global Financial
Crisis. According to Fig. 8e, the exchange rate still remains explosive
after the relative prices of non-traded goods are taken into account
although the time duration of the explosive behaviour in the s f−t t
N
series is shorter than those from the st series. On the other hand, we
also observe three additional bubble periods from the s f−t t
N series.
Overall, the above results seem to suggest that the relative prices of
traded goods play a crucial role in explaining the explosiveness in the
nominal US Dollar-Philippine Peso exchange rate.
The exclusion of the intercept term for model formulation of
hypothesis yields quite different results as indicated in the right panel
of Fig. 8. The null hypothesis of no explosive behavior for st and s f−t t
T
are not rejected at the 10% significance level while the hypothesis for
s f−t t
N is rejected at the 5%. The episode in 1997-1998 is identified in
all three series (st, s f−t N
T and s f−t t
T ). There are two long-lasting
episodes in st (1999M07-2007M02) and s f−t N
T (2000M03-2007M09)
in Fig. 8b and f, respectively and these results are not expected and may
be spurious. These two episodes are not detected under the model
specification ‘with an intercept’. It seems that the relative prices of
traded goods ft
T explain the majority of exchange rate movements.
5.2.6. Singapore Dollar (SGD)
Unlike most Asian currencies, a managed floating exchange rate
regime was adopted by the Singapore government in 1973 (Lu and Yu,
1999). In 1967, the Board of Commissioners of Currency of Singapore
(BCCS) was established to issue currency. The Monetary Authority of
Singapore (MAS) established in 1971 manages the Singapore Dollar
against a trade-weighed basket of currencies. The Board of
Commissioners of Currency of Singapore merged with the Monetary
Authority of Singapore in October 2002.
As can be seen from Table 5, under the assumption ‘with an
intercept’, we find strong evidence of explosive behaviour in all three
series for USD/SGD at the 1% significance level. As shown in Fig. 9a, a
bubble episode between 1997M09 and 1998M02 as well as several
‘collapse and recovery’ episodes (e.g., 1994M07-1995M08, 2007M09-
2008M08 and 2011M01-2011M09) are observed in st. The bubble
episode during 1997-1998 is associated with the 1997 Asian Financial
Crisis. Neither fN
T or ft
T could explain the explosiveness during the
Asian financial downturn, suggesting evidence of rational bubbles.
More ‘collapse’ episodes have been found in Fig. 9e (e.g., 1994M07-
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1995M11, 2008M02-2008M04 and 2010M08-2011M09). Overall, we
find significant evidence of bubbles during the 1997 Asian Financial
Crisis.
It seems that the exclusion of the intercept for constructing the null
hypothesis has affected the limit theory of the PSY approach. We obtain
quite different results in the two model specifications. When the
intercept is removed in the model specification of null hypothesis, st
and s f−t t
N series are no longer explosive and the test statistics are
lower than the 10% significance level. On the other hand, s f−t t
T
remains explosive at the 5% significance level. These results seem to
suggest that there is little evidence of bubbles. The episode in 1997-
1998 is explosive in Figs. 9b, d and f but it is short-lived. Once the
intercept is removed, we no longer find ‘collapse and recovery’ type of
episodes. Moreover, ft
T does not play an important role in explaining
the majority of the movements in st.
5.3. Results for BRICS countries
We also look for evidence of explosive behavior in BRICS currencies
including the Brazilian Real (BRL), Indian Rupee (INR) and South
African Rand (ZAR) measured against the US Dollar6. Maldonado et al.
(2016) adopt the cointegration approach and detect the presence of
bubbles in BRICS economies' currencies against the US Dollar using
data from 1999M03 to 2013M06. It would be interesting to make a
comparison between our results and those of Maldonado et al. (2016).
5.3.1. Brazilian Real (BRL)
The Brazilian Real was pegged to 1 US Dollar when it was initially
introduced in July 1994. The Real appreciated against the US Dollar in
the early years, but from July 1996, the Real depreciated against the US
Dollar. By the end of 1998, the Real depreciated slowly against the US
Dollar at a rate of 1:1.2. The Real was allowed to fluctuate within a
narrow trading band until early 1999 such that its value was closely
controlled by the government (Gruben and Welch, 2001). The adoption
of the pre-set band provides some flexibility of the exchange rate,
aimed at resolving the inflation problem. The Real was floated in
January 1999 as the government was unable to hold the peg (Ferreira
and Tullio, 2002). As a result, the Real further devalued to a rate of 1:2.
Based on Table 6, the null hypothesis of explosive behavior is
rejected at the 5% significance level for the nominal USD/BRL
exchange rate st. The first bubble period between June 1997 and
March 1999 in Fig. 10a is associated with the devaluation of the Real.
According to Ferreira and Tullio (2002), the price index for non-traded
goods increased by 120 per cent, and the price index for traded goods
increased by about 27 per cent between July 1994 and the end of 1998.
Several short bubble episodes can be seen in Fig. 10a (e.g., 2001M07-
2001M10, 2002M06-2002M07, 2002M09-2002M10) along with a
‘collapse’ episode during 2005M08-2005M11. We then investigate
whether the explosiveness in st is driven by rational bubbles or
exchange rate fundamentals. According to Fig. 10c, s f−t t
T suggests
no evidence of rational bubbles as the ratio is no longer explosive. Thus
ft
T plays a vital role in explaining the volatility of the nominal exchange
rate. On the other hand, the ratio of s f−t t
T is explosive as shown in
Fig. 10e. Hence, ft
N has little contributions in explaining the explo-
siveness.
When the intercept is not used for constructing the hypothesis, st
and s f−t t
N are still significant at the 1% level while the null hypothesis
of no explosive bubbles in s f−t t
T cannot be rejected at the 10% level.
We find evidence of multiple bubbles in Fig. 10b (e.g., 1997M12-
1999M02, 2001M08-2001M11 and 2002M05-2002M10). We cannot
detect those ‘collapse and recovery’ episodes any more in the right
panel of Fig. 10. Interestingly, there is a bubble episode between
2001M07 and 2003M03 in Fig. 10f, which is not identified before. It
seems that ft
T has explained most movements in the exchange rate for
both model formulations. Maldonado et al. (2016) report a lager
Table 5
The GSADF test for exchange rate in emerging markets countries.
Exchange rate Test Stat under H0 with an intercept Episodes Test Stat under H0 without an intercept Episodes
USD/MYR
st 6.8802
a*** 97M08-98M08, 03M03-03M06 3.3746** 97M09-98M02, 98M05-98M08
06M02-06M06, 06M11-08M08
s f−t t
N 8.3895*** 97M08-98M09 3.4557b** 97M09-98M02, 98M05-98M08
s f−t t
T 4.4348*** 97M08-98M02, 07M12-08M05 2.9921 97M09-98M02
USD/PHP
st 5.8052*** 97M08-98M10, 06M12-08M05 2.8246 97M05-99M01, 99M07-07M02
s f−t t




T 3.3214*** 97M08-98M02 2.2802 97M08-98M02, 14M01-14M11
USD/SGD
st 4.7261*** 94M07-95M08, 97M09-98M02 3.1190 97M11-98M02
07M09-08M08, 11M01-11M09
s f−t t




T 3.0141*** 97M07-98M02, 98M05-98M09 3.2448c* 97M08-98M02, 98M05-98M09
14M10-14M12
a*** indicates significance at the 1% level.
b** indicates significance at the 5% level.
c* indicates significance at the 10% level.
6 Due to the lack of the PPI data for Russia, we could not test for the explosive behavior
in the US Dollar-Russian Ruble exchange rate fundamentals. Jiang et al. (2015)
investigated the explosive behavior in the Chinese RMB-US Dollar exchange rate. We
therefore only include the three remaining countries in our analysis.
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bubble from March 1999 to July 2007 and a short-lived bubble in 2008
for Brazil. However, our results for USD/BRL under both model
formulations do not provide similar outcomes.
5.3.2. Indian Rupee (INR)
Results for the nominal US Dollar-India Rupee exchange rate are
presented in Table 6. The GSADF test suggests strong evidence of
bubbles in st as the null of no explosive behavior is rejected at the 1%
Fig. 7. Dating strategy for USD/MYR nominal exchange rate st, the relative ratio of the exchange rate to the traded goods fundamental s f−t t
T and the relative ratio of the exchange rate
to the non-traded goods fundamental s f−t t
N . (a) USD/MYR st with an intercept. (b) USD/MYR st without an intercept. (c) USD/MYR s f−t t
T with an intercept. (d) USD/MYR s f−t t
T
without an intercept. (e) USD/MYR s f−t t
N with an intercept. (f) USD/MYR s f−t t
N without an intercept.
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significance level. Fig. 11a shows the date-stamping results for st and
displays multiple periods of explosiveness including 1995M11-
1996M02, 1998M03-1999M02, 2001M09-2002M05 and 2004M01-
2004M04. The nominal exchange rate st is no longer explosive in
Fig. 11c once the relative prices of traded goods are accounted for. We
find no episodes in Fig. 11c as the relative prices of traded goods
explain the explosiveness in st. A ‘collapse and recovery’ episode
between 2007M05 and 2008M04 is identified in Fig. 11e.
Fig. 8. Dating strategy for USD/PHP nominal exchange rate st, the relative ratio of the exchange rate to the traded goods fundamental s f−t t
T and the relative ratio of the exchange rate
to the non-traded goods fundamental s f−t t
N . (a) USD/PHP st with an intercept. (b) USD/PHP st without an intercept. (c) USD/PHP s f−t t
T with an intercept. (d) USD/PHP s f−t t
T
without an intercept. (e) USD/PHP s f−t t
N with an intercept. (f) USD/PHP s f−t t
N without an intercept.
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The date-stamping results for the model specification under the
assumption of no intercept is quite different as shown in Figs. 11b, d
and f. In Fig. 11b, we find a spurious bubble episode in st from
December 1993 to December 2014 and we do not expect such a long-
lasting bubble. Similarly, a long-lasting episode between December
1993 and February 2007 is detected in s f−t t
N of Fig. 11f. Similarly,
Fig. 9. Dating strategy for USD/SGD nominal exchange rate st, the relative ratio of the exchange rate to the traded goods fundamental s f−t t
T and the relative ratio of the exchange rate
to the non-traded goods fundamental s f−t t
N . (a) USD/SGD st with an intercept. (b) USD/SGD st without an intercept. (c) USD/SGD s f−t t
T with an intercept. (d) USD/SGD s f−t t
T
without an intercept. (e) USD/SGD s f−t t
N with an intercept. (f) USD/SGD s f−t t
N without an intercept.
Y. Hu, L. Oxley Economic Modelling 64 (2017) 419–442
88
Maldonado et al. (2016) also identify a bubble in the US Dollar-India
Rupee exchange rate from March 1999 to early 2007. Our results from
s f−t t
N overlap with those identified in Maldonado et al. (2016).
Although the GSADF test statistic for st and s f−t t
T suggest evidence
of bubbles, these results are spurious and we hardly believe the
existence of genuine bubbles. These results demonstrate the impor-
tance of model specification in right-tailed unit root tests. When the
intercept is excluded in the model formulation for constructing the null
hypothesis, we could obtain some spurious and unexpected results (i.e.,
a spurious long-lasting episode). Thus it is important to assess a wide
range of model specifications in the null.
5.3.3. South African Rand (ZAR)
We find strong evidence of bubbles in the nominal USD/ZAR
exchange rate st as shown in Table 6 as the null of no bubbles is
rejected at the 1% significance level. Multiple bubbles periods are
identified in Fig. 12a including 1994M01-1994M08, 1996M03-
1997M01, 1998M04-1998M10, 1998M12-1999M04 and 2000M08-
2002M09. According to Figs. 12c and e, the relative prices of traded
goods ft
T have explained the majority of the movements in the nominal
exchange rate. As both the relative prices of traded goods fundamentals
and non-traded goods fundamentals cannot explain all the explosive-
ness in the nominal exchange rate, we therefore conclude the evidence
of rational bubbles.
Comparing the left panel and right panel of Fig. 12, we obtain very
different date-stamping results. Both st and s f−t t
N series remain
explosive at the 1% significance level. However, s f−t t
T is no longer
explosive as ft
T could explain some explosiveness in st. More im-
portantly, we find a long-lasting bubble episode from 1993M11 to
2003M09 in both st and s f−t t
N series and this episode is spurious.
Maldonado et al. (2016) identify two bubbles in the US Dollar–South
African Rand exchange rate. The first one is from March 1999 to early
2003 and the second one originates and collapses in 2009. Our bubble
detection results from st in Fig. 12b and s f−t t
N in Fig. 12f overlap with
the first bubble identified from Maldonado et al. (2016). However, our
empirical results are not in line with those in Jirasakuldech et al.
(2006), who find no evidence of bubbles in the US Dollar-South African
Rand exchange rate between January 1989 and December 2004. Our
results based on two model formulations indicate that the intercept
term has greatly affected the asymptotic theory and the date-stamping
strategy of the PSY approach. As discussed before, without considering
the intercept in the null, the PSY approach no longer identifies
‘collapse’ episodes and ‘collapse and recovery’ episodes but this
example shows that it could lead to spurious bubbles.
5.4. Results for other emerging markets countries
In this section, we test for the existence of exchange rate bubbles in
the US Dollar against Colombian Peso and Mexican Peso and the
corresponding bubble detection results are provided in Table 7. The
collapse of the Mexican Peso in 1994–95 was widely regarded as one of
the exchange rate crises in the 20th century. Colombia has also
experienced a banking crisis in late 1990s and followed by a currency
crisis.
5.4.1. Colombian Peso (COP)
As shown in Table 7, the null hypothesis of no bubbles in the USD-
COP exchange rate st is rejected at the 10% level
7. Fig. 13a illustrates
two episodes (1997M09-2001M10 and 2002M07-2003M04). The first
episode between the late 1990 s and early 2000 s is likely related with
Table 6
The GSADF test for exchange rate in emerging markets countries.
Exchange rate Test Stat under H0 with an intercept Episodes Test Stat under H0 without an intercept Episodes
USD/BRL
st 2.2281








T 0.8156 1.8511 98M08-98M12
USD/INR
st 2.7861*** 95M11-96M02, 98M03-99M02 4.0151** 93M12-14M12
01M09-02M05, 04M01-04M04
s f−t t








N 4.9297*** 94M02-94M08, 96M03-97M02 5.0760*** 93M11-03M09
97M09-99M08, 00M08-02M11
s f−t t
T 2.1865** 98M06-98M08, 00M10-01M04 2.8881 96M03-96M12, 98M05-98M09
01M09-02M03 00M04-02M04
a** indicates significance at the 5% level.
b*** indicates significance at the 1% level.
7 We let r0=0.15 for the following analysis. If we let r T= 0.01 + 1.8/0 and T is 286, r0
is approximately to 12%. We find that r0 is not larger enough for initial estimation and
therefore consider a larger r0.
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the Colombian Banking Crisis, see Gomez-Gonzalez and Kiefer (2009).
The Colombian Banking Crisis during the late 1990s is also accom-
panied by a currency crisis, and the exchange rate regime is abandoned
and is allowed to float freely in 1999 (Arias, 2000). s f−t t
T is no longer
explosive in Fig. 13c. On the contrary, the relative prices of non-traded
goods fundamentals play little role in explaining the explosiveness of
exchange rates as s f−t t
N is still explosive. In addition, we spot two
‘collapse’ episodes in Fig. 13e (e.g., 2007M04-2007M07 and 2008M01-
Fig. 10. Dating strategy for USD/BRL nominal exchange rate st, the relative ratio of the exchange rate to the traded goods fundamental s f−t t
T and the relative ratio of the exchange rate
to the non-traded goods fundamental s f−t t
N . (a) USD/BRL st with an intercept. (b) USD/BRL st without an intercept. (c) USD/BRL s f−t t
T with an intercept. (d) USD/BRL s f−t t
T
without an intercept. (e) USD/BRL s f−t t
N with an intercept. (f) USD/BRL s f−t t
N without an intercept.
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2008M08).
Model formulation in the null hypothesis seems to have an impact
on the PSY approach as detailed in Figs. 13b, d and f. The PSY
approach detects two long-lasting episodes in Fig. 13b (1994M08-
2014M12) and Fig. 13f (1995M06-2008M02) and these results are not
expected and spurious. Thus the rejection of no bubbles in the null
hypothesis under the assumption ‘without an intercept’ in the PSY
could lead to some spurious episodes. Even if the GSADF test statistic
for st and s f−t t
N indicate evidence of bubbles, we hardly believe the
presence of genuine bubbles on a close inspection of the actual
exchange rate series.
Fig. 11. Dating strategy for USD/INR nominal exchange rate st, the relative ratio of the exchange rate to the traded goods fundamental s f−t t
T and the relative ratio of the exchange rate
to the non-traded goods fundamental s f−t t
N . (a) USD/INR st with an intercept. (b) USD/INR st without an intercept. (c) USD/INR s f−t t
T with an intercept. (d) USD/INR s f−t t
T
without an intercept. (e) USD/INR s f−t t
N with an intercept. (f) USD/INR s f−t t
N without an intercept.
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5.4.2. Mexican Peso (MXN)
The Mexican Peso was pegged to the US Dollar and the Peso was
allowed to appreciate or depreciate against the US Dollar within a
narrow target band. The Mexican central bank maintained the peg by
frequently intervening in exchange rate markets (Whitt, 1996). As can
be seen from Table 7, we find evidence of explosive behavior in the
Fig. 12. Dating strategy for USD/ZAR nominal exchange rate st, the relative ratio of the exchange rate to the traded goods fundamental s f−t t
T and the relative ratio of the exchange rate
to the non-traded goods fundamental s f−t t
N . (a) USD/ZAR st with an intercept. (b) USD/ZAR st without an intercept. (c) USD/ZAR s f−t t
T with an intercept. (d) USD/ZAR s f−t t
T
without an intercept. (e) USD/ZAR s f−t t
N with an intercept. (f) USD/ZAR s f−t t
N without an intercept.
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nominal Dollar-Mexican Peso exchange rate st under the assumption of
the intercept8. The null hypothesis of no bubbles in st can be rejected at
the 1% significance level. We observe two episodes from Fig. 14a (i.e.,
1994M02-1994M04, 1994M12-1995M04).
Importantly, our results support the finding of explosiveness in
USD/MXN between 1994 and 1995. The episode between 1994M12
and 1995M04 cannot be explained by two exchange rate fundamentals,
which indicates the presence of rational bubbles. The 1994 Mexican
currency crisis is one of the most well-known exchange rate crises in
the literature. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
came into force at the beginning of 1994 and was signed by Canada,
Mexico and the US. The agreement aimed at encouraging foreign
investors to take advantage of Mexican's access to the US market and
lowering trade barriers between two countries (Whitt, 1996). However,
in fewer than 12 months, the crisis exploded in December 1994, when
the Mexican government suddenly devalued the Peso by 15%.
Devaluation of the Peso led to a deep crisis in Mexico's financial
services sector (Wilson et al., 2000). Thus the USD/MXN crisis of
1994-1995 is a bubble, which is of particular interest. However, when
the intercept is removed from model formulation under the null
hypothesis, all three series (st, s f−t t
N and s f−t t
T ) are not explosive.
The null hypothesis of no bubbles cannot be rejected at the 10% level,
suggesting no bubbles in USD/MXN. Although there are short-lived
episodes in Figs. 14b and f during 1994–1995, we could not conclude
that the crisis of 1994-1995 is a bubble when the intercept term is
excluded in the null.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we test for the explosiveness in the nominal exchange
rate and if it is identified, investigate the cause of the explosiveness. We
then explore whether the explosiveness in the nominal exchange rate is
driven by rational bubbles or exchange rate fundamentals. We concur
with Bettendorf and Chen (2013), that explosiveness in the asset price
does not, on its own, imply the existence of rational bubbles, where it is
necessary to consider the role played by economic fundamentals in
asset prices. Following the recent work of Bettendorf and Chen (2013)
and Jiang et al. (2015), we use the GSADF test of Phillips et al. (2015a,
PSY) to investigate the evidence of exchange rate bubbles for both G10
and emerging markets countries (including some Asian and BRICS
countries). The results can be summarized as follows.
Results for some G10 cross rates as presented in Tables 1, 2, 3
suggest, no evidence of bubbles in most exchange rate pairs with only a
few exceptions. Under the assumption ‘with an intercept’, the GSADF
test statistic for the Sterling-Swiss Franc and Sterling-Japanese Yen
seems to suggest evidence of bubbles as the test statistic is significant at
the 1% or 5% level in Table 1. In fact, the PSY identifies several
‘collapse’ episodes rather than bubbles as it cannot distinguish between
‘collapse’ episodes and bubbles if the intercept term is included in the
null. Hence, we find little evidence of bubbles in these two exchange
rate pairs.
Some interesting results are obtained from the Asian currencies.
First, in line with the theory of Engel (1999) and Betts and Kehoe
(2005), the relative prices of traded goods play an important role in
explaining the majority of the movements in the US Dollar-Philippine
Peso, US Dollar-Indonesian Rupiah and US Dollar-Singapore Dollar
(under the model specification ‘with an intercept’) exchange rates.
Second, our results indicate that the exchange rate movements between
Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and the US cannot be explained by the
theory of Engel (1999) and Betts and Kehoe (2005). We conclude that
exchange rate fundamentals (the relative prices of traded goods and
non-traded goods) do not explain the explosiveness in the US Dollar-
Thai Baht and US Dollar-Korean Won exchange rates, which confirm
the presence of rational bubbles. Unlike existing studies, our empirical
results also suggest that the relative prices of traded goods don't
explain most movements in the US Dollar-Malaysian Ringgit exchange
rate under two model specifications. Last, we find evidence of bubbles
or rational bubbles in several Asian currencies during the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis and also identify several ‘collapse’ episodes and
‘collapse and recovery’ episodes.
Our results from the three BRICS countries (e.g., Brazil, India and
South African) suggest that the relative prices of traded goods account
for the majority of the movements in exchange rates, which confirms
Engel (1999) and Betts and Kehoe (2005). Overall, we find evidence of
bubbles for these currencies but some evidence obtained from the
model specification ‘without an intercept’ is spurious (e.g., Indian
Rupee and South African Rand).
We also find evidence of explosive behavior in the US Dollar-
Colombian Peso exchange rate but the evidence obtained from the
model specification ‘without an intercept’ is spurious. The explosive-
ness in the US Dollar-Colombian Peso seems to be explained by the
relative prices of traded goods. Moreover, we find significant evidence
of explosive behavior in the US Dollar-Mexican Peso exchange rate as
well. Our results also support the hypothesis that there is a bubble in
the US Dollar-Mexican Peso exchange rate during the 1994–1995
Mexican currency crisis and this finding should be of some consider-
able interest.
Table 7
The GSADF test for exchange rate in emerging markets countries.
Exchange rate Test Stat under H0 with an intercept Episodes Test Stat under H0 without an intercept Episodes
USD/COP
st 2.1757
a** 97M09-01M10, 02M07-03M04 5.4578b*** 94M08-14M12
s f−t t
N 2.7464*** 97M09-03M11, 05M11-06M03 4.9002*** 95M06-08M02, 08M09-09M05
07M04-07M07, 08M01-08M08
s f−t t
T 0.7397 94M08-94M12 2.1901 00M08-01M05, 02M07-03M04
USD/MXN
st 3.5056*** 94M02-94M04, 94M12-95M04 2.5653 98M08-98M11, 03M01-03M03
s f−t t
N 3.3521*** 94M02-94M04, 94M11-95M03 2.6254 98M08-99M03, 02M12-03M02
98M08-98M11, 08M04-08M08 04M04-04M10
s f−t t
T 1.8151 94M11-95M03 1.9643
a** indicates significance at the 5% level.
b*** indicates significance at the 1% level.
8 We let r0=0.05 for the following analysis. This is due to the fact that the sample data
starts from January 1993 and we would like to test for the evidence of exchange rate
bubbles during Mexican currency crisis in 1994–1995. We also carry out an analysis by
letting r T= 0.01 + 1.8/0 and do not find significant evidence of bubbles.
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Overall, we obtain quite different results when using a model
specification ‘without an intercept’ in the null hypothesis. Firstly, the
null hypothesis of no explosive bubbles is frequently not rejected as the
critical values become larger under the model specification without an
intercept. Secondly, when the intercept term is included in the model
formulation for constructing the null hypothesis, we will identify both
‘collapse’ episodes, ‘collapse and recovery’ episodes and potential
bubbles as the PSY cannot distinguish between the ‘collapse’ type of
episodes and bubbles. Thirdly, if the null hypothesis involves no
intercept, the ‘collapse’ type of episodes will not be identified by the
Fig. 13. Dating strategy for USD/COP nominal exchange rate st, the relative ratio of the exchange rate to the traded goods fundamental s f−t t
T and the relative ratio of the exchange rate
to the non-traded goods fundamental s f−t t
N . (a) USD/COP st with an intercept. (b) USD/COP st without an intercept. (c) USD/COP s f−t t
T with an intercept. (d) USD/COP s f−t t
T
without an intercept. (e) USD/COP s f−t t
N with an intercept. (f) USD/COP s f−t t
N without an intercept.
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PSY approach but some episodes may be spurious (e.g., Philippine
Peso, Indian Rupee, South African Rand and Colombian Peso). In
short, the intercept term affects the asymptotic theory and date-
stamping strategy of the PSY approach. The inclusion of the intercept
demonstrates the practical importance in right-tailed unit root tests. It
is of great importance to assess a wide range of specifications in the
null and make a suitable choice. Finally, it seems that newly emerging
economies are more likely to exhibit bubbles in the exchange rate than
Fig. 14. Dating strategy for USD/MXN nominal exchange rate st, the relative ratio of the exchange rate to the traded goods fundamental s f−t t
T and the relative ratio of the exchange
rate to the non-traded goods fundamental s f−t t
N . (a) USD/MXN st with an intercept. (b) USD/MXN st without an intercept. (c) USD/MXN s f−t t
T with an intercept. (d) USD/MXN
s f−t t
T without an intercept. (e) USD/MXN s f−t t
N with an intercept. (f) USD/MXN s f−t t
N without an intercept.
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more mature countries, perhaps because their monetary policy stances
are somewhat looser than for example, those in the G10.
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Chapter 4
Exuberance, Bubbles or Froth?
Some Results using Very Long
Run Historical House Price Data
for Amsterdam, Norway and
Paris.
Abstract
The idea that house prices can experience periods of ‘bubbles’ has recently gained
support with some suggesting they were either a cause or effect of the Global
Financial Crisis. In this research, we econometrically test whether historical house
prices exhibit bubbles and, if they do, whether contagion from other historical
financial crises are mirrored in these housing markets. We apply the generalized
sup ADF (GSADF) test of Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015a, PSY) and long memory
estimators of Geweke and Porter-Hudak (1983), Robinson (1995) and Shimotsu
(2010) to search for evidence of exuberance or bubbles in several historical housing
price indices, in particular, the Herengracht index for Amsterdam (1649-2010),
Norway (1819-2014) and Paris (1650-2012). We find, firstly, there is little evidence
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of exuberance in the real Herengracht index or of bubbles in the house price-
rent ratio for Amsterdam. Secondly, our results provide evidence of exuberance
in Norwegian house prices, where exuberant episodes coincide with the major
financial crises in Norwegian history. Thirdly, evidence of exuberance is found in
the historical house price series of Paris only for a particular model specification.
House price exuberance appears to be a very recent phenomenon as no explosive
behaviour is detected in these house price series before 1850. Fourthly, our results
from PSY are generally in line with those obtained from long memory models
based on the mean value of d but not the revelent 95% confidence intervals.
Keyword
Bubbles; Generalized sup ADF test; Exuberance; House prices; Herengracht In-
dex; Norway; Paris
JEL classifications: G01; N2; N90; R30; R39
4.1 Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and its aftermath, the Great Recession, has
popularized the idea that house prices can exhibit “bubbles” and although some
economists continue to deny their existence, several central banks have decided
to try and cool their hot domestic housing markets1. Perhaps the most famous
deniers, Case and Shiller (2003), consider that the early 2000s were not in fact
the beginning of a house price bubble in the US, but that income growth driven
“fundamentals” could explain why houses were more affordable than they had
been in 1995. Similarly, McCarthy and Peach (2004) and Himmelberg et al.
(2005) conclude that, based on data from 1980-2004, real estate prices could be
1In 2014 the Reserve Bank of New Zealand introduced minimum deposit requirements to try
and deflate what they saw as a bubbly Auckland housing market. The paper by Greenaway-
McGrevy and Phillips (2016) supports this conclusion and that a similar, but more pervasive
bubble occurred in New Zealand house prices in 2003.
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explained by fundamentals alone. Recent work by Hu and Oxley (2018a) leads to
conclusions that dispute these traditional views.
Identifying bubbles, or periods of aberrant, exuberant, price changes empirically,
however, is a difficult and often controversial exercise, one made harder by the
relatively short sample periods used by some recent authors see for example,
Del Negro and Otrok (2007), Goodman and Thibodeau (2008), Wheaton and
Nechayev (2008) and Mayer (2011). It seems particularly hard to identify such
episodes when bubbles grow, but deflate slowly rather than ‘bursting with a bang’,
see Ambrose et al. (2013).
It is well-documented that the presence of a unit root in log price-dividend ra-
tio implies rational bubbles, see Diba and Grossman (1988), Froot and Obstfeld
(1991) and Craine (1993). When standard unit root tests are employed in such
studies, they report mixed results, perhaps because such tests find it hard to dis-
tinguish between a unit root and a fractional-order root (a near unit root). Several
studies, therefore, have applied long memory models to test for the presence of
bubbles, for example, see Cuñado et al. (2005), Cuñado et al. (2012), Koustas and
Serletis (2005), Frömmel and Kruse (2012). Long memory models have also been
applied to housing markets, see Barros et al. (2012), although such applications
are rare. The presence of a long memory process is inconsistent with rational
bubbles. Following a recent study of Ramanan (2016) on US housing markets
using long memory models, we will consider a range of estimators for long mem-
ory focusing, in particular, on the semi-parametric two-step exact local Whittle
procedures of Shimotsu (2010) to estimate the value of the long memory param-
eter d for historical house price series. This particular estimator is consistent for
d ∈ (1
2
, 1) and robust to non-normality and heteroskedastic errors.
In terms of recent econometric testing, however, Phillips and co-authors (Phillips
and Yu (2011), Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011)2, Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015a, PSY),
Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015b)) have developed right-tailed only unit root tests to
2Harvey, Leybourne, Sollis, and Taylor (2016) investigate the non-stationary volatility effect
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“date-stamp” bubbles, even (different) bubble episodes that might occur multiple
times in a long time series. Their empirical examples include analysis of 150
years of data for the S&P 500, the NASDAQ during the 1990s, and recently an
investigation of the housing market in Auckland, New Zealand see Greenaway-
McGrevy and Phillips (2016). Hu and Oxley (2018b) also investigate the famous
South Sea and Mississippi Bubbles during the period 1719-1720.
A crucial starting point for the discussion and identification of bubbles relates
to how they are defined. We follow the standard approach that defines price
movements in relation to some ‘fundamental’. In terms of house prices this might
be a price-to-rental cost ratio; a price-to-average income ratio etc, for example,
the PSY approach is often applied to a price-fundamental ratio to assess the
explosive behaviour. Because this is a right-tail only test, if we reject the null
hypothesis of a unit root, we conclude in favor of explosive behavior for xt. If the
time series xt involves an economic fundamental
3, we may conclude that a finding
of explosive behavior denotes the presence of a bubble. Alternatively, if the time
series xt doesn’t involve an economic fundamental, but simply a proxy like price-
to-income ratio, we may only conclude that a finding of explosive behavior is
evidence of an exuberant episode. Without a fundamental series to compare the
time path of (e.g, house) prices to, econometric tests, including those of PSY,
can only identify periods of exuberant growth (or decline) in the series, which
may be a necessary property of a bubble, but is not sufficient (without a model
for the fundamental). If the measured series is neither a bubble nor a period of
exuberance (or alternatively collapse in prices), then we refer to changes over time
in the market as ‘frothy’.
In this paper, apart from long memory models, we will utilize the econometric
approaches of PSY and variants thereof, to consider the extent to which house
on the reliability of the Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011) test and propose wild bootstrap implemen-
tation of this test to overcome the spurious indications of explosive bubbles.
3The time series xt is commonly expressed as a ratio (e.g., house prices/ rents or income,
stock prices/ dividends).
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price bubbles or periods of exuberant behavior are exclusively recent behavior
or whether history provides similar time series episodes. In particular, we will
consider the time series properties (long memory) and results of PSY-type tests
applied to three long-term series; 355 years of the Herengracht, Amsterdam house
price series (see, Eichholtz (1997), Ambrose et al. (2013), and Eichholtz et al.
(2015)); house prices in four of the five main Norwegian cities (Oslo, Bergen,
Trondheim and Kristiansand) between 1819-1989 (see Eitrheim and Erlandsen
(2004)) and Friggit (2001)’s house price series for Paris, 1650-20124.
We investigate the explosiveness of these historical house price indices for several
reasons. First, long-term house price indices are extremely scarce. Most house
price indices in the literature exist for a few decades or even less. However,
there are few exceptions for example, Eichholtz (1997) has constructed a house
price index of an area of Amsterdam since 1628, which is widely known as the
Herengracht index. The Herengracht index reports house prices over a 350 year
period in one of the most prestigious locations in Amsterdam in the Netherlands.
Friggit (2001) has constructed an annual house price index for Paris (1200-2012),
which is regarded as the longest historical house price series in the literature.
Eitrheim and Erlandsen (2004) have also developed annual house price indices for
four main Norwegian cities since 1819. In addition, an aggregate Norwegian index
has also been created.
Second, these historical series represent different types of real estate markets in
terms of their coverage. For example, the Herengracht index covers a small area
in Amsterdam while the Paris and the city-level Norwegian indices represent the
whole city. The aggregate Norwegian index simply measures the house price
inflation for the whole country. It would seem to be of interest to investigate
4Recently, Blöndal (2015) investigated the possibility of speculative bubbles in the Stockholm
housing market 1875-1935, using a newly created series and tests based upon the existence
of common trends in a cointegrating regression framework. He concluded that there was no
indication of a speculative bubble in the Stockholm housing market. His sample period is
relatively short for our purposes.
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explosive behavior in different types of real estate markets and this is what we do
here.
Third, being very long data, these series appear to be ideal candidates to apply
the PSY approach in the search for house price bubbles and potential contagion as
it allows for the possibility of multiple bubble episodes. For example, Amsterdam
experienced several crisis episodes in its history including the Mississippi Bubble
(1719-1720), the South Sea Bubble (1720), the Amsterdam Banking Crisis of
1763 and the Credit Crisis of 1772. Similarly, several severe banking crises have
occurred in Norway especially during the 19th century (1899-1905, 1920-1928 and
1988-1993), see Gerdrup (2004) and Vale (2004). Grytten and Hunnes (2010)
also discuss nine major financial crises in Norway’s history since independence
in 1814. There are also several major historical bubbles/crises in French history
including the Mississippi Bubble (1719-1720), the Crisis of 1763, the Crisis of
1772 and the French stock market crisis of 1882. Fourth, there exist a clearly
recorded historiography and sets of complementary data, which allow possible
bubble/exuberant periods, identified by the time series approaches of PSY, to be
scrutinized against contemporary events. We utilize this extant historiography to
consider the extent to which events identified by the tests could likely have been
driven by events of the time.
There are several contributions from this research. First, the majority of existing
studies investigate the presence of housing bubbles using a short series with no
more than a few decades. Those short house price series tend to be associated with
a fewer (possible/likely) bubble episodes and are typically pre-screened in that
they are chosen to test whether a particular episode was bubbly. To this extent
any published evidence of recent bubbles could be pre-test biased. Our paper
attempts to overcome some of these problems by considering very long periods
of data where one might expect to identify a range of possible episodes, calm,
froth, exuberance, and bubbles. Our approach does not attempt to ‘cherry pick’ a
particular period with an expected high probability of a bubble, but to trace the
102
time series behaviour over a very long period of time. Second, prior to the results
presented here, no housing bubbles or house price exuberance has been reported or
investigated using these powerful PSY-type bubble detection tests using historical
data prior to 1900. Unlike the famous stock price bubbles of the Mississippi,
the South Sea and the British Railway Mania in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, house price bubbles seem to be a very recent phenomenon. Among
many prominent bubble episodes, there are only two well-documented housing
bubbles in thoroughly researched in recent history: Japan’s real estate bubble in
the 1980-90s and the US housing bubble during the 2000s. Our paper therefore
contributes to the literature by investigating house price exuberance/bubbles prior
to 1900. Third, although some authors (e.g., Friggit (2008), Ambrose et al. (2013)
and Eichholtz et al. (2015)) have undertaken some statistical analysis of these
historical house price series, none have formally tested for the existence of bubbles
or price exuberance. Moreover, their statistical tests cannot locate the origination
and termination of bubbles. However, an econometric test that formally tests for
evidence of bubble or price exuberance (and allows for multiple episodes of such)
is now available see Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011), Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2014) and
Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015a, PSY). The more recent right-tailed unit root test of
Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015a, PSY) in particular, is ideally suited to the search
for multiple bubbles/exuberant episodes in the house price series of Amsterdam,
Norway and Paris. In this study, we present empirical results based on different
model specifications and lag order selection.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an
overview of the data used5. Section 4.3 provides a brief description of the long
memory estimators of Geweke and Porter-Hudak (1983), Robinson (1995) and Shi-
motsu (2010) and the GSADF test of Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015a). Section 4.4
provides results for the long run house price series and Section 4.5 concludes.
5An excellent description of the data including sampling, coverage and sources can be found
in Friggit (2008) and the references therein.
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4.2 Data
This section describes the three historical housing price indices used in the paper
and the time series plots of these indices are shown in Figure 4.1. We also construct
the house price-rent ratio for Amsterdam, which is presented as Figure 4.2.
4.2.1 The Herengracht Index (1649-2010) and the Bien-
nial Herengracht Index (1628-1973)
The Herengracht index was sourced from Piet Eichholtz’s website for the period
1649-2010. We also obtain the biennial Herengracht index between 1628 and
1973 from Eichholtz (1997). These data represent an update on the biennial
series (1628-1973) first presented and discussed extensively in Eichholtz (1997),
updated to 2005 in Ambrose et al. (2013) and Eichholtz et al. (2015). Figure 4.1a
and Figure 4.1b (below) provide the time series plots of the real Herengracht index
and biennial Herengracht index (both on a log scale)6.
The series cover, on a biennial basis, 4877 properties located along the banks
of the Herengracht, a canal in Amsterdam. In the Golden Age of this city, the
17th century, this area was the most fashionable place in the Netherlands. It
was urbanized very early: by 1680 nearly all the lots along the canal had been
developed. The index was created using a repeat sales method by comparing the
successive sale price of buildings. 4252 transaction prices for the 1628-1973 period
were collected, which means on average around 12.3 prices per year.
The only quality effect taken into account is the use of the buildings. Beginning in
the 19th century, but especially in the 1920s and 1930s, many buildings along the
Herengracht were changed into offices, which increased their value. Buildings used
as offices have been excluded from the calculation. All other quality effects have
6The real Herengracht index is deflated by the CPI from van Zanden (2005).
7487 presently, as opposed to 614 originally, this decrease stemming from the combination of
lots to allow for the construction of bigger buildings.
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not been filtered out, thus if for example central heating was installed between
two successive transactions, the resulting effect of this amenity on the price is
ignored.
4.2.1.1 House Price-rent Ratio for the Herengracht (1628-1850)
Ambrose et al. (2013) created an Amsterdam house price-rent ratio for the period
1650-2005, however, this ratio is not publicly available. Thus, we construct the
house price-rent ratio (1628-1850) to assess the evidence of housing bubbles using
data obtained from Eichholtz (1997) and Eichholtz et al. (2012). The nominal
biennial Herengracht index 1628 and 1850 was obtained from Eichholtz (1997)
and is shown in Figure 4.2a. We utilise the temporal disaggregation method of
Dagum and Cholette (2006) to disaggregate the nominal biennial Herengracht
index series (1628-1850) to the annual Herengracht index series (1628-1850) and
is displayed as Figure 4.2b. The rent index obtained from Eichholtz et al. (2012)
is presented as Figure 4.2c and we select the sub-period 1628 and 1850. A house
price-rent ratio was calculated and presented as Figure 4.2d.
4.2.2 House prices in Norway (1819-2014)
The house price indices for Norway are from Eitrheim and Erlandsen (2004) and
can be downloaded from Norges Bank8. Figure 4.1c provides the real house price
index9 in Norway (1912=100, both in log scale) between 1819 and 2014 with
195 observations. The construction of this annual house price index, 1819-2014, is
described in some detail in (Eitrheim and Erlandsen, 2004, p.357) and is calculated
by a hedonic-weighted repeat sales (hybrid) approach based upon transaction
prices in the property registers to 1985 and per square meter from 1986 (based
upon data from the Norwegian Association of Real Estate Agents). In particular,
the indices are constructed on the basis of nominal transaction prices of property,
8The house price index can be accessed from http://www.norges-
bank.no/en/Statistics/Historical-monetary-statistics/.
9The real house price index is deflated by the CPI from Grytten (2004).
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compiled from the archives of real property registers of the four cities (Eitrheim
and Erlandsen, 2005, p.8). Only buildings located in the centre of the respective
town are used and the types of buildings vary from rental apartment blocks to
single family homes.
In addition to the national level series, data are available separately for four of
the five main Norwegian cities, Oslo (1841-2014), Bergen (1819-2014), Trondheim
(1897-2014) and Kristiansand (1867-2014). Due to data availability, the samples
for these four cities cover different years in the 1800s. A weighted repeat sales
method is used to construct the city house price indices, which are described in
(Eitrheim and Erlandsen, 2005, p.15).
4.2.3 House prices in Paris (1200-2012)
The house price index for Paris was constructed by Friggit (2008) using several
different sources including, d’Avenel (1894), Duon (1946), Friggit (2001) and cov-
ers the period 1200 to 2012 (2000=100). The time series plot of the real house
price index is given as Figure 4.1d. The real series are deflated by a consumer
price index from several sources. Friggit (2008) presents an extensive discussion
of four related price indices for Paris and from this constructs his own Friggit
(2001):
(i) d’Avenel (1894) who provides a series of average home prices (averaged over
25 years) for Paris, 1200-1800. No adjustments are made for house quality
changes;
(ii) Duon (1943a,b) creates two variants of a repeat sales home price index for
Paris. For the period 1790-1850 the calculations are based upon 10 year
periods 1790-1850 and for 1840-1944 a yearly home price index; Notaries
databases. This index applies to apartments sold by the unit and is based
upon a record of transactions (both current and previous transactions for the
unit are recorded). Quality changes are not recorded or recognised. Some
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34,594 transaction pairs were used to construct the index for the period
1944-1999;
(iii) Notaires-INSEE index. For the years after 1999 an annualised value for
quarterly Notaries-INSEE indices can be constructed based upon hedonic
indices (see here Gouriéroux and Laferrère (2009));
(iv) Based upon the properties of these indices, Friggit (2001, 2008) constructs a
Paris house price 1840-2006 (updated to 2012) which has been adjusted for
obsolescence prior to 1914 (see Friggit (2008) for details).
4.3 Method
Testing for the existence of bubbles has followed three basic routes: i) cointegration-
based tests for example, Campbell and Shiller (1987); ii) the long-memory/fractional
integration approach; iii) the right tailed only, date-stamping approach of PSY.
In this paper, we will concentrate on ii) and iii) as the cointegration based tests
are indirect tests which do not reject the no-bubble hypothesis if the price is coin-
tegrated with the fundamental value. For example if the house price to rent ratio
is stationary or house price is cointegrated with the fundamental price then the
no bubble hypothesis cannot be rejected. The approach is not well suited for tests
of multiple bubbles (something we are keen to test for) and is now rarely used in
the literature as it has been superseded by ii) and iii).
4.3.1 Long Memory Estimation
A number of studies for example, Gil-Alana and Hualde (2009) and Barros et al.
(2012) utilize the notion of persistence as exhibited by long-memory processes
to define testable hypotheses about the existence or otherwise of bubbles using
estimates (d) of a fractional integration (long memory) process; 0 < d < 1.
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Figure 4.1 – (a) The real Herengracht index (1649=100, both in log scale) between
1649 and 2010; (b) the real biennial Herengracht index (1628=100, both in log scale)
between 1628 and 1973; (c) the real house price index in Norway (1912=100, both
in log scale) between 1819 and 2014; (d) the real house price index in Paris between
1650 and 2012 (2000=100, in log scale).




< d < 0 stationary or overdifferenced, mean reverting, no rational
bubble;
• d = 0 stationary, no rational bubble;
10See Ramanan (2016) for an extended discussion of the rational bubble.
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Figure 4.2 – (a) The nominal biennial Herengracht index (1628-1973, 1628=100) is
obtained from Eichholtz (1997); (b) The nominal annual Herengracht index (1628-
1973, 1628=100) is obtained using the temporal disaggregation method of Dagum
and Cholette (2006); (c) The nominal rent index (1628-1850, 1628=100) is obtained
from Eichholtz et al. (2012); (d) A house price-rent ratio for this period is therefore
calculated (1628=100, in log scale).
• 0 < d < 1
2
possesses long memory and mean reversion, no rational bubble;
• 1
2
< d < 1 non-stationary ARFIMA process. Long memory but mean
reverting, no rational bubble;
• d ≥ 1 non-stationary and explosive process, no mean reversion, rational
bubble.
As was demonstrated in Rea et al. (2013), ‘not all estimators (of d) are born equal’
and it is important to be aware of the various properties of alternative estimation
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methods for d given how crucial it is in this approach to determine whether there
is prima facie evidence of bubbles or not. The sample sizes available in the data
used here cover long historical periods, but the number of observations is relatively
small compared to the typical high frequency financial data used to estimate long
memory processes. As a result, we consider three methods to estimate the value
of the long memory parameter, d, i) GPH estimator of Geweke and Porter-Hudak
(1983); ii)the local Whittle estimator of Kuensch (1987) and Robinson (1995); iii)
and the two-step exact local Whittle estimator of Shimotsu (2010). As will be
seen in the reported results one of the major issues with very popular estimators
like GPH is its lack of efficiency in small samples. Unlike other studies estimating
d we will report not only the mean estimate but also its standard error (se).
4.3.1.1 GPH Estimator
Geweke and Porter-Hudak (1983) develop the so-called GPH estimator to estimate
d of the ARFIMA model using log-periodogram regression. The periodogram of





















, for j = 1, . . . , T. (4.2)





Regressing the log of the periodogram Ix(ωj) on the log of the spectrum density
fx(ω) gives,
logIx(ωk) = c− dlog(4 sin2 πω) + εk, (4.4)
where c is a constant, ωk = k/T and k = 1, . . . , n < T/2. The OLS estimate of
dGPH is then calculated.
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4.3.1.2 Local Whittle Estimator
The local Whittle estimator is proposed by Kuensch (1987) and Robinson (1995).
The following notation is taken from Robinson (1995) and Ramanan (2016). The





















where Ix(λj) is the periodogram of Xt evaluated at the fundamental frequencies
and Xt is a fractional process with order d.






where ∆1 and ∆2 are numbers such that 0 < ∆1 < ∆2 < ∞. The local Whittle
estimator of d̂ is denoted as d̂LWE.
4.3.1.3 Two-step Exact Local Whittle Estimator
Shimotsu (2010) proposed a 2-step ELW estimator that allows for an unknown
mean and a trend. The data Xt can be generated by




t = (1− L)−d0utI {t ≥ 1} (4.9)
where µ0 is a non-random unknown finite number.
Shimotsu (2010) estimates the unknown mean µ0 as a linear combination of the
sample mean X̄ and the first observation X1:
ũ(d) = ω(d)X̄ + (1− ω(d))X1, (4.10)
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where ω(d) is a twice continuously differentiable weight function such that ω(d) =
1 for d 6= 1/2 and ω(d) = 0 for d ≥ 3/4.
The modified ELW objective function is given by











The estimation of the long memory parameter d is achieved by a 2-step procedure.
The 2-step exact local Whittle estimator d̂2ELW is given by
d̂2ELW = d̂T −R′F (d̂T )/R′′F (d̂T ), (4.12)
where d̂T is the first step estimator and RF (d) is the modified objective function
given in Equation (4.11). The two-step ELW estimator d̂2ELW can be extended to
the cases where the data have a polynomial time trend with an unknown mean:
Xt = µ0 + β10t+ β20t
2 + · · ·+ βk0tk +X0t ; X0t = (1− L)−d0utI {t ≥ 1} (4.13)
The long memory parameter d can be estimated by applying the two-step esti-
mation to the residuals X̂t. We will denote the two-step ELW estimator with
detrending as d̂2ELWdetrend.
4.3.2 PSY Approach
Phillips, Wu, and Yu (2011) develop a sup ADF (SADF) procedure that can test
for evidence of price exuberance and date stamp its origination and collapse. Such
a test procedure makes use of a right-tailed unit root and a sup test in a recursive
way. The SADF test is recursively applied to the sample data and is implemented
as follows. For each time series xt, we apply the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
test for a unit root against the alternative of an explosive root (right-tailed). The
following autoregressive specification for xt is estimated by least squares:
xt = µx + δxt−1 +
J∑
j=1
φj∆xt−j + εx,t, εx,t ∼ NID(0, σ2x), (4.14)
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for some given value of the lag parameter J, where NID denotes independent
and normally distributed. The null hypothesis of this test is H0 : δ = 1 and
the alternative hypothesis is H1 : δ > 1. Equation (4.14) is estimated repeatedly
using subsets of the sample data incremented by one additional observation at each
pass in the forward recursive regression. Thus the SADF test is constructed by
repeatedly estimating the ADF test. Let rw be the window size of the regression.
The window size rw expands from r0 to 1, where r0 is the smallest sample window
width fraction and 1 is the largest window fraction (the full sample). The starting
point r1 is fixed at 0, and the end point of each sample (r2) equals rw and changes
from r0 to 1. The ADF statistic for a sample that runs from 0 to r2 is therefore
denoted by ADF r20 . The SADF statistic is defined as the sup value of the ADF
statistic sequence:
SADF (r0) = sup
r2∈[r0,1]
ADF r20
Unlike the SADF test, the GSADF test is extended by using a more flexible
window size. The end point r2 varies from r0 (the minimum window size) to 1.
The start point r1 is also allowed to vary from 0 to r2−r0. The GSADF statistic is
the largest ADF statistic over range of r1 and r2. The key difference between the
SADF and GSADF is the window size of starting point r1. The GSADF statistic
is therefore defined as:




According to Phillips et al. (2015a), the minimum window size r0 needs to be large
enough to allow initial estimation, but it should not too large to miss the chance
of detecting an early bubble period. We therefore follow Phillips et al. (2015a)
and let r0 = 0.01 + 1.8/
√
T , where T is number of observations. A small fixed lag
order approach is used in this study as suggested by Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015a).
Hence, the lag order is chosen at 0 and 3 for the following analysis. The finite
critical values are obtained from Monte Carlo simulation with 2000 replications.
Many studies have followed Phillips, Shi, and Yu’s (2014) suggestion to include
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an intercept in the regression model. As a result, many empirical papers have
reported rejections of the null suggesting periods of rapid increases in, for example,
prices associated with a growing bubble, when in fact the data identifies a ‘collapse’
or a ‘collapse and recovery’ phase and not a bubble. An example of ‘collapse
episode’ and ‘collapse and recovery episode’ can be seen in Figure 4.3 below.
The backward SADF statistic (blue line) and its 95% critical value (red line) for
Figure 4.3a suggest a number of ‘bubbles’, as the test statistic exceeds the relevant
critical value. However, the plot of the actual data (green line) shows that the
data is continuously declining (a collapse period and not a series of bubbles).
Figure 4.3b presents data and test results consistent with a ‘collapse and recovery’
episode and a genuine ‘bubble’ or an ‘exuberant’ episode. The plot of the actual
data makes the classification of these different episodes clear and highlights why
the actual data and the test statistic (and relevant critical values) need to be
presented on the same graph. It should be pointed out that both specifications
inflate the the probability of an incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis. The
inclusion of an intercept could increase the probability of an incorrect rejection of
the null hypothesis (false positive) by detecting a collapse episode or a collapse
and recovery episode. Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2014) also argue that omitting an
intercept from the regression model inflates the probability of a false positive.
In this paper, we consider two different regression model specifications (a model
without an intercept and a model with an intercept) to explore evidence of bubbles
and compare the results obtained from both formulations. This paper compares
the bubble detection results using the aforementioned model specifications, see
Hu and Oxley (2018a).
4.4 Results
Here we investigate the evidence of exuberant episodes or bubbles (where relevant,
i.e. when prices can be compared to a ‘fundamental’) in historical housing price
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Figure 4.3 – Examples of collapse episode, collapse and recovery episode and bubble/
exuberant episode.
first the long memory estimates to be followed by the right-tailed unit root tests,
where in the latter case we report results with or without an intercept term in the
regression model. We apply the PSY to both the Herengracht index (1649-2010)
and biennial Herengracht index (1628-1973) to check the robustness of the test on
data with different frequencies. In addition, we also apply three semi-parametric
long memory procedures to estimate long memory parameter d for assessing the
presence of bubbles or explosive behavior.
4.4.1 Long Memory Results
We follow the discussion of Ramanan (2016) using the estimated values of the
fractional integrating parameter d to assess explosive behavior in housing mar-
kets. If d lies between zero and one, the process is mean reverting and has no
rational bubbles in housing prices. If d is greater than 1, house prices exhibit
bubble-like behavior. Three long memory parameter estimates are used for esti-
mating the long memory parameter d including the GPH estimator d̂GPH , local
Whittle estimator d̂LW , the 2-step exact local Whittle estimator with detrending
d̂2ELWdetrend. The corresponding long memory results are presented in Table 4.1.
Section 4.4.1.1 discusses the long memory parameter estimates and Section 4.4.1.2
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presents the standard errors for different estimators.
4.4.1.1 Different Estimators
We first focus on the Herengracht index in Amsterdam. As presented in Table 4.1,
the estimated values of the long memory parameter for the Herengracht index
(1649-2010) estimated by three semi-parametric estimators are 0.7328 (d̂GPH),
0.6252 (d̂LW ) and 0.7947 (d̂2ELWdetrend), respectively. Overall, it is reasonable
to conclude that the long memory parameter (d) is less than 1, indicating no
explosive behavior. There is no exuberance in the Herengracht index for this
period.
Results from Table 4.1 also suggest no evidence of explosive behavior in the bi-
ennial Herengracht index (1628-1973) as the three estimators are all less than
1, suggesting no explosive behavior (e.g., d̂GPH : 0.7891, and d̂LW : 0.6544 and
d̂2ELWdetrend: 0.9749). A similar conclusion may be drawn for the Amsterdam
house price-rent ratio between 1628 and 1850 as two estimates are less than 1
(e.g., d̂LW : 0.7434 and d̂2ELWdetrend: 0.6074). The exception is d̂GPH (1.0007).
Both the log periodogram regression of Geweke and Porter-Hudak (1983) and lo-







and these estimators are inconsistent for d > 1, see Phillips and
Shimotsu (2004) and Phillips (2007). Hence, d̂2ELWdetrend provides a consistent
and unbiased estimate for d. We, therefore, conclude no explosive behavior in the
biennial Herengracht index.
If we consider the long memory results for the aggregate Norwegian house price
index (1819-2014), the d̂2ELWdetrend is 1.0660, indicating explosive behavior. In
contrast, d̂GPH and d̂LW are 0.7952 and 0.8191, respectively. Overall, there is
evidence of explosive behavior in the aggregate Norwegian house price index based
on long memory estimator d̂2ELWdetrend, but not the other two methods. If we now
consider long memory results for Bergen (1819-2014), d̂2ELWdetrend is 1.0241 while
d̂GPH and d̂LW are less than 1 (e.g., 0.8313 and 0.8216). Given the properties of the
116
estimators, we conclude there is evidence of explosive behavior in the house price
index in Bergen. Interestingly, all three estimators are less than 1 for Kristiansand
(1867-2014) and, therefore, suggest no sign of explosive behavior (e.g., d̂GPH :
0.7719, d̂LW : 0.9514 and d̂2ELWdetrend: 0.8674). Oslo also exhibits no explosive
behavior with all three estimators are less than 1 (e.g., d̂GPH : 0.2144, d̂LW : 0.5216
and d̂2ELWdetrend: 0.9602) from 1841 to 2014. We do, however, find evidence of
explosive behavior in the house price index in Trondheim (1897-2014) as d̂GPH
and d̂2ELWdetrend are greater than 1 although d̂LW is 0.7956.
If we consider the results for Paris (1650-2012), we find mixed evidence of explosive
behavior. The two-step exact local Whittle estimator d̂2ELWdetrend is greater than
1 while d̂GPH and d̂LW are 0.7701 and 0.6522, respectively.
4.4.1.2 Estimate Standard Errors
As shown in Table 4.1, confidence intervals of d̂LW and d̂2ELWdetrend for the Heren-
gracht index do not contain 1, suggesting no explosive behavior. The confidence
interval for d̂GPH includes 1 with a standard error of 0.1681. We know from Rea
et al. (2013) that the GPH estimator is very inefficient in small samples and thus
d̂GPH is perhaps not a reliable estimator in this case. On a close inspection of
Table 4.1, d̂GPH has a relatively large standard error compared with those of other
estimators. We also take into account variability of long memory parameter for the
biennial Herengracht index by constructing confidence intervals of three estima-
tors. There is no significant evidence to rule out explosive behavior as the upper
bound of confidence interval for d̂2ELWdetrend exceed 1. The confidence interval
for Herengracht’s price rent ratio also do not contain 1 for d̂LW and d̂2ELWdetrend,
indicating no sign of explosive behavior.
The evidence of explosive behavior for Norway is mixed based on the three confi-
dence intervals. Confidence intervals for d̂GPH and d̂LW do not exceed 1 while the
confidence interval for d̂2ELWdetrend ranges from 0.9 to 1.2. Hence the evidence of
explosive behavior based on d̂2ELWdetrend is not very strong despite the fact that
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d̂2ELWdetrend is greater than 1. Similarly, the evidence of explosive behavior for
Bergen is also not very strong as the lower confidence interval for d̂2ELWdetrend
is less than 1. This phenomenon can be observed for Kristiansand and Oslo as
well, where the lower bound of confidence interval for d̂2ELWdetrend is less than 1
and the upper bound is above 1. No significant evidence of explosive behavior for
Paris can be found based on the confidence interval of d̂2ELWdetrend.
Based on results from Section 4.4.1.1, Amsterdam data shows little evidence of
explosive behavior. Norwegian data exhibits explosive behavior at the national
and city levels and Parisian data also seems to support exuberance in house prices
based on long memory estimate of d̂2ELWdetrend. Section 4.4.1.2 discussed the
variability of long memory estimators by constructing their confidence intervals.
Due to the small sample size of the housing series, when we consider the often
wide confidence intervals for the three long memory estimators, we would now
conclude that there is no overwhelming evidence to support explosive behavior in
general, which is somewhat different to the findings based on only the mean value
of the long memory estimates in Section 4.4.1.1.
4.4.2 PSY Results
4.4.2.1 Herengracht Index in Amsterdam (1649-2010)
The date-stamping outcomes for the real Herengracht index in Amsterdam are
provided as Figure 4.4. We firstly present results based on the lag order of 0 under
the assumption ‘with an intercept’ and ‘without an intercept’ in Figure 4.4a and
Figure 4.4b, respectively. According to these two figures, there is no evidence of
exuberant episodes in the real Herengracht index between 1649 and 2010.
Consider now results based on a lag order of 3 (in the PSY test) for the real Heren-
gracht index under both assumptions as Figure 4.4c and Figure 4.4d, respectively.
Using the model specification ‘with an intercept’, the null hypothesis of no ex-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.4978 which is smaller than the 10% right-tail critical value of 1.9504. As can be
seen from Figure 4.4c, two episodes are identified: 1799-1804 (a ‘collapse and re-
covery’ episode) and 1812-1817 (a ‘collapse’ episode). Under the regression model
‘without an intercept term’, the null hypothesis of no explosive behavior is not
rejected at the 10% significance level as the test statistic is lower than the 10%
critical value (e.g., 2.4577<3.1855) even if an exuberant episode originated and
collapsed during 1879-1889 is identified in Figure 4.4d. Under different formula-
tions and lag order selection in the regression model, the above results suggest
no evidence of exuberant episodes in the real Herengracht index and thus the
Herengracht index alone is not explosive or ‘exuberant’.
4.4.2.2 Biennial Herengracht Index (1628-1973)
Empirical results for the real biennial Herengracht index are presented as Fig-
ure 4.5. Date-stamping outcomes based on the lag order of 0 for the real biennial
Herengracht index under the assumption ‘with an intercept’ and ‘without an in-
tercept’ are presented as Figure 4.5a and Figure 4.5b, respectively. Under the
assumption ‘with an intercept’, the null hypothesis of no explosive behavior is not
rejected at the 10% significance level as the test statistics (0.3134) is much smaller
than the 10% right-tail critical value. As shown in Figure 4.5a, we observe no ev-
idence of exuberance. Similarly, under the assumption ‘without an intercept’, the
null hypothesis of no explosive behavior is not rejected at the 10% significance
level (e.g., 2.4524<3.1219) although the presence of exuberance during 1878-1888
is detected in Figure 4.5b.
Date-stamping outcomes based on the lag order of 3 for the real biennial Heren-
gracht index under the assumption ‘with an intercept’ and ‘without an intercept’
are presented in Figure 4.5c and Figure 4.5d, respectively. Under the assump-
tion ‘with an intercept’, the test statistics is 1.4245. As indicated in Figure 4.5c,
we observe three episodes in the real Herengracht index: 1800-1802 (a ‘collapse’
episode), 1812-1818 (a ‘collapse and recovery’ episode) and 1874-1888 (an ‘ex-
uberant’ episode). On the other hand, under the assumption ‘without an in-
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(a) real Herengracht index (1649-2010)
with an intercept at
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(c) real Herengracht index (1649-2010)
with an intercept at
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(d) real Herengracht index (1649-2010)
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Figure 4.4 – Date-stamping strategy for the real Herengracht index (1649=100, log
scale) between 1649 and 2010 using the GSADF test under the assumption with/with-
out an intercept in the regression model with a lag order of 0 and 3.
tercept’, the test statistics is smaller than the 10% right-tail critical value (e.g.,
2.7283<3.1219). We detect an exuberant episode between 1878 and 1888 as pre-
sented in Figure 4.5d.
We find some short-lived episodes between the mid-1870s and 1880s, which are
clearly demonstrated in the real Herengracht index of Figure 4.4d (1880-1889)
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(a) real biennial Herengracht index
(1628-1973) with an intercept at
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(c) real biennial Herengracht index
(1628-1973) with an intercept at
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(d) real biennial Herengracht index
(1628-1973) without an intercept at
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Figure 4.5 – Date-stamping strategy for the real biennial Herengracht index
(1628=100, log scale) between 1628 and 1973 using the GSADF test under the as-
sumption with/without an intercept in the regression model with a lag order of 0 and
3.
and the biennial Herengracht index of Figure 4.5b (1878-1888), Figure 4.5c (1874-
1888), and Figure 4.5d (1878-1888). Overall, our results seem to suggest the
biennial Herengracht index (1628-1973) is not exuberant. Such a finding is perhaps
not surprising. The nominal index increases more than tenfold from 1628-1973
but the real value of the index at the end of period is a little more than double the
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value in 1628. This indicates that Herengracht index doesn’t offer very positive
real returns as it took nearly 350 years double the real biennial Herengracht index,
suggesting an annual average price increase of only 0.2% a year (Shiller, 2006).
4.4.2.3 House Price-rent Ratio in Herengracht (1628-1850)
We also test for evidence of house price bubbles in the Amsterdam house price-
rent ratio during the period 1628-1850. Date-stamping outcomes obtained from
the GSADF test for the Amsterdam house price-rent ratio under the assumption
‘with or without an intercept’ in the regression model with the lag order of 0 and
3 are presented as Figure 4.6. We observe a short-lived bubble (1663-1665) in
the price-rent ratio in Figure 4.6b. Overall, as can be seen from Figure 4.6 under
different assumptions in the regression model, we find no evidence of bubbles in
the house price-rent ratio for Amsterdam. The test statistic is not significant at
the 10% level for all model specifications, suggesting no evidence of bubbles. The
historical house price-rent ratio during this period in Amsterdam is not explosive.
However, our results are not in line with those in Ambrose et al. (2013). Using the
Amsterdam rent-price ratio from 1650 to 2005, Ambrose et al. (2013) conclude
that the rent-price ratio deviates from its long run average for substantial periods
of time. They find that the deviation of house prices from rents can be persistent
and long-lasting and the correction will take decades to get back to an equilibrium.
Ambrose et al. (2013) also conclude that “our analysis of the rent-price ratio
reveals sustained periods of “bubble” and “crisis” conditions [in Amsterdam] that
can continue without a corresponding correction (or crash)”.
4.4.2.4 Discussion
Eichholtz (1997) argues that the Tulipmania episode had a very limited effect on
the Amsterdam housing market as in 1632, the real biennial Herengracht house
price index was 212.7. However, the real biennial Herengracht house price index
fell to 113.5, which was almost half its value in 1632. The Tulipmania bubble
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burst in 1637. However, at the same time, the real biennial Herengracht house
price index started to recover reaching 136.8 in 1639. Eichholtz (1997) argues
that a pest epidemic likely had more impact on the Amsterdam housing market
as Amsterdam lost 14% of its population due to the epidemic in 1636 alone.
Our findings of an absence of housing bubbles in the Amsterdam house price-rent
ratio (1628-1850) is not surprising as the two house price series (the Herengracht
index and biennial Herengracht index) are not exuberant during this period. A
finding of ‘exuberance’ in house prices seems to be a necessary property of a
bubble, but not sufficient (without considering fundamentals). As Amsterdam
house prices experience no exuberant episodes, we would not expect the presence
of housing bubbles in the price-rent ratio during the same period.
There were four other famous bubbles in the eighteenth century: the Mississippi
Bubble (1719-1720), the South Sea Bubble (1720), the Amsterdam Banking Cri-
sis of 1763 and the Credit Crisis of 1772 (see Sheridan (1960), Garber (2001),
Schnabel and Shin (2004), Kindleberger and Aliber (2011), Brunnermeier and
Schnabel (2016)). Among these financial bubbles, the Mississippi Bubble and
the closely related South Sea Bubble are the most well-known examples in the
literature. The Amsterdam Banking Crisis of 1763 originated in Amsterdam and
spread to Hamburg, Berlin, London. The Crisis of 1772 was more widespread as
it spread to the Continent of Europe including Amsterdam. Most importantly,
empirical results from Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 suggest these four crises do not
have a great impact on real house prices in Amsterdam as we could not find ev-
idence of either collapse episodes or exuberant episodes in the two Herengracht
series. Hence, these historical bubbles/crises do not seem to spill-over to the Am-
sterdam housing markets, which is a very interesting finding and until now an
issue that has not been addressed in the literature. Overall, it seems that there is
little independent evidence for us to expect to observe the rent-price ratio reveals
sustained periods of “bubble” and “crisis” (Ambrose et al., 2013) and our test
results do not overturn this expectation.
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(a) House price-rent ratio (1628-1850)
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Figure 4.6 – Date-stamping outcomes obtained from the GSADF test for the house
price-rent ratio in the Herengracht index (1628=100, log scale) from 1628 to 1850
under the assumption with or without an intercept in the regression model with a lag
order of 0 and 3.
4.4.2.5 House Price Index in Norway (1819-2014)
Here, we investigate evidence of explosive behavior in the real Norwegian house
price index between 1819 and 2014. Empirical results based on the PSY procedure
for the real Norwegian house price index are presented as Figure 4.7 under various
regression model specifications (e.g., with/without the intercept and the lag order
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choice). As previously, we firstly present results based on the lag order of 0 for
two model specifications. Considering an intercept in the regression model, the
test statistics is larger than the 5% right-tail critical value (i.e., 2.1488>2.1261),
providing evidence of exuberance in the real Norwegian house price index. The
corresponding date-stamping outcomes are shown in Figure 4.7a and two explo-
sive episodes are identified (e.g., 1985-1988 and 2004-2014). Without including
the intercept in the regression model, the test statistic is larger than the 10%
right-tail critical value (i.e., 3.1718>3.1670), indicating some evidence of house
price exuberance. As suggested in Figure 4.7b, we identify additional exuberant
episodes in the late nineteenth century (1875-1879 and 1890-1903) along with
more recent evidence of exuberance during 1981-1989 and 2000-2014.
Results under the assumption of with/without an intercept at the lag order of 3
are presented in Figure 4.7c and Figure 4.7d, respectively. The null hypothesis of
no explosive behavior is rejected at the 5% significance level (i.e., 2.3836>2.1261),
suggesting evidence of exuberance in Figure 4.7c. We can observe several exuber-
ant episodes from Figure 4.7c: 1859-1860, 1873-1901, and 1982-1989. during the
19th-20th centuries. On the other hand, without considering the intercept in the
regression model, the test statistic is also greater than the 5% significance level
(e.g., 3.5987>3.5445). As can be seen from Figure 4.7d, there are two exuberant
episodes (i.e., 1869-1918 and 1980-1990).
Overall, under various regression model specifications, our results seem to sug-
gest evidence of exuberance. Several exuberant episodes have been identified in
Figure 4.7 and a summary of these episodes can be found in Table 4.2. Our iden-
tified episodes generally coincide or overlap with several major financial crises in
Norway as discussed in Grytten and Hunnes (2010), who conclude in favour of
nine ‘devastating financial crises’ in almost 200 years of Norwegian history (e.g.,
1814-1839, 1847-1850, 1856-1861, 1875-1888, 1899-1905, 1920-1928, 1930-1933,
1987-1993, and 2007-2010). Therefore, our identified episodes are highlighted in
bold as shown in Table 4.2 where our empirically identified episodes coincide or
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overlap with these historical financial crises.
Among these identified episodes (including both collapse episodes and exuberant
episodes), three exuberant episodes are of particular interest and worth discussing
in detail. The first two exuberant episodes coincide with two banking crises in
Norway, see Gerdrup (2004) and Brunnermeier and Schnabel (2016). Gerdrup
(2004) discusses three major banking crises in Norwegian history during the 20th
century (e.g., 1899-1905, 1920-1928 and 1988-1993). Brunnermeier and Schnabel
(2016) review 23 of the most important bubble episodes from the past 400 years
including the Norwegian crisis (1895-1900) and the Scandinavian crisis in Norway
(1984-1992). The third episode is related to the recent run-up in house prices
during the 2000s. Those three identified exuberant episodes from the long-term
aggregate house price series coincide with the history of financial developments in
Norway, which should be of considerable interest.
The first exuberant episode that should be highlighted is between 1890 and 1903
in Figure 4.7b under the model without an intercept at the lag order of 0, which
is related to the Kristiania Crisis or known as the first banking crisis in Norway.
In particular, as discussed in Grytten and Hunnes (2010), the Kristiania Crisis
(1899-1905) was one of nine major financial crises in Norway. However, such
an exuberant episode is not identified under the model ‘with an intercept’ in
Figure 4.7a. Two long lasting exuberant episodes (i.e., 1873-1901 and 1869-1918)
are identified in Figure 4.7c and Figure 4.7d, respectively.
Gerdrup (2004) studies three booms and busts involving banking crises in Norway
(1899-1905, 1920-1928 and 1988-1993) and finds that strong bank expansion and
asset price inflation are common features during these crises. In particular, as
discussed in Grytten and Hunnes (2010), the Kristiania Crisis (1899-1905) was
one of nine major financial crises in Norway. The economic development of the
late 1980s-early 1900s was linked to a spectacular real estate boom and bust in
Oslo and other large Norwegian cities (Gerdrup, 2004, p.149). As shown in the
Figure on p.161 of Gerdrup (2004), house prices in Oslo rose more than 20% per
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year between 1896 and 1899. The failure of a highly leveraged non-financial firm
accelerated the collapse in asset markets. As credit markets were affected, a real
estate crash took place in several Norwegian cities due to bank failures at the
end of the boom. Hence the identified exuberant episode between the late 19th
century and the early 20th century (e.g., 1890-1903 in Figure 4.7b) coincides with
the first major banking crisis in Norway during the 19th century that triggered
by a real estate crash.
Under all four model specifications in Figure 4.7, PSY also successfully identifies
another two exuberant episodes in the aggregate house price index: one in late
1980s, and the other one in the late 2000s. The crisis between the 1980s and
early 1990s had its roots in the structural imbalances that developed in the 1970s
and 1980s, which stemmed from a heavily regulated financial system after World
War II to the market-based system in the mid-1980s (Gerdrup, 2004). The Nor-
wegian housing market was heavily regulated on quantity and prices after World
War II, and these regulations ended in July 1982 (Anundsen and Jansen, 2013).
The Norwegian credit market regulations were also gradually lifted in the 1980s.
Anundsen and Jansen (2013) conclude that the combined effect of liberalization
processes (the deregulation on housing markets and credit markets) lead to a
boom in the real estate market. Krogh (2010) overviews the changes of regula-
tions in Norwegian credit markets in 1970-2008 especially during the strict credit
market regulations in the 1970s and the gradual deregulation of credit markets
in the 1980s. Financial deregulations tend to increase the availability of credit
and therefore freed banks and other financial institutions to promote a lending
boom. During the period of credit liberalization in the 1980s the house price
indices also increase sharply in real terms (Eitrheim and Erlandsen, 2004). The
financial deregulations on banks’ lending resulted in a bank lending boom, which
was accompanied by a boom in both residential and non-residential real estate
(Vale, 2004).
According to Gerdrup (2004), house prices declined as much as 1/3 in real terms
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from 1988 and 1992. Allen and Gale (1999) argue that the collapse of an asset
price bubble and the banking crisis were due to the decline in oil prices. The col-
lapse of house prices in the late 1980s possibly related to the Norwegian banking
crisis. The Norwegian banks were exposed to little credit risk during the heavily
regulated period 1945-1984 as banks could not easily expand their lending. How-
ever, banks expanded their lending rapidly when the quantitative regulation was
lifted. According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), the Norwegian Banking Crisis
(1988-1993) is one of the five major bank-centered financial crises in history. The
crisis peaked in 1991 with the second and fourth largest banks losing all their
capital with a total market share of 24% and the largest bank getting into serious
trouble (Vale, 2004). Grytten and Hunnes (2010) conclude that the crisis in 1980-
90s was the most severe financial crisis in Norway since the 1930s and the worst
banking crisis since the 1920s. Hence, our identified episode during the 1980s is
in line with one of the major banking/financial crises.
An exuberant episode during the 2000s is identified in Figures 4.7a, 4.7b, 4.7c
and 4.7d, suggesting the presence of exuberance in the real aggregate house prices.
There has been a rapid increase in house prices since 2000 in Norway. In a re-
port from the International Monetary Fund (2012), house prices in Norway were
shown to grow at an annual rate of 11% during the period 2004-07, which was
much higher than the OECD average of 5.5%. The price-to-rent ratio shows
price overvaluation as Norway has the highest price-to-rent ratio at around 70%
above its historical average, the highest level of almost all OECD countries. Sim-
ilarly, the price-to-income ratio also indicates the presence of overvaluation as it
is 28% above its historical average. More importantly, the report suggests that
the Norwegian house prices are overvalued by 15% − 20%. Another report from
International Monetary Fund (2013) suggests that house prices in Norway may be
overvalued by 40% and both price-to-rent and price-to-income ratios still indicate
the signs of overvaluation. The authorities adopted tightening measures to cool
down the housing market with Robert Shiller warning of the existence of bubbles
in Norway’s housing market in 2013. Jurgilas and Lansing (2013) also conclude
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Table 4.2 – Episodes identified from the real house price index in Norway (1819-
2014), where ** and * indicate the 5% and 10% significance level. Episodes are
highlighted in bold if they are overlapped with major financial crises in Norway as
discussed in Grytten and Hunnes (2010).
Country/Model Specification Test Stat Episode(s)
Lag order=0
Norway (with an intercept) 2.149** 1985-1988, 2004-2014
Norway (without an intercept) 3.172* 1874-1883, 1885-1904,
1982-1989, 2000-2014
Lag order=3
Norway (with an intercept) 2.384 1875-1882, 1894-1900
1986-1989
Norway (without an intercept) 3.599* 1870-1917, 1978-1990
2010-2014
real house prices in Norway have risen by 30% since 2006. They also notice that
the price-to-rent ratio for Norway from 1960 onwards reaches its highest level and
the price-to-income ratio for Norway from 1980 onwards is higher than its pre-
vious peak. Moreover, the household leverage ratio (ratio of household debt to
disposable income) remains historically high and around 210% above its level in
1980. The recent exuberant episode in the 2000s seems to be a global phenomenon
see, Girouard et al. (2006), Kim and Renaud (2009) and Knoll et al. (2017). For
example, Knoll et al. (2017) show that house prices in most industrial economies
stayed constant in real terms from the 19th to the mid-20th century, but rose
sharply in recent decades. To sum up, our finding of the recent exuberant episode
during the 2000s seems to be in agreement with the conclusion drawn by Robert
Shiller in 2013 and with the summary statistical analysis.
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Table 4.3 – Episodes identified from the real house price index in Bergen and Kris-
tiansand, where ***, ** and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level.
Episodes are highlighted in bold if they are overlapped with major financial crises
in Norway as discussed in Grytten and Hunnes (2010).
City/Model Specification Test Stat Episode(s)
Lag order=0
Bergen (with an intercept) 1.9000* 1986-1988, 2002-2014
Bergen (without an intercept) 3.1720* 1986-1988, 2001-2014
lag order=3
Bergen (with an intercept) 3.1008*** 1872-1900, ,
1983-1990, 2004-2014
Bergen (without an intercept) 3.8260** 1870-1918,
1981-1990, 2003-2014
Lag order=0
Kristiansand (with an intercept) 0.3421
Kristiansand (without an intercept) 3.0066 2010-2014
lag order=3
Kristiansand (with an intercept) 3.2472*** 1920-1922, 2005-2014
Kristiansand (without an intercept) 2.6735 1978-1984, 1986-1991
1997-2014
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Table 4.4 – Episodes identified from the real house price index in Oslo and Trond-
heim, where ***, ** and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level. Episodes
are highlighted in bold if they are overlapped with major financial crises in Norway
as discussed in Grytten and Hunnes (2010).
City/Model Specification Test Stat Episode(s)
Lag order=0
Oslo (with an intercept) 0.9853 2006-2008, 2012-2014
Oslo (without an intercept) 2.8547 1898-1900, 2005-2014
lag order=3
Oslo (with an intercept) 1.0515 1898-1900
Oslo (without an intercept) 2.7117 1891-1902
Lag order=0
Trondheim (with an intercept) 1.0730 1918-1921, 2006-2008
2011-2014
Trondheim (without an intercept) 6.3771*** 1985-1989, 2001-2014
lag order=3
Trondheim (with an intercept) 1.9726* 1980-1989
Trondheim (without an intercept) 4.0636** 1978-1990, 2011-2014
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(a) Norway (1819-2014)
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Figure 4.7 – Date-stamping strategy using the GSADF test for Norway under the
assumption with/without an intercept at the lag order of 0 or 3.
4.4.2.6 City-level House Price Index
In this section, we consider analysis based on city-level house price indices using
the PSY approach. Figures 4.8, 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 illustrate the date-stamping
strategies based on PSY for the real house price indices in Bergen, Kristiansand,
Oslo, and Trondheim, respectively.
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As listed in Table 4.3, the null hypothesis of no explosive behavior for the house
price index in Bergen is rejected at least at the 10% significance level under
different models. The exuberant episode in the late 1980s is identified in Figure 4.8
under all model specifications. The presence of an exuberant episode between the
early or mid-2000s and 2014 is also clearly demonstrated in Figures 4.8a, 4.8b, 4.8c
and 4.8d, and this finding seems to be in line with the recent house price boom in
Norway. Moreover, the exuberant episode related to the first Norwegian banking
crisis of the 19th century is also detected in Figure 4.8c and Figure 4.8d.
However, quite different results are obtained from Kristiansand. Table 4.3 suggests
that the null hypothesis of no explosive behavior for Kristiansand can be rejected
only at the 1% significance level for including the intercept in the regression model
with a lag order of 3. We observe exuberance in Figures 4.9b, 4.9c and 4.9d. A
‘collapse and recovery’ episode is identified from 1919 to 1922 in Figure 4.9c.
Overall, we may conclude no explosive behavior in the house price series.
As shown in Table 4.4, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no exuberance in the
real house price for Oslo under all four models, indicating no significant evidence of
exuberance. Despite the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, we identify exuberant
episodes between the 1890s and early 1900s in Figures 4.10b, 4.10c, and 4.10d.
We also find evidence of exuberance in the recent 2000s under the two regression
model specifications with a lag order of 0 in Figures 4.10a and 4.10b.
We also find significant evidence of exuberance for Trondheim in Table 4.4 as the
test statistic is significant at the 1% level when choosing the lag order of 0 in the
regression model without the intercept, at the 10% or 5% level with a lag order of
3 under the assumption of including or excluding the intercept in the regression
model. The corresponding date-stamping outcomes suggest exuberance in the
2000s (e.g., Figure 4.11a, Figure 4.11b and Figure 4.11d). An interesting finding
from Figure 4.11a is that we identify a ‘collapse’ episode between 1918-1921. In
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Figure 4.8 – Date-stamping strategy using the GSADF test for Bergen under the
assumption with/without an intercept in the regression model with a lag order of 0
and 3.
The majority of episodes identified from the city-level indices are consistent with
those detected from the real aggregate house price index in Norway as displayed
in Figure 4.7, the exceptions being 1918-1921 (Trondheim), and 1920-1922 (Kris-
tiansand). The house price index declined in real terms during WWI; the nominal
aggregate house price increased by 72% from 1914 to 1920 while the CPI rose by
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Figure 4.9 – Date-stamping strategy using the GSADF test for Kristiansand under
the assumption with/without an intercept in the regression model with a lag order of
0 and 3.
197% during this period (Eitrheim and Erlandsen, 2005). We find a collapse
episode in Figure 4.11a for Trondheim and a collapse and recovery episode in
Figure 4.9c for Kristiansand. These two ‘collapse’ episodes are hardly exuberant
episodes and these episodes are likely caused by the 1916 introduction of the rent
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Figure 4.10 – Date-stamping strategy using the GSADF test for Oslo under the
assumption with/without an intercept in the regression model with a lag order of 0
and 3.
4.4.2.7 House Price in Paris (1650-2012)
We analyse the real house price index in Paris based on the sample period 1650-
2012. The date-stamping outcomes under various regression model specifications
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Figure 4.11 – Date-stamping strategy using the GSADF test for Trondheim under
the assumption with/without an intercept in the regression model with a lag order of
0 and 3.
based on the PSY procedure are shown as Figure 4.12. Allowing an intercept in
the regression model with a lag order of 0, the null hypothesis of no exuberance
is rejected at the 1% level (4.4668>2.8755) and we find two ‘collapse and recov-
ery’ episodes in Figure 4.12a (e.g., 1918-1921 and 1945-1953). Although the test
statistic may suggest the rejection of the null hypothesis of no exuberance in the
real house price index for Paris, these ‘collapse’ episodes are hardly believable
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exuberant episodes as these episodes are detected when the real house price index
is continuously declining. This example shows the rejection of the null hypothesis
of no exuberance in the PSY could lead to false positive identification of ‘genuine’
exuberant episodes/ bubbles if the plot of the actual data series is not taken into
account. A short-lived exuberant episode between 2010 and 2012 is also detected.
Alternatively, we obtain quite difficult results when the intercept term is excluded
from the regression model. There is evidence of house price exuberance in the real
house price series for Paris as the null is rejected at the 5% level (3.7572>3.5501).
As suggested in Figure 4.12b, we can identify an exuberant episode 1982-2012 and
a spurious episode 1911-1915. Thus we find significant evidence of exuberance in
the real house price index in Paris only under this model specification. This
finding is very interesting as the house price seems to exhibit explosive behaviour
only during very recent decades. The recent house price run-up phenomenon has
been observed in some existing studies, see Kim and Renaud (2009) and Knoll
et al. (2017).
When the lag order of 3 is considered in the regression model, we find little
evidence of exuberance in the real house price series. The null of no exuberance
cannot be rejected at the 10% level under the assumption with or without an
intercept, respectively. For example, we find a short-lived ‘collapse’ episode in
Figure 4.12c between 1946 and 1949 and an episode in Figure 4.12d between 1911
and 1915. The latter episode identified in Figure 4.12d is almost in line with the
one detected in Figure 4.12b in 1910s.
The Parisian data seem to suggest a nonlinear specification. Hence, assuming a
linear autoregressive (AR) model could be misspecified. Upon closer inspection of
the real house price series in Figure 4.12, the real house price declined significantly
from 1942 and reached its lowest level in 1949/50. The decline in the real house
price is due to the implementation of rent controls in times of high inflation,
caused by World War II (Friggit, 2008, p.26). Because of this special feature,
PSY identifies the collapse and recovery episode in Figure 4.12a and Figure 4.12c
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when the intercept term is considered in the regression model specification. As
a result, PSY fails to identify the exuberant episode at the end of sample period
under most model specifications. However, under the model without an intercept
and the lag order of 0, we find evidence of exuberance in the historical house price
index for Paris.
In order to shed insight into these experiences, we also explore whether some
historical episodes might have impacted on the real house price index in Paris.
First, we could not find evidence of house price exuberance during the Mississippi
Bubble (1719-1720). The same conclusions are drawn for the Crisis of 1763 and
the Crisis of 1772. Second, the crisis in the French stock market in 1882 was the
worst in French history in the nineteenth century and such a crisis led to a deep
recession that lasted until the end of the decade (White, 2007). Our empirical
results suggest that the crisis of 1882 doesn’t cause any explosive behavior in the
housing markets. It seems to suggest that these crises have no significant impact
on the real house price in Paris as no collapse episodes or exuberant episodes
are detected. Third, according to White (2007), the Paris housing price bubbles
started around 1884 and bust in 1900-1901. However, our empirical results suggest
no evidence of house price exuberance during this period.
4.4.3 Summary
We also compare results from long memory and PSY approaches in Table 4.5. The
Long memory and PSY results for different data are discussed in Section 4.4.1.1
and Section 4.4.2, respectively. As can be seen from Table 4.5, our results from
PSY are generally consistent with those obtained from long memory models except
the Paris series. Overall, we prefer the PSY approach as it could detect the
presence of multiple bubbles.
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Figure 4.12 – Testing for explosive behaviour in Paris real house price index
(2000=100, log scale) between 1650 and 2012 using the GSADF test under two dif-
ferent regression model specifications with a lag order of 0 and 3.
4.5 Conclusion
Recent debates relating to the role of sub-prime mortgage funded housing market
booms in the US, has brought the concept of bubbles back into the public and
academic arenas. Furthermore, the growing sophistication and integration of fi-
nancial markets may have led to the rapid contagion of the original financial crisis
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Table 4.5 – Summary of the results from the two approaches where N and Y stand
for no explosive behavior and explosive behavior.
Data Long Memory PSY
Amsterdam
Herengracht index (1649-2010) N N
Biennial Herengracht index (1628-1973) N N
Herengracht’s price-rent ratio (1628-1850) N N
Norway
House price in Norway (1819-2014) Y Y
House price in Bergen (1819-2014) Y Y
House price in Kristiansand (1867-2014) N N
House price in Oslo (1841-2014) N N
House price in Trondheim (1897-2014) Y Y
Paris
House price in Paris (1650-2012) Y N
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spreading not only spatially but across different markets. In this paper, we have
sought to test whether housing market bubbles (or periods of very rapid price
rises- ‘exuberance’) have historical precedents and furthermore, whether there is
any evidence that bubbles or crisis in different financial markets (i.e., the Missis-
sippi or South Sea bubbles spilled-over into local or national housing markets).
Long memory models of Shimotsu and Phillips (2005) and Shimotsu (2010) and
right-tailed unit root tests of Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015a, PSY) are considered
in this paper.
To consider these questions we tested for evidence of exuberance in three long-
lasting house price indices, namely the Herengracht index of Amsterdam, Norwe-
gian and Paris house price indices. In addition, we also investigated the presence
of housing bubbles for the Amsterdam. Firstly, there is no evidence of exuberance
in both the real Herengracht and biennial Herengracht indices. This finding indi-
cates the real Herengracht index on its own is not exuberant. More importantly,
our results do not support the existence of housing bubbles in the Amsterdam
price-rent ratio during 1628-1850 despite the occurrences of several (other) his-
torical bubbles. A finding of ‘exuberance’ in house prices seems to be a necessary
property of a bubble but not sufficient (without considering fundamentals). As the
Amsterdam house price experiences no exuberant episodes, we would not expect
the presence of housing bubbles in the price-rent ratio during the same period.
Secondly, we find evidence of exuberance in the Norwegian house price index and
these episodes either coincide or overlap with several major financial crises in Nor-
way as discussed in Grytten and Hunnes (2010). Our empirical results also suggest
that the house price episodes identified from four main cities (Oslo, Bergen, Trond-
heim and Kristiansand) are generally in line with those episodes obtained from
the real house price index at the national level. Of particular interest is that three
identified exuberant episodes are related with the banking crises in 1895-1900 and
1988-1993, and the recent house price run-up in the 2000s. Thirdly, the real house
price index of Paris exhibits significant evidence of exuberance under a particular
model specification. Several crises including the Mississippi Bubble, the Crisis of
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1763 and the Crisis of (1772) appear to have no significant impact on the real
house price index in Paris. The Parisian series is of great interest as the data
seem to suggest a nonlinear specification, which creates considerable difficulty in
detecting exuberant episodes for PSY. Future development on bubble detection
methodologies could consider this interesting series to check the robustness of new
tests. Fourthly, our results seem to draw an important conclusion that housing
price exuberance seems to be a very recent phenomenon as no explosive behaviour
is detected in housing markets before 1850 based on three very well-known house
price series. Fifthly, our results from PSY are generally in line with those obtained
from long memory models based on the mean value of d. However, the number of
observations in each sample is very small, leading to a wider confidence interval.
When we take into account the confidence intervals for long memory models, there
is no overwhelming evidence to support explosive behavior. Lastly, there is a need
to be careful when interpreting empirical results from these new time series-based
methods of PSY, minimally checking that failed test date-stamping have both an
empirical (a ‘bubble’ not a ‘collapse and recovery’ episode) and where possible,
some historiographically sourced supporting information.
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Bubbles in US regional house prices: evidence from house price–income ratios
at the State level
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ABSTRACT
We investigate the presence of bubbles in the US house price-income ratio at the State level by
applying the recent time series-based econometric test to data from January 1975 to December
2014. We find evidence of bubbles in several States in the 1980s (i.e. California, Hawaii,
Massachusetts, New York, etc.), which coincides with some existing studies that investigate
housing bubbles or booms and busts using a range of alternative approaches. Our results
show the existence of a housing bubble that originates in the early 2000s and collapses in the
mid-2000s in more than 20 States and the District of Columbia concluding that the bubbles of
the 2000s were more widespread than the 1980s, which is of special interest and importance. Our
results seem to be in agreement with the talk given by Alan Greenspan in 2005, who suggest no
sign of a nationwide housing bubble but a lot of local bubbles. We also study the importance of
the regression model specification with/without an intercept and the regression model with an
intercept could lead to false-positive identification of bubbles.
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The US seems to have a long history of real estate
speculation (Glaeser 2013). The purpose of this
article is to investigate evidence of housing bub-
bles by comparing house price changes with
changes in income, and whether the outcomes
are generic, localized or create regionally con-
strained spillovers? To consider such questions
we will utilize the recently developed bubble detec-
tion and date-stamping approach of Phillips, Shi,
and Yu (2015, PSY). The PSY approach has
important advantages over the conventional unit
root and cointegration tests as this new method
not only tests for the empirical existence (or
otherwise) of bubbles but is also able to precisely
‘date-stamp’ their growth and collapse.
Furthermore, it can also identify multiple bubble
formations and collapses (and their precise dates),
making it not only theoretically more interesting
but also practically more useful. We will add to
this approach by considering evidence based on
their right-tailed unit root tests both with and
without an intercept in the regression model. By
making use of the PSY approach, we are able to
identify points (in time and space) related to the
origination and termination of any bubble event.
Our empirical study focuses on the 1980s and the
early 2000s and has three main aims and contributions
where it differs from existing studies in several respects.
First, a major focus is to examine the econometric evi-
dence for housing bubble(s) during the 1980s with par-
ticular emphasis on the States of California, Hawaii,
Massachusetts and New York. Several other studies, for
example, Case and Shiller (1988, 1994, 2003) and
Wheelock (2006), consider US house price booms and
busts or bubbles during the 1980s; however, most of
these studies describe or graphically inspect some
house price measure (e.g. house price, price–income
ratio or price–rent ratio) without applying any econo-
metric tests. Thus, our article fills the gap by providing
empirical test-based evidence of housing bubbles during
the 1980s. Second, more recently, much attention has
been paid to the rapid increase in US house prices in the
2000s, see, for example, Del Negro and Otrok (2007),
Shiller (2007), Goodman and Thibodeau (2008),
Wheaton and Nechayev (2008), Mayer (2011). A num-
ber of States/areas experienced a dramatic boom during
the 2000s and thus there is an increasing interest in
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testing for evidence of housing bubbles during this per-
iod using a range of approaches. Del Negro and Otrok
(2007) see this recent rapid increase as a national phe-
nomenon; however, Greenspan disagreed, stating that
‘we don’t perceive that there is a national bubble, but it’s
hard not to see that there are a lot of local bubbles’ in
2005. Martin (2011) also concluded that the 2000s US
housing bubble was not a national phenomenon. Our
second aim will therefore consider whether there is
evidence of a national or several local (disconnected)
bubbles (or no bubbles at all) at the regional level in
the US during the early-mid 2000s. To anticipate, we
find evidence of a housing bubble that originates in the
early 2000s and collapses in the mid-2000s in more than
20 States and theDistrict ofColumbia (DC) in our study.
Our results show the bubble of the 2000s is not a national
phenomenon, but is more widespread than the 1980s.
This is perhaps the first empirical study to make a
comparison in terms of their magnitude and coverage
between the regional housing bubbles in the 1980s with
the recent regional bubbles in the 2000s, which also
contributes to the novelty of this article. Third, we also
use the US State-level house price–income ratio data to
study the importance of regression model formulation
highlighted in Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2014) by exploring
the role of the intercept in the regression model of
Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015). Based upon the model
specification with an intercept, we can identify ‘collapse’
episodes, ‘collapse and recovery’ episodes and the poten-
tial bubbles. Whereas without an intercept in the regres-
sion model leads to identification of no ‘collapse’
episodes and ‘collapse and recovery’ episodes. An
important finding in the regression model specification
without the intercept is that several States do not exhibit
any bubble-like behaviours for the whole sample period.
The article is organized as follows. Section II reviews
some existing studies on US house price bubbles.
Section III provides a brief description of the general-
ized sup ADF (GSADF) of Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015)
and Section IV describes the data. Section V provides
empirical results for all the 50 States and the District of
Columbia and Section VI concludes.
II. Literature review
The PSY testing procedure has become one of the most
popular new approaches to detect asset price bubbles
in the literature. Following the empirical studies of
New Zealand and Australian housing markets (e.g.
Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips 2015; Shi et al.
2016) and theoretical developments on bubble detec-
tion procedure of Phillips and Shi (forthcoming), Hu
and Oxley (2018) subject the famous South Sea and
Mississippi Bubbles in 1719–1720, and the British
Railway Mania of the 1840s, respectively. Hu and
Oxley (2017b) also investigate the well-documented
Japan’s asset price bubble of the 1980-1990s. They
find significant evidence of bubbles in the Japanese
stock and housing markets, and signs of bubble con-
tagion from Japan’s stock market to its housing market
for the first time in the literature. A series of papers also
adopt the PSY testing procedure to examine the pre-
sence of bubbles in housing markets, see Chen and
Funke (2013), Yiu, Yu, and Jin (2013), Jiang, Phillips,
and Yu (2015) and Pavlidis et al. (2016).
A large number of studies have been tested for the
existence of house price bubbles in the US. A house
price bubble is defined as a situation when the
growth of the price is not supported by changes in
its fundamentals (e.g. Stiglitz 1990). A ‘fundamental’
in empirical studies of the housing market is often
assumed to be either a rental cost–house price ratio,
where the logic is that the rent represents the stream
of future income from the housing asset, or a perso-
nal income–house price ratio, where the idea is that
in the long-run house prices cannot exceed the abil-
ity to purchase the property or service the debt in
the process. These two types of ratio lend themselves
to what have become some of the most common
forms of analysis of whether house prices deviate
from ‘fundamentals’, which are based on tests for
cointegration between the numerator and denomi-
nator series. For example, Malpezzi (1999) rejected
the null hypothesis of no cointegration between
house prices and income in US Metropolitan areas
concluding there was no evidence of bubbles.
McCarthy and Peach (2004) and Himmelberg,
Mayer, and Sinai (2005) find little evidence of a
bubble in US home prices. Gallin (2006) provides
an excellent example of tests of the relationship
between house prices and income in the US where
using 27 years of US national-level data and finds no
evidence of cointegration. As standard cointegration
tests are known to have low power in small samples,
Gallin (2006) applied several panel cointegration
tests to a panel of 95 US Metropolitan areas over a
23-year period and also found no evidence of coin-
tegration. In both cases, a finding of no
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cointegration relationship suggests evidence of bub-
bles. Zhou and Sornette (2006) investigated the exis-
tence of US housing bubbles at the regional and
State levels using quarterly data, 1993–2005 where
instead of tests for ‘market fundamentals’ they define
a bubble as a ‘faster-than-exponential price growth’.
They concluded that 22 States exhibited evidence of
a fast-growing bubble. Mikhed and Zemčík (2009)
also used a panel test for the price–rent ratio in 23
US Metropolitan areas for the period 1978–2006 and
concluded that there was evidence of a bubble.
Holly, Pesaran, and Yamagata (2010) used Moon
and Perron (2004) and Pesaran (2007) panel tests
to consider the relationship between real house
prices and real per capita disposable incomes in the
US at the State level using annual data 1975–2003
and found little evidence of house price bubbles with
a few exceptions (e.g. California, New York,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Oregon
and Washington). Empirical results from Kivedal
(2013) suggest that there was a bubble in the US
housing market prior to the 2007 subprime financial
crisis. Nneji, Brooks, and Ward (2013) examined the
presence of intrinsic bubbles of a Froot and Obstfeld
(1991) type 1 or rational speculative bubbles of a
Blanchard and Watson (1982) type in the residential
property market in the US between 1960 and 2011.
They split the data into two periods (1960–1999 and
2000–2011) and found an intrinsic bubble for the
first period and a rational speculative bubble for the
second period only. Escobari, Damianov, and Bello
(2015) proposed a new test to identify house price
bubbles, which explored a specific feature of the
market such that low-tier house prices should
appreciate more during the upswing of a growing
boom and fall faster during the bust, and found
evidence of bubbles in 15 US Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs). It should be noted, how-
ever, that the methodology developed by Escobari,
Damianov, and Bello (2015) does not consider ‘mar-
ket fundamentals’ in assessing house price bubbles.
Several existing studies attempt to explain the
surge in house prices after 2000. Case and Shiller
(2003) argue that fundamentals play a crucial role in
explaining much of the rapid increase in the housing
market. In particular, income growth explains the
house price increase in most States and a falling
interest rate also contributes to the recent run-up
in house prices. McCarthy and Peach (2004) and
Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) both argue
that the economic fundamentals such as low interest
rates and high income growth could explain house
prices growth in the early 2000s. Glaeser, Gyourko,
and Saks (2005) focus on housing supply constraints
and explain that rising housing prices have been
accompanied by a declining housing supply due to
changing local development regulations in certain
areas. Malpezzi and Wachter (2005) also conclude
that the impact of speculation is dominated by the
effect of the price elasticity of supply. In fact, the
large impacts of speculation are only observed when
supply is inelastic. Ihlanfeldt (2007) finds that reg-
ulation restriction increases house prices and
decreases vacant land prices in more than 100
Florida cities. Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz (2008)
point out that areas with inelastic housing supply
are associated with more increase in house prices.
Subprime mortgage lending is a financial innova-
tion in commercial banking, see Frame and White
(2014). During the spectacular rise and later collapse
of house prices in the early 2000s, the dramatic
increase in subprime lending has been blamed for
the sharp rise and collapse in house prices. However,
Coleman, LaCour-Little, and Vandell (2008) con-
clude that subprime loan products are not the pri-
mary blame for the housing bubble across 20
metropolitan areas over the period 1998–2006.
Brueckner, Calem, and Nakamura (2012) also argue
that subprime lending is a consequence rather than a
cause of the housing bubble based on their theore-
tical model. Huang and Tang (2012) find that supply
restrictions (residential land use regulations and geo-
graphic land scarcity) are linked to the booms and
busts in the US house prices from 2000 and 2009.
III. Method
We apply the right-tailed unit root test of Phillips,
Shi, and Yu (2015) to examine evidence of bubbles
in US regional real estate markets. The martingale
null with an asymptotic drift is specified as
H0 : yt ¼ dTη þ yt1 þ εt; εt,NIDð0;σ2Þ; (1)
1Intrinsic bubbles are driven solely by fundamentals (Froot and Obstfeld 1991).
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where d is a constant and the localizing coefficient η
is greater than 1/2. The alternative hypothesis is a
mildly explosive process:
H1 : yt ¼ δTyt1 þ εt; (2)
where δT ¼ 1þ cTθ with c > 0 and θ 2 ð0; 1Þ.
The following regression model is estimated:
Δyt ¼ αþ βyt1 þ
XK
i¼1
γiΔyti þ εt; (3)
where α is an intercept.
The GSADF test relies on repeated estimation of
the ADF test regression of Equation (3) on subsam-
ples of the data in a recursive fashion. The window
size rw expands from r0 to 1, where r0 is the mini-
mum window size. The end point r2 varies from r0
to 1 and the starting point r1 varies from 0 to r2  r0.
The GSADF statistic is the largest ADF statistic over
the range of r1 and r2:
GSADFðr0Þ ¼ sup
r2 2 ½r0; 1
r12½0;r2r0
ADFr2r1 :
The backward SADF (BSADF) statistic is defined as
the sup value of the ADF statistic sequence:
BSADFr2ðr0Þ ¼ sup
r1 2 ½0; r2  r0
ADFr2r1 ;
where the BSADF statistic and its corresponding
critical value are used for dating the origination
and termination dates of a bubble. The minimum





values are simulated using 2000 replications.
The PSY approach is often applied to a price–
fundamental ratio to assess the explosive behaviour.
If the test statistic exceeds the critical value, we may
conclude a finding of explosive behaviour. A finding
of explosive behaviour in a price–fundamental ratio
may be interpreted as evidence of bubbles. Previous
applications (e.g. exchange rate market, stock market,
housing market and commodity market) of the
approach have followed Phillips et al.’s (2014) sugges-
tion to include an intercept in the regression model.
As a result, many empirical papers have reported
rejections of the null suggesting periods of rapid
increase in prices associated with a growing bubble,
when in fact the data identify a ‘collapse’ or a ‘collapse
and recovery’ phase and not a bubble. Visual inspec-
tion can usually resolve these cases, although it also
seems that false (positive) bubbles also seem to be
reported when an intercept is included in the regres-
sion model. An example of ‘collapse episode’ and
‘collapse and recovery episode’ can be seen in
Figure 1. The backward SADF statistic (blue line)
and its 95% critical value (red line) for Figure 1(a)
suggests a number of ‘bubbles’ as the test statistic
exceeds the relevant critical value. However, the plot
of the actual data (green line) shows that the data is
continuously declining (a collapse period and not a
series of bubbles). Figure 1(b) presents data and test
results consistent that relate to a ‘collapse and recov-
ery’ episode and a genuine ‘bubble’. The plot of the
actual data makes the classification of these different
episodes clear and highlight why the actual data and
the test statistic (and relevant critical values) need to
be presented on the same graph. Previous empirical
studies have either ignored such cases or if they have
mentioned them they have provided no explanation
of the possible reason for the false test positives. Some
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Figure 1. An example of (a) collapse episode and (b) collapse and recovery episode and bubble (For interpretation of the references
to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.).
APPLIED ECONOMICS 3199
156
only the backward SADF statistic with the 95% cri-
tical value sequences and provide no plot of the actual
data series in the date-stamping strategy graph. In this
article, we use two different regression model specifi-
cations (a model without an intercept and a model
with an intercept) to explore the evidence of bubbles
and compare the results obtained from both formula-
tions. A small fixed lag order is used in both formula-
tions as suggested by Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015).
IV. Data
As US regional housing markets could behave quite
differently, we focus here on State level data rather than
national data. The monthly Freddie Mac State house
price index provides a measure of house price inflation
for the US in 50 State indexes and the District of
Columbia. All series used are from January 1975 to
December 2014 (December 2000 = 100). Quarterly
State personal income for 50 States and the District
of Columbia is obtained from the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis. Due to data frequency availability,
we use the commonly adopted Chow and Lin’s (1971)
GLS procedure to interpolate the quarterly personal
income series to create a monthly series.2 All monthly
personal income series have been calculated
(December 2000 = 100). We are then able to calculate
a monthly house price–income ratio for all States as
well as the District of Columbia.
V. Results
We divide our results into several parts. The ‘General
results’ section provides an overview of the bubble
detection results for all the States and the District of
Columbia. The results for several key States –
California, District of Columbia, Massachusetts,
Hawaii, Nevada and New York – are then discussed
in the following subsections. Later, we also discuss
results for farm and the ‘Rust Belt’ States and ‘energy-
producing’ States.
General results
The price–income ratio for all the 50 States and the
District of Columbia can be classified into two
groups: one is oscillating with peaks and troughs
(e.g. California, Florida, Hawaii, etc.) and the other
exhibits a declining trend (e.g. Indiana, Mississippi,
South Carolina, etc.).3 Figure 2 displays periods of
explosiveness suggested by the GSADF test at the
State level based on a regression model with an
intercept.4 Tables A1 and A2 present the correspond-
ing date-stamping outcomes and GSADF test statis-
tics for all the 50 States and the District of Columbia.5
Overall, we seem to find evidence of explosive beha-
viour in the house price–income ratio for all the
States and the District of Columbia except West
Virginia. The GSADF statistics for the house price–
income ratio of 34 States and the District of Columbia
are significant at the 1% level, which indicates strong
evidence of explosive periods. The GSADF statistics
of 12 States provide evidence of explosive behaviour
at the 5% level (i.e. Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Wyoming). The
GSADF statistics of price–income ratio for the
remaining 3 States exceeds the 10% right-tail critical
values (i.e. Louisiana, Oklahoma and Utah). However,
it is necessary to bear in mind that the regression
model formulation with an intercept could not dis-
tinguish between collapse or collapse and recovery
episodes and bubbles. Hence, under the model for-
mulation with an intercept, a finding of explosive
behaviour in the price–income ratio does not neces-
sarily lead to identification of bubbles. We need to
interpret such results with care.
On the other hand, results obtained from the
model formulation without an intercept differ from
these findings. Figure 3 displays periods of explosive-
ness suggested by the GSADF test at the State level
based on the model formulation without an intercept
in the regression model. Figures 7, 9, 11, A2, A4, A6,
A8, A10, A12, A14, A16 and A18 compare the
2A number of researchers have applied the Chow and Lin’s (1971) GLS procedure that can provide the best linear unbiased interpolations in house prices or
property markets (see Kenny (1999), Meese and Wallace (2003), Assenmacher and Gerlach (2008), Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) and Zhou (2010)).
3A declining price–income ratio implies that the growth of house prices doesn’t outpace the growth in personal income. House prices could drop quite
substantially in some States due to unfavourable expectations, low employment and economic recession during the 1980–1990s.
4We assume that a housing bubble should last at least for 6 months. Thus, a potential bubble episode with shorter period is ignored. Figures 6, 8, 10, A1, A3,
A5, A7, A9, A11, A13, A15 and A17 compare the backward SADF statistic with the 95% critical value sequences for the price–income ratio under the
regression model with an intercept.
5The critical values under the regression model with an intercept are 2.5343 (90%), 2.7960 (95%), 3.4337 (99%). The critical values under the regression
model without an intercept are 3.4989 (90%), 3.8319 (95%), 4.5976 (99%).
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Figure 3. Date-stamping strategies based on the regression model formulation without an intercept.
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backward SADF statistic with the 95% critical value
sequences for the price–income ratio under the
assumption without an intercept. Tables A3 and A4
present the corresponding date-stamping outcomes
and GSADF test statistics for all the States and the
District of Columbia. The GSADF statistics of eight
States and the District of Columbia are significant at
the 1% level, which indicates strong evidence of
explosive behaviour (e.g. California, Delaware,
Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island and Virginia). The null hypothesis of no explo-
sive behaviour is rejected at the 5% level for 11 States
(e.g. Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts,
Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania and Vermont). The GSADF sta-
tistics of house price–income ratio for New Mexico,
Oregon, Washington and Wyoming also exceeds the
10% right-tailed critical values. We find no significant
evidence of bubbles for the remaining States.
Comparing Figures 2 and 3 show that the exclusion
of the intercept in the regression model formulation
has affected the theory and date-stamping strategy of
the PSY approach.
We present results based upon tests of the regres-
sion model with and without an intercept. Based on
the above results, the intercept term plays a crucial
role in identifying the explosive behaviour as it can
potentially affect the date-stamping outcomes from
the PSY. Our results suggest that we would find the
same date-stamping outcomes for with and without
intercept in a particular State if the State data does not
have any collapse or collapse and recovery events –
only the potential bubbles. Examples of collapse epi-
sodes can be seen in Figure 10(b,d,e), etc. Similarly,
examples of collapse and recovery episodes may be
found in Figure 8. When the intercept is included in
the regression model, we not only detect the collapse
episode or collapse and recovery episode but also the
potential bubbles. However, without considering the
intercept, the PSY approach detects only the potential
bubbles. Special attention should be paid to assessing
the evidence of the potential bubbles.
Quite different date-stamping outcomes are
obtained from the two model specifications (with
or without an intercept) if the price–income ratio
of a particular State has a declining trend. Most
States with a declining trend exhibit strong evidence
of collapse episodes under the model specification
with an intercept (e.g. Georgia in Figure A9, Indiana
in Figure A5, South Dakota in Figure A7, Tennessee
in Figure A13, etc.), which could give the false indi-
cation of bubbles. However, when the intercept term
is removed in the regression equation, our date-
stamping strategies no longer detect the collapse
episodes (e.g. Georgia in Figure A10, Indiana in
Figure A6, South Dakota in Figure A8, Tennessee
in Figure A14, etc.), which suggest no evidence of
bubbles.
Our empirical evidence demonstrates the practical
importance of regression model specification. Based
upon the regression model specification with an
intercept, we can identify collapse episode, collapse
and recovery episode and the potential bubbles.
When the data exhibits a declining trend, the
model specification without an intercept seems to
provide more promising results as it identifies only
the potential bubbles. We do not try to suggest a
particular model specification, which always pro-
vides the most reliable way in examining the pre-
sence of bubbles. One of the take-home messages
from our study is that it is useful to try a range of
model specifications for assessing evidence of bub-
bles in right-tailed unit root tests.
Was there a housing bubble in the 1980s?
Existing studies found the existence of a bubble in
several States during the 1980s. As shown in Figure 4,
based upon the model without an intercept, our
empirical results seem to suggest that only 10 States
and the District of Columbia experience a housing
bubble in the 1980s. The 10 bubbling States include
Figure 4. States experiencing a bubble during the 1980s based
on the model specification without an intercept.
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Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania and Vermont. The finding of a housing
bubble in the 1980s is in line with several existing
studies including Case (1986), Case and Shiller
(1988), Case and Shiller (1994), Riddel (1999), Case
and Shiller (2003) and Zhou and Sornette (2003). It
should be pointed out that California experiences a
housing bubble during the 1980s only under the
assumption with an intercept.
Was there a housing bubble in the early 2000s?
Several States experienced a dramatic house price
boom in the early 2000s followed by a collapse. Glick,
Lansing, and Molitor (2015) conclude that the States
with the largest house price booms from 2002 to 2006
are Hawaii, Florida, Nevada, California, and Arizona
and the States with the smallest house price booms are
Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Kentucky, Colorado, Idaho, Nebraska, Ohio, Indiana
and Michigan. Our results seem to support the view
that the States with the largest house price booms are
bubbles. The date-stamping strategies of Hawaii in
Figure 6(d), Florida in Figure A9, Nevada in Figure 6
(e), California in Figure 6(a) and Arizona in
Figure A15 indicate the presence of bubbles between
2001 and 2006 based on themodel formulation with an
intercept. A similar conclusion can also be drawn
based on the model formulation without an intercept
except in the case of Arizona and Nevada. On the other
hand, the date-stamping strategies of those States with
the smallest house price booms suggest no evidence of
bubbles between 2001 and 2006 – the exception is
Michigan as shown in Figure 9(b).
It should be emphasized that the States with a hous-
ing bubble are not limited to California, Florida,
Hawaii and Nevada as shown in Figure 5. We also
find States with a bubble that grows in the early
2000s and collapses in mid-2000s as presented in
Table 1 based on two different model formulations.
We can see that the housing bubble is not an isolated
phenomenon in particular, 22 or 25 States (depending
on the model formulation) and the District of
Columbia experience a bubble during this period.
Although there are some differences in the origination
and collapse dates of the bubbles based on the two
model formulations, our results provide similar date-
stamping outcomes and also confirm the existence of a
bubble in these States. According to Martin (2011), the
States that experienced a bubble during this period
include California, District of Columbia, Florida,
Hawaii, Massachusetts, Nevada, Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island, which are well aligned with our results.
Crucially, our results allow us to draw an important
Figure 5. States experience a bubble during the early 2000s
based on the two model specifications. A State experiencing a
bubble under both models is coloured in red. A State experien-
cing a bubble only under the assumption without an intercept is
coloured in yellow while a State experiencing a bubble only
under the assumption with an intercept is coloured in green (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend,
the reader is referred to the web version of this article.).
Table 1. States with a bubble during the early 2000s boom.
State
Bubble episode(s)
under the model with
an intercept
Bubble episode(s) under




















New Hampshire 2001M03–2005M10 2001M11–2006M07
New Jersey 2001M11–2005M12 2002M10–2006M09
New York 2001M06–2005M11 2001M06–2006M10
New Mexico 2005M05–2007M01 2004M10–2007M07
Oregon 2004M02–2007M11
Pennsylvania 2004M11–2005M11 2003M05–2006M11






conclusion – the bubble of the 2000s is more wide-
spread than the 1980s. This phenomenon is clear via
close inspection of Figure 3. Our results also seem to
suggest that the housing bubble in the early 2000s is
not a national bubble, as many States experience no
bubble activity during this period. This conclusion is
consistent with the views of Greenspan in 2005. The
States that experience a bubble are mainly located in
Northeast or West with the exception of Florida, New
Mexico, Montana, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota and
Illinois. Wheelock (2006) also concluded that housing
booms and busts in the 1980s and early 2000s are
different in terms of their magnitude and coverage
where the early 2000s boom appeared more widely
spread out than that of the 1980s.
California (CA)
A number of studies focus on the Californian hous-
ing market (e.g. Case and Shiller (1994), Gabriel,
Mattey, and Wascher (1999),6 Riddel (1999) and
Riddel (2011).7). Our date-stamping strategy results
for the Californian price–income ratio are pre-
sented in Figure 6(a), where the price–income
ratio reaches its lowest point in 1984/1985 and
starts to climb to a peak in 1989. After 1989/1990,
the ratio declines sharply then reaches another peak
in 2005/2006. We find several episodes from the
price–income ratio for California: 1983M07–
1985M06, 1988M05–1989M10 and 2001M02–
2005M11. Case (1986) argues that there is a house
price boom in California in 1976–1980; however,
our results indicate that such a ‘housing boom’ was
not a bubble.
Based on our analysis, there are two episodes in the
1980s (1983M07–1985M06, 1988M05–1989M10). The
first period between 1983M07 and 1985M06 is an
example of a collapse episode. The papers by Case
(1994), Case and Shiller (1994), Riddel (1999), Zhou
and Sornette (2003) and Gupta and Miller (2012) offer
some support for our findings. Case and Shiller (1988)
were the first to uncover the role of high expectations
in driving up the California boom in late 1980s using a
questionnaire survey. First, Case and Shiller (1988),
surveyed a sample of 2000 households who bought
homes in 1988 in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Boston
and Milwaukee. The Los Angeles and San Francisco
housing markets were chosen to represent two ‘boom
markets’ and Boston was selected as a ‘post-boom
market’. Milwaukee was treated as a control market
to reflect a ‘normal’ housing market. A key finding
from Case and Shiller (1988) suggests that three hous-
ing markets (Los Angeles, San Francisco and Boston)
have gone through a house price bubble period. A
house price boom in California over the period
1987–1989 is also identified in Case (1994), which
coincides with our second episode 1988M05–
1989M10.8 Second, Case and Shiller (1994) compared
two house price boom/burst cycles in Boston and Los
Angeles and they focused on the period post-1983 in
Boston and the period post-1985 in Los Angeles. The
prices in Los Angeles increased more than 100%
between 1985 and 1989. They concluded that these
two house price booms cannot be fully explained by
economic fundamentals. The run-up in prices seem to
have be driven by ‘speculation’ as most home buyers
paid higher prices for properties and aimed at future
capital gains. Moreover, Riddel (1999) concluded that
there was a speculative housing bubble from late 1987
to mid-1990 in the Santa Barbara County of California.
Zhou and Sornette (2003) also found evidence of a
housing bubble that originated around 1984 and
burst in 1989 in the Californian market based on the
characteristic of a bubble defined as ‘a super-exponen-
tial growth’ phase. They draw the same conclusion for
Los Angeles and San Francisco as these two cities led
the Californian market. This finding is consistent with
our analysis. Lastly, Southern California experienced a
run-up and subsequent fall in house prices during the
late 1980s and early 1990s (Gupta and Miller 2012).9
This is due to the fact that California experienced
considerable economic growth during 1983–1989 and
suffered a major decline in economic activity during
the 1990–1991 recession.
6Gabriel, Mattey, and Wascher (1999) explored the housing price patterns in California’s two largest Metropolitan areas (Los Angeles and San Francisco) prior
to 2000.
7Riddel (2011) estimated an error correction model that spanned 1978Q2 to 2008Q1 using quarterly housing price data for Las Vegas and Los Angeles with
both national and regional economic variables. Riddel (2011) provided support for the contagion hypothesis that income and price in Los Angeles
contributed to the run-up house values in Las Vegas from 2002 to 2006.
8Case (1994) reviewed the house prices in the US since the 1950s at national and regional level and discussed the causes of house price behaviours across
regions.
9Gupta and Miller (2012) explored the cointegration relationships between house prices in eight Southern California metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).
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House prices in California accelerated again in the
early 2000s then declined from their peak in 2005/
2006. Our results confirm this period as a bubble.
The finding of a bubble during this period coincides
with several existing studies in the literature (e.g.
Case and Shiller 2003; Gupta and Miller 2012). For
example, Case and Shiller (2003) replicated a ques-
tionnaire survey in 2003 for the same markets (e.g.
Los Angeles, San Francisco, Boston and Milwaukee).
Unlike the first survey in 1988, these three markets
were in booms while Milwaukee was a control city.
The survey was conducted among 2000 persons who
had bought houses between March and August 2002.
They concluded the characteristics of bubbles in
these four markets were strong in 2003, but not as
strong as in 1988. Results obtained from Case and
Shiller (2003) also seem to suggest the existence of
bubbles. Moreover, house prices rose dramatically in
Southern California MSAs in the early 2000s, peak-
ing in 2005 or 2006 depending on the MSA (Gupta
and Miller 2012). It is interesting that our identified
episode (2001M02–2005M11) is in line with the




































































































Price-income ratio for CA (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for DC (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for MA (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for HI (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for NV (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for NY (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Figure 6. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for several key States based on the regression model formulation with




We obtain quite different results, however, using
the regression model specification without an inter-
cept. According to Figure 7(a), we detect an early
episode in 1979, which is not detected earlier. This
finding is consistent with Case (1986), as discussed
earlier, who concluded a housing boom at that time
in California. No explosive behaviour is found in the
1980s as the collapse-only episode between 1983M07
and 1985M06 is not identified. This result does not
support the view that California experienced a bub-
ble in the 1980s, which is a key difference between
the two models. However, the housing boom in the
2000s is shown to be a bubble.
District of Columbia (DC)
Based upon the assumption ‘with an intercept’, the
data-stamping strategy for the District of Columbia
is shown in Figure 6(b). The empirical results
suggest that the District of Columbia experiences
three house price bubbles in 1978M08–1980M08,
1987M10–1990M03 and 2001M02–2005M11. These
occurrences are quite unusual as, based upon our
results, few other areas experienced a housing bubble
between the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, the
District of Columbia experiences a housing bubble























































































1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
85M03-87M12
88M03-88M10 01M06-06M10
Price-income ratio for CA (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for DC (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for MA (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for HI (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for NV (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for NY (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Figure 7. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for several key States based on the regression model formulation without
an intercept. (a) California (CA); (b) District of Columbia (DC); (c) Massachusetts (MA); (d) Hawaii (HI) (e) Nevada (NV); and (f) New
York (NY).
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1980. A collapse episode is also identified during the
period 1992M12–1994M04. The recent run-up in
housing prices during the early-mid 2000s is shown
to be a bubble.
Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 7(b), we obtain
similar date-stamping outcomes when the intercept is
removed from the regression model, where we are able
to identify the following bubbles: 1978M08–1980M09,
1980M11–1981M06, 1987M12–1990M10, 2000M12–
2005M12 and 2014M05–2014M12. The most recent
episode (2014M05–2014M12) suggests that the
District of Columbia is experiencing a new housing
bubble, which is of particular interest. Our results,
based on tests of the regression model without an
intercept, indicate the District of Columbia is the
only area experiencing a housing bubble post-2010.
This is clearly shown in Figure 3.
Massachusetts (MA)
Based on the model formulation with an intercept, we
find significant evidence of bubbles in the price–
income ratio for the period 1985M01-–1987M07 and
2001M02–2005M08 presented in Figure 6(c). The
GSADF statistics is 3.3926, which is significant at the
1% level. A series of papers by Case (1986, 1994) and
Case and Shiller (2003) enable us to understand house
price dynamics in Boston during the 1980s. House
prices rose rapidly in Boston in 1984 with house prices
in the Boston Metropolitan area increasing by 39% in
1985 and more than 140% in 1988 (Case and Shiller
2003). House prices in Boston remained unchanged at
or near their peak for almost 3 years from 1987Q2 to
1990Q1. If the price increases in 1994/1995 were main-
tained, house prices would double approximately every
3 years in Boston (Case 1986). Most importantly, Case
(1986) concluded that Boston had experienced a hous-
ing price bubble as market fundamentals, (e.g. popula-
tion growth, employment growth, increasing income,
mortgage rates, construction costs) did not fully
explain the rapid increase in house values. Case
(1994) also described several house price booms in
the US including the boom in Boston 1983–1987.
Therefore, our findings for the first explosive period
(1985M01–1987M07) coincide with the historical
experiences of house price boom/bubble in Case
(1986, 1994) and Case and Shiller (2003). The run-up
in house values of Massachusetts in the early 2000s is a
bubble, which is consistent with the conclusion drawn
by Case and Shiller (2003).
We obtain similar date-stamping outcomes when
the intercept term is removed from the regression
model specification. As shown in Figure 7(c), two
episodes (1985M12–1987M06 and 2000M05–
2005M12) are identified. Results based on the
two model formulations seem to suggest that
Massachusetts experienced a bubble in the 1980s
and early 2000s, respectively.
Hawaii (HI)
As illustrated by Figure 6(d), Hawaii experienced a
bubble period between July 1988 and July 1991. As
suggested in a series of papers by Miller, Sklarz, and
Ordway (1988), Wheelock (2006), Krainer and
Wilcox (2011), Krainer and Wilcox (2013), there
was rapid growth in Hawaii’s real estate market
from the late 1980s where the appreciation of
house prices was driven by Japanese investors. The
house values in Hawaii rose dramatically during the
years of the Japanese economy boom in the 1980s
and house prices dropped significantly in the early
1990s when the Japanese asset price bubble collapsed
(Krainer and Wilcox 2013). Our results support the
historical house price dynamics in Hawaii during the
late 1980s and early 1990s.
When the intercept term is removed from the
regression model, the PSY approach no longer
detects the collapse episodes (i.e. 1996M09–
1998M02 and 2008M10–2009M06). The exclusion
of the intercept term has affected the asymptotic
theory and date-stamping outcomes of the PSY
approach. Overall, based on the two models, our
results seem to indicate that Hawaii experienced a
bubble during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This
finding coincides with the house price boom/bust in
Hawaii. Moreover, the housing boom in the early
2000s in Hawaii is also a bubble.
Nevada (NV)
The null of no explosive behaviour for Nevada’s
price–income ratio is rejected at the 5% level
(4.2925 > 2.7960). As illustrated by Figure 6(e), we





and Sornette (2008) analysed the real estate market
of Las Vegas between June 1983 and March 2005
and argue for the existence of a housing bubble
during 2003 to mid-2004.10 This finding partially
supports our analysis for the episode during
2003M10–2005M02. Riddel (2011) presented the
view that contagious price and income growth
from the Los Angeles market contributed to the
bubble formed in Las Vegas house prices during
2002–2006.
However, a close inspection of the price–income
ratio series in Figure 6(e) shows that the general
trend of the price–income ratio is declining. Several
identified episodes are collapse episodes. When the
intercept is removed from the regression model, we
find no explosive behaviour as the GSADF statistics
is much lower than the 10% critical values
(2.4837 < 3.4989). Thus, there is no evidence to
indicate the presence of bubbles in Nevada for the
whole period as suggested in Figure 7(e).
New York (NY)
The null of no explosive behaviour is rejected at the
1% level for New York (3.5519 > 2.5343). As shown
in Figure 6(f), we identify several episodes: 1984M09–
1987M12, 1994M12–1996M06, 2001M07–2005M12
and 2011M01–2011M07. Case (1986) also discussed
a house price boom in New York during the 1980s,
where the median sale prices of existing single-family
homes rose by 30% in New York in 1985. The rapid
increase in house prices in Boston and New York in
the mid-1980s doesn’t suggest a national house mar-
ket boom as many cities faced a decline in nominal
values Case 1986. A house price boom in New York
in 1983–1987 is identified in Case (1994). A finding
of a bubble period 1984M09–1987M12 from our ana-
lysis seems to be in line with house price boom in
New York during the mid-1980s. Wheelock (2006)
also support a housing boom in New York between
1985Q1 and 1987Q3 and a decline in house price
followed.11 Moreover, based on our results, the
rapid appreciation of house price–income ratio
between 2001M07 and 2005M12 is a bubble.
We no longer detect the collapse episodes of
1994M12–1996M06 and 2011M01–2011M07 in
Figure 7(f) when the intercept is removed from the
regression model specification. We obtain similar
date-stamping outcomes under the regression
model without an intercept except for the omission
of the two collapse episodes.
Farm and ‘rust belt’ states: Iowa (IA), Michigan
(MI), Wisconsin (WI) and West Virginia (WV)
The date-stamping strategy for the price–income
ratio of the farm and the so-called ‘Rust Belt’ States
is presented in Figure 8. The general trend for the
price–income ratio in these figures is downward
sloping. The null hypothesis of no explosive beha-
viour in the price–income ratio is rejected at the 1%,
5% and 5% level for Iowa, Michigan and Wisconsin,
respectively. The GSADF statistics for the house
price–income ratio in West Virginia is 1.8273,
which is below the 10% level significance.
The house price busts occurred during 1980–1982
in these four States (Wheelock 2006). Of particular
interest is whether these house price busts are bub-
bles. As can be seen in Figure 8, the price–income
ratio reaches a peak or maintains a high level in 1980
for Iowa (IA), Michigan (MI), West Virginia (WV)
and Wisconsin (WI). The income of these States
relied heavily on older manufacturing industries
(e.g. automobiles and steel) where there was a large
decline during the early 1980s recession (Wheelock
2006).12 Although these States do not experience a
high growth in house prices, the PSY approach
identifies the collapse and recovery episodes in
the early 1980s based (e.g. 1981M01–1981M12 for
Iowa, 1982M06–1982M11 for Michigan, 1981M10–
1982M12 for West Virginia and 1980M10–1982M08
for Wisconsin).
As shown in Figure 9, quite different results are
obtained from the GSADF test under the assumption
of no intercept. The null hypothesis of no explosive
behaviour cannot be rejected at the 10% level and we
find no significant evidence of bubbles in these four
States. We also find no explosive periods during
10Zhou and Sornette (2008) defined a bubble as a price acceleration faster exponential. This definition is the same as Zhou and Sornette (2006).
11Wheelock (2006) summarized that US States experienced 20 house price booms between 1980 and 1999.
12During 1980–1982, Iowa, Wisconsin, West Virginia and Michigan ranked 42nd, 44th, 45th, and 50th, respectively, among all States in real personal income
growth, and 45th, 40th, 48th and 50th in employment growth (Wheelock 2006).




























































1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
80M10-82M08 10M06-14M12
Price-income ratio for IA (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for MI (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for WV (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for WI (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Figure 8. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for farm and the ‘Rust Belt’ States based on the regression model

























































1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
04M04-05M11
Price-income ratio for IA (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for MI (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for WV (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for WI (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Figure 9. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for farm and the ‘Rust Belt’ States based on the regression model
formulation without an intercept. (a) Iowa (IA); (b) Michigan (MI); (c) West Virginia (WV); and (d) Wisconsin (WI).
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1980–1982 in these four States, which indicates that
the house price busts are not bubbles.
Energy-producing states: Alaska (AK), Louisiana
(LA), Montana (MT), Oklahoma (OK), Texas (TX)
and Wyoming (WY)
The oil prices rise sharply during the 1970s energy
crisis and it reached a peak in 1980 at more than $35
per barrel before plunging to less than $10 per barrel
in 1986. Wheelock (2006) argues that the house
price busts in these energy-producing States was
associated with a sharp decline in energy prices.
We therefore aim to investigate whether these
house price busts during the early-mid 1980s are
bubbles. The trend for price–income ratio of these
six energy-producing States is downward sloping
(see Figure 10). The null hypothesis of no bubbles
is rejected for all six States; however, we find sig-
nificant evidence of ‘collapse’ episodes and ‘collapse
and recovery’ episodes in Figure 10.
Based on the regression model without an inter-
cept, the null hypothesis of no explosive periods can
be rejected for Alaska, Montana and Wyoming at the
5%, 5% and 10% significance level, whereas the null





























































































Price-income ratio for AK (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for MT (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for TX (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for WY (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for OK (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for LA (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Figure 10. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for energy-producing States based on the regression model formula-
tion with an intercept. (a) Alaska (AK); (b) Louisiana (LA); (c) Montana (MT); (d) Oklahoma (OK); (e) Texas (TX); and (f) Wyoming
(WY).
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Texas. Perhaps more importantly, we find insuffi-
cient evidence to support that house price busts
associated with the sharp decline in energy prices
during the early-mid 1980s are bubbles in Figure 11.
VI. Conclusion
In this article, we investigate the presence of bubbles
in the US housing market at the State level based on
price–income ratio data, January 1975–December
2014. The recently developed right-tailed unit root
test of Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015,) is adopted in our
study. Our results are summarized as follows. First,
we find the presence of a bubble in several States in
the 1980s (i.e. California, Hawaii, Massachusetts and
New York), which is consistent with some existing
studies that investigate housing bubbles or housing
booms and busts (i.e. Case (1986), Case and Shiller
(1988, 1994, 2003), Riddel (1999) and Zhou and
Sornette (2003)). Our article completes analysis in
this area by formally testing for bubbles (rather than
simply analysing graphs or house price indicators) in
all US States (and DC) during the 1980s, providing
empirical evidence of housing bubbles in several
States. Second, we identify the existence of a housing
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Price-income ratio for AK (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for MT (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
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95% critical value sequence (left axis)
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93M12-96M10
Figure 11. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for energy-producing States based on the regression model formulation
without an intercept. (a) Alaska (AK); (b) Louisiana (LA); (c) Montana (MT); (d) Oklahoma (OK); (e) Texas (TX); and (f) Wyoming (WY).
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collapses in the mid-2000s in more than 20 States
and the District of Columbia. Our results also sug-
gest that the housing bubble in the early 2000s is
more widespread than the 1980s. Moreover, the
rapid rise in house values during the early 2000s
does not seem to be a nationwide bubble which is
in agreement with the talk given by Alan Greenspan
in 2005. Lastly, the exclusion of an intercept in the
regression model has shown to affect the asymptotic
theory and date-stamping outcomes for the PSY
approach. When the intercept is removed from the
regression model specification, we no longer detect
the collapse or recovery episode only the potential
bubble. We do not try to suggest a particular model
specification, which always provides the best date-
stamping outcomes. One of the take-home messages
from our study is there is a need to consider differ-
ent regression model specifications for assessing evi-
dence of bubbles in the right tailed unit root tests.
This represents an important example of how care is
required when using the PSY approach.
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Appendix
Table A1. Testing for explosiveness in the US house price–income ratio at the State level based on regression model formulation




Alaska (AK) 2.5753** 87M02–88M05, 89M02–90M02, 03M06–06M09, 11M06–12M04
Alabama (AL) 2.8677*** 80M09–82M06, 88M08–89M06, 89M10–91M03, 91M10–92M07, 97M10–98M07, 09M12–13M04
Arkansas (AR) 3.4767*** 81M05–82M05, 88M11–90M04, 97M07–98M08, 07M08–09M05, 10M02–13M05
Arizona (AZ) 4.0760*** 84M05–90M12, 96M11–98M11, 04M05–05M11, 08M10–09M05
California (CA) 3.9756*** 83M07–85M06, 88M05–89M10, 01M02–05M11
Colorado (CO) 2.5833** 83M08–92M01, 97M10–98M08, 06M10–09M03, 10M10–12M05
Connecticut (CT) 2.8532*** 86M01–87M08, 01M10–05M10, 10M10–13M04
District of Columbia
(DC)
3.8213*** 78M08–80M08, 87M10–90M03, 92M12–94M04, 01M02–05M11
Delaware (DE) 3.8356*** 87M04–88M03, 90M10–02M01, 02M12–06M10, 08M10–13M02
Florida (FL) 3.7602*** 81M02–81M11, 84M09–86M05, 02M04–05M11
Georgia (GA) 4.3743*** 83M02–85M06, 88M07–95M05, 07M08–12M12
Hawaii (HI) 4.7460*** 88M07–91M07, 96M09–98M02, 02M07–06M06, 08M10–09M06
Iowa (IA) 2.5337** 81M01–81M12, 07M10–09M04, 10M10–13M09
Idaho (ID) 2.5736** 80M09–81M09, 83M12–85M06, 87M07–90M03, 97M05–03M03, 05M05–05M11, 06M02–06M08, 09M06–12M04
Illinois (IL) 2.3791** 81M09–83M02, 97M07–98M06, 07M09–09M04, 10M06–13M03
Indiana (IN) 2.2692** 81M11–83M02, 83M06–85M07, 07M08–09M04, 10M10–13M04
Kansas (KS) 2.6143** 80M10–87M02, 88M08–89M08, 89M10–91M02, 91M09–92M06, 06M10–07M04, 07M09–08M11, 10M10–12M04,
12M08–13M04
Kentucky (KY) 3.0950*** 80M10–82M08, 90M01–92M12, 97M08–99M02, 07M08–09M04, 10M03–13M07
Louisiana (LA) 1.9972* 84M05–86M01, 87M07–91M03, 11M06–13M04
Massachusetts (MA) 3.3926*** 85M01–87M07, 01M01–05M08
Maryland (MD) 3.3083*** 82M02–83M04, 83M10–86M03, 92M11–01M02, 02M05–03M12, 04M02–06M06, 08M08–09M04
Maine (ME) 3.6362*** 87M01–88M03, 92M12–93M08, 01M04–05M12
Michigan (MI) 3.8590*** 06M06–12M11
Minnesota (MN) 2.2989** 83M10–86M04, 88M12–90M12, 01M11–03M11, 04M11–05M11, 07M08–09M04, 10M06–12M04
Missouri (MO) 3.6546*** 88M10–89M07, 90M04–93M03, 07M06–09M04, 10M06–13M04
Mississippi (MS) 3.7950*** 81M06–82M03, 87M08–90M10, 10M04–13M03
** indicates significance at the 5% level.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.
* indicates significance at the 10% level.
Table A2. Testing for explosiveness in the US house price–income ratio at the State level based on regression model formulation
with an intercept (2).
Territorial authority GSADF statistic Episode(s)
Montana (MT) 2.9110*** 88M12–90M04, 93M11–95M01, 04M11–06M12, 09M11–12M11
North Carolina (NC) 3.4271*** 80M10–82M01, 88M01–90M09, 91M07–93M05, 09M03–13M05
North Dakota (ND) 3.1273*** 11M06–12M11
Nebraska (NE) 4.3557*** 84M06–85M06, 87M11–89M08, 06M12–09M07, 10M06–13M12
New Hampshire (NH) 2.7671** 80M09–83M04, 86M03–87M04, 90M12–92M07, 01M03–05M10, 07M09–09M04, 10M010–12M11
New Jersey (NJ) 2.8940*** 86M01–87M08, 95M11–96M05, 01M11–05M12
New Mexico (NM) 3.0967*** 87M09–92M08, 97M10–99M01, 99M09–02M04, 05M05–07M01, 11M06–12M04
Nevada (NV) 4.2925*** 82M12–90M09, 91M11–93M06, 03M10–05M02, 07M08–09M04
New York (NY) 3.5519*** 85M01–87M11, 94M12–96M06, 01M06–05M11, 11M01–11M08
Ohio (OH) 2.8279*** 81M02–82M10, 83M10–85M12, 07M08–14M12
Oklahoma (OK) 2.2009* 81M02–82M05, 84M06–91M08, 07M11–08M11
Oregon (OR) 3.1929*** 81M02–82M02, 04M12–07M06
Pennsylvania (PA) 2.5222** 81M06–83M02, 92M05–93M07, 94M11–98M06, 04M11–05M11, 10M10–12M04
Rhode Island (RI) 2.8820*** 81M10–82M10, 86M06–87M07, 92M02–93M09, 01M04–05M11
South Carolina (SC) 3.5162*** 83M11–85M03, 88M02–89M06, 92M12–93M08, 08M09–14M03
South Dakota (SD) 2.7747** 86M04–87M02, 87M07–92M09, 10M10–12M05
Tennessee (TN) 3.5187*** 80M07–81M04, 88M01–95M04, 97M11–98M11, 10M05–13M02
Texas (TX) 2.9688*** 84M08–86M05, 86M10–91M02, 96M08–98M06, 07M11–09M01
Utah (UT) 2.2061* 81M05–82M10, 83M08–91M01, 94M01–94M10, 97M10–02M02, 10M09–12M03
Virginia (VA) 3.6578*** 80M11–81M08, 82M01–82M11, 90M10–91M05, 91M08–99M06, 03M03–06M06
Vermont (VT) 4.5995*** 79M06–80M03, 81M02–82M09, 87M11–88M11, 91M08–00M03, 02M02–06M05, 11M03–12M05
Washington (WA) 2.7979*** 95M10–97M05, 05M04–07M03, 10M09–12M06
Wisconsin (WI) 2.9467*** 80M10–82M08, 10M06–14M12
West Virginia (WV) 1.8273 81M10–82M12, 01M07–02M02, 08M08–09M04, 10M11–12M04
Wyoming (WY) 2.3944** 80M05–81M04, 84M05–86M04, 94M03–96M04
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.
** indicates significance at the 5% level.
* indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table A4. Testing for explosiveness in the US house price–income ratio at the State level based on regression model formulation
without an intercept (2).
Territorial authority GSADF statistic Episode(s)
Montana (MT) 3.9162** 94M03–95M10, 04M06–07M11
North Carolina (NC) 0.1472
North Dakota (ND) 1.7347
Nebraska (NE) 1.7782
New Hampshire (NH) 5.9468*** 86M04–87M07, 01M11–06M07
New Jersey (NJ) 4.2077** 86M07–87M10, 02M10–06M09
New Mexico (NM) 3.8277* 04M10–07M07
Nevada (NV) 2.4837
New York (NY) 3.9831** 85M03–87M12, 88M03–88M10, 01M06–06M10
Ohio (OH) 1.2067
Oklahoma (OK) 1.2085
Oregon (OR) 3.5237* 92M05–92M11, 93M04–97M07, 04M02–07M11
Pennsylvania (PA) 3.8800** 88M04–88M12, 03M05–06M11
Rhode Island (RI) 4.6938*** 02M03–06M01
South Carolina (SC) 0.9467




Virginia (VA) 4.6772*** 03M01–06M11
Vermont (VT) 3.9377** 87M12–88M12, 02M04–06M12
Washington (WA) 3.6748* 79M01–79M11, 03M05–07M08
Wisconsin (WI) 3.1672 04M04–05M11
West Virginia (WV) 3.3261 05M03–05M12
Wyoming (WY) 3.7067* 93M12–96M10
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.
** indicates significance at the 5% level.
* indicates significance at the 10% level.
Table A3. Testing for explosiveness in the US house price–income ratio at the State level based on regression model formulation
without an intercept (1).
Territorial authority GSADF statistic Episode(s)
Alaska (AK) 3.9690** 79M04–79M11, 96M05–96M11, 03M10–06M12
Alabama (AL) 0.8321
Arkansas (AR) 0.6238
Arizona (AZ) 2.7832 04M03–04M08
California (CA) 4.7830*** 79M03–79M11, 01M03–06M08
Colorado (CO) 2.3487 79M03–79M08
Connecticut (CT) 4.2990** 02M01–06M08
District of Columbia (DC) 5.9705*** 78M08–80M09, 80M11–81M06, 87M12–90M10, 00M12–05M12, 14M05–14M12
Delaware (DE) 5.1558*** 87M08–90M06, 03M08–07M09
Florida (FL) 4.2377** 03M03–06M05
Georgia (GA) 1.3040
Hawaii (HI) 4.9623*** 88M01–91M11, 02M10–06M07
Iowa (IA) 2.0512
Idaho (ID) 2.3192




Louisiana (LA) 2.9086 04M04–04M10
Massachusetts (MA) 3.8427** 85M12–87M06, 00M05–05M12
Maryland (MD) 4.0003** 89M04–90M04, 03M03–06M11
Maine (ME) 5.1095*** 86M05–88M10, 01M08–06M11
Michigan (MI) 2.8259 01M06–04M11
Minnesota (MN) 4.1407** 01M04–06M09
Missouri (MO) 2.8779 03M05–03M09, 04M05–05M10
Mississippi (MS) 0.8537
** indicates significance at the 5% level.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.
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Figure A1. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for Northeast-New England States based on the regression model
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Figure A2. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for Northeast-New England States based on the regression model





































Price-income ratio for NJ (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
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Price-income ratio for PA (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Figure A3. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for Northeast-Mid-Atlantic States based on the regression model
formulation with an intercept. (a) New Jersey (NJ) and (b) Pennsylvania (PA).
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Figure A5. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for Midwest-East/West North Central States based on the regression model
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Figure A4. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for Northeast-Mid-Atlantic States based on the regression model
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Figure A6. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for Midwest-East/West North Central States based on the regression model
formulation without an intercept. (a) Illinois (IL); (b)Indiana (IN); (c) Ohio (OH); and (d) Minnesota (MN).
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Figure A7. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for Midwest-West North Central States based on the regression model
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Figure A8. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for Midwest-West North Central States based on the regression model
formulation without an intercept. (a) Kansas (KS); (b) Missouri (MO); (c) Nebraska (NE); (d) North Dakota (ND); and (e) South Dakota
(SD).
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Figure A9. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for South Atlantic States based on the regression model formulation with
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Figure A10. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for South Atlantic States based on the regression model formulation
without an intercept. (a) Delaware (DE); (b) Florida (FL); (c) Georgia (GA); (d) Maryland (MD); (e) North Carolina (NC); and (f) South
Carolina (SC).
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Figure A11. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for South Atlantic/East South Central States based on the regression
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Figure A12. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for South Atlantic/East South Central States based on the regression
































1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
81M05-82M05 88M11-90M04
97M07-98M08 07M08-09M0510M02-13M05
Price-income ratio for TN (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for AR (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Figure A13. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for East/West South Central States based on the regression model



























1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Price-income ratio for TN (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Price-income ratio for AR (right axis)
95% critical value sequence (left axis)
Bacwards SADF sequence (left axis)
Figure A14. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for East/West South Central States based on the regression model
formulation without an intercept. (a) Tennessee (TN) and (b) Arkansas (AR).
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Figure A15. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for West-Mountain States based on the regression model formulation
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Figure A16. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for West-Mountain States based on the regression model formulation
without an intercept. (a) Arizona (AZ); (b) Colorado (CO); (c) Idaho (ID); (d) New Mexico (NM); and (e) Utah (UT).
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Figure A17. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for West-Pacific States based on the regression model formulation with
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Figure A18. Date-stamping strategy of price–income ratio for West-Pacific States based on the regression model formulation
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a b s t r a c t
Applying the methods of Phillips et al. (2015, PSY), while considering the possibility of non-stationary
volatility (Harvey et al., 2016), evidence of exuberance in share prices is confirmed for the South Sea
Company, and established for a number of other 18th century financial organisations, for the first time.
The timings of these bubble episodes show signs of possible contagion.
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Financial history reports the presence of bubbles in a range of
commodity markets, for example, Tulipmania of 1634–1637, the
StockMarket Crash of 1929, Japan’s asset price bubble in the 1980s,
the 1990s NASDAQ bubble. Renewed interest in the existence of
bubbles has been rekindled with the consequences of the GFC, and
recent empirical developments, including the date-stamping tests
methods proposed by Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015, PSY), has intro-
duced a degree of rigour (and flexibility1 ) into their identification.
In this paper we subject two famous price series; the South
Sea Company and the Mississippi Company and six other under-
researched 18th century financial series, to the rigours of the 21st
century tests of Phillips, Shi, and Yu.
* Correspondence to: Department of Economics, University of Waikato, Private
Bag 3105, Hamilton 3240, New Zealand.
E-mail address: loxley@waikato.ac.nz (L. Oxley).
1 Multiple bubble episodes can be identified punctuated by periods of calm.
2. Background
The motivation of the Mississippi and the South Sea schemes
was to refinance the national debts accumulated during theWar of
the Spanish Succession, see Hamilton (1947) and Dickson (1967).
The Mississippi ‘bubble’ resulted from John Law’s ‘system’ to ac-
quire the French national debt accumulated by the wars of Louis
XIV, using equity. Similarly, the South Sea Bubble involved a com-
pany (the South Sea Company) that acquired some outstanding
British government debt in 1720. Several studies have investigated
theMississippi, the South Sea or related companies for bubbles see
Neal (1990), Carlos et al. (2002) and Temin and Voth (2004).
3. Data
The log daily share prices for the relevant companies are ob-
tained fromFrehen et al. (2013) and shownas Fig. 1; theMississippi
Company share price in livres between 2 July 1719 and 14 Novem-
ber 1720 (T=385) is shown as Fig. 1a, where T is sample size; the
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.004
0165-1765/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 1. The time series plot of the log daily stock prices (Julian dates).
South Sea Company share price in pounds between 10August 1719
and 23 November 1720 (T=393) is also shown as Fig. 1a with the
Bank of England (T=393) and East India Company (T=417). Fig. 1b
also shows the time series plot of the share price per pound for
London Assurance (T=307), Million Bank (T=348), Royal African
Company (T=418) and Royal Exchange Assurance (T=294).
4. Method
We apply the right-tailed unit root test of Phillips, Shi, and Yu
(2015) to examine evidence of explosive behaviour in historical
stock prices. The martingale null with an asymptotic drift is speci-
fied as:
H0 : yt = dT−η + yt−1 + εt , εt ∼ NID(0, σ 2), (1)
where d is a constant and the localizing coefficient η is great than
1/2. The alternative hypothesis is a mildly explosive process:
H1 : yt = δTyt−1 + εt , (2)
where δT = 1 + cT−θ with c > 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1).
The following regression model is estimated:
∆yt = α + βyt−1 +
K∑
i=1
γi∆yt−i + εt , (3)
(a) Mississippi Company.
(b) South Sea Company.
Fig. 2. Date-stamping strategies for the Mississippi and South Sea share prices
between 1719 and 1720. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
where α is an intercept.
The generalized sup ADF (GSADF) test relies on repeated esti-
mation of the ADF test regression of Eq. (3) on subsamples of the
data in a recursive fashion. The window size rw expands from r0
to 1, where r0 is the minimum window size. The ending point r2
varies from r0 to 1 and the starting point r1 varies from 0 to r2 − r0.






The backward SADF (BSADF) statistic is defined as the sup value
of the ADF statistic sequence:
BSADFr2 (r0) = sup
r1∈[0,r2−r0]
ADFr2r1 ,
where the BSADF statistic and its corresponding critical value are
used for dating the origination and termination dates of a bubble.
Theminimumwindow size r0 is equal to 0.01+1.8/
√
T . A fixed lag
order of 0 is also selected. Critical values are obtained by following
the method of Harvey et al. (2016), which uses a wild bootstrap
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Fig. 3. Date-stamping strategies for all eight companies using wild bootstrapping.
with 2000 replications, to take into account the presence of any
possible heteroscedasticity.2
The PSY procedure is often applied to a price-fundamental
ratio to assess explosive behaviour where the rejection of the null
hypothesis of a unit root implies explosive behaviour for yt . If the
time series yt involves an economic fundamental, we conclude that
a finding of explosive behaviour denotes the presence of a bubble.
Otherwise, we may only conclude that a finding of explosive be-
haviour in a price series is evidence of exuberance, and such an
episode is described as an exuberant episode, see Hu and Oxley
(2016).
5. Results
We present our bubble detection results for two most famous
Mississippi and South Sea share prices in Fig. 2. Results for the
date-stamping outcomes for the Mississippi share price are pre-
sented as Fig. 2a. The null of no explosive behaviour is rejected at
the 1% level as the GSADF test statistic is much greater than the
critical value (10.5665>4.8017), suggesting very strong evidence
of explosive behaviour and the date-stamping outcomes in Fig. 2a
seem to provide ‘some evidence’, where the test statistic (blue solid
line) exceeds the critical value sequences (red dashed line) in May
1720. However, we should not interpret such results as evidence
of exuberance in the share prices due to the fact that rejection is
caused by a ‘collapse and recovery’ episode (not exuberance) in
May 1720, which is clearly shown in Fig. 2a. During this period,
the share price (green dashed line) declined sharply frommidMay
and rebounded at the end of May 1720.3
The date-stamping outcomes for the South Sea share price are
presented as Fig. 2b. The null hypothesis of no explosive behaviour
is rejected at the 1% level (6.8010>3.1459), indicating strong evi-
dence of exuberance. As shown in Fig. 2b, we observe an exuberant
episode between mid November 1719 and late September 1720.
Such an exuberant episode is closely related to the rapid growth
and burst of the well-known South Sea Bubble. Thus we provide
2 The wild-bootstrap critical values are generated using an add-in package for
the EViews, see Caspi (2017, forthcoming).
3 We also apply the PSY procedure to the Mississippi share price under the
regression model without an intercept using wild bootstrapping. We identify an
exuberant episode between September 1719 and May 1720, which coincides with
the traditional view of the Mississippi Bubble, see Hu and Oxley (2017). This result
will be further investigated in the future.
some signs of exuberance to support the famous South Sea episode
in 1720 by applying the PSY procedure, which is the novel in the
literature.
The South Sea Bubble is related to the spectacular rise and
fall in the South Sea stock price, however, as discussed in Frehen
et al. (2013), the South Sea Company does not experience the
largest price increase and several other major companies also ex-
perience significant increases and falls during 1720. For example,
the East India share price increased over 100% and the Bank of
England share price surged by 60% before they fall back (Hoppit,
2002). Carlos et al. (2006) also point out that the Royal African
Company is more speculative than other joint stock companies
during the South Sea Bubble. We, therefore, test for explosiveness
in stock prices for the other six major corporations in the British
market. Fig. 3 displays the identified exuberant episodes for all
eight companies considered in our study. It is known that the
PSY procedure can sometimes lead to the identification of collapse
episodes, rather than bubbles, see Hu and Oxley (2016). However,
Phillips and Shi (2017, forthcoming) now recommend that users
of their procedure be careful to identity such episodes ex-post,
hence we only present and plot the exuberant episodes (not those
identified as collapses) in Fig. 3.
Several interesting results can be concluded from Fig. 3. Firstly,
the South Sea Company experiences the first exuberant episode
in the British market, and such an episode is closely followed by
those of the Royal African Company, London Assurance and other
companies.Wealso notice that the South Sea episode is not the first
one to burst and it lasts the longest period. Secondly, several British
share prices also exhibit strong signs of exuberance (e.g., East India
Company, London Assurance, Million Bank, the Royal African Com-
pany and the Royal Exchange Assurance) as the null of no explosive
behaviour can be strongly rejected at the 1% level. We can clearly
see that these companies experience exuberant episodes during
the South Sea episode in Fig. 3. Thirdly, there is little evidence of
exuberance for the Bank of England as the null of no explosive
behaviour cannot be rejected at the 10% level although a very
short exuberant episode seems to exist between June 1720 and
July 1720. This result is perhaps not surprising as the share price of
Bank of England is widely regarded as the least speculative stock
among the major joint-stock companies (Carlos and Neal, 2006).
Finally, our results seem to draw a very interesting conclusion for
this period in that the British share market was generally much
more speculative, as the South Sea Company was not the only one
experiencing exuberance in its share price.
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6. Conclusion
We have subjected two famous and six less famous 18th cen-
tury share price series to the rigours of 21st century tests in the
form of Phillips, Shi, and Yu’s (2015) procedure. Exuberance is
confirmed in the South Sea Company and established for several
other British companies.Wealso identify the timing and collapse of
each of these company’s periods of exuberance. The timing of these
relationships is provided as some possible evidence of spillovers
or contagion in exuberance in the financial market more generally
during this period. The famous ‘South Sea Bubble’ survives the
rigours of the 21st century tests and the ‘tests’ identify a new
member of the bubbly club.
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A B S T R A C T
This paper investigates the most documented asset price bubbles of the 1980-90s in Japan, and subjects them to
the rigours of recent econometric tests. We focus on testing for bubbles in Japan’s stock and real estate markets
from 1970Q1 to 1999Q4 using the right-tailed unit root test of Phillips et al. (2015a, PSY). We also utilize the
econometric methods of Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016) to explore the possibility of contagion between
these two markets. The paper offers significant econometric-based evidence of bubbles in both markets during
this period in Japan and more importantly, for the first time in the literature, formal tests of bubble contagion
from Japan’s stock market to its real estate market. Our findings may help to understand why Japan’s real estate
bubble collapsed after the stock price bubble, as the bubble-like behaviour from the stock market migrates to the
real estate market.
1. Introduction
Japan’s asset price bubble of the late 1980s to early 1990s has at-
tracted considerable attention in the literature, as it is widely regarded
as one of the most famous bubble episodes of the past 400 years, see
Brunnermeier and Schnabel (2016) for a recent survey. As discussed in
Okina et al. (2001), Japan’s bubble economy was characterised by a
rapid rise in asset prices; overheating of economic activity and the
expansion of the money supply and supply of credit. From the late
1980s, Japan experienced the most intense episode of growth in asset
prices (e.g., art, antiques, golf course memberships, land, real estate,
stocks) with prices reaching historical highs. However, during the
second half of the 1980s, the growth in asset prices was widely believed
to be reflected in economic fundamentals, rather than a bubble, sug-
gesting future, positive, sustained economic growth in Japan. This we
now know did not materialize.1
What makes Japan’s recent asset price bubble interesting is that it
has several very unusual distinguishing features, in particular, unlike
most historical financial bubbles, which experience only a single type of
bubble asset, for example, the South Sea and Mississippi Bubbles or the
British Railway Mania see Hu and Oxley (2018b, 2017). Japan ex-
periences at least two sets of bubbles (i) stock prices and (ii) real estate
prices. This makes Japan an ideal candidate to examine evidence of
bubble spillovers. The second important feature of Japan’s bubble
economy is that, despite the passage of three decades, neither the stock
nor real estate markets have regained their heights achieved in the late
1980s or early 1990s. The third classic feature is that Japan’s bursting
bubbles foreshadowed a decade of economic stagnation with a growing
government debt. The aftermath of economic stagnation in the 1990s,
following the bursting of the asset price bubble is commonly referred to
as “the Lost Decade”.
The aim of this paper is to subject Japan’s asset market and real
estate price data to firstly, the rigours of modern time series econo-
metric methods using the right-tailed unit root test of Phillips et al.
(2015a, PSY) and secondly, tests of contagion following the approach of
Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016).2 We focus on the real estate
market rather than land market for two obvious reasons. First, the rise
in land prices certainly contributes to higher house prices. This is due to
the fact that the land cost is more than 60% of housing costs in Japan’s
large cities, over 80% in the surrounding city of Tokyo and approxi-
mately 98.5% in the central district of Tokyo, see Noguchi (1994).
Second, it is more difficult to obtain the fundamental value for land,
which is the discounted sum of all future rent revenues. Instead, we can
certainly obtain a house price-rent ratio for Japan as a measure of the
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jjie.2018.09.002
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real estate fundamental. This paper, therefore, empirically examines the
presence of bubbles in two inflated asset markets and crucially is able to
identify the origination and termination dates in each to ascertain
whether these econometrically identified bubble episodes coincide with
historical events. Furthermore, an additional and perhaps more im-
portant focus of the paper is to examine potential contagion between
the two markets in Japan by utilising the recent time-varying regression
methodology of Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016). Existing
studies seem to suggest that Japan’s stock price bubble migrates to real
estate or land market during the 1980s, see Voth (2003) and Basile and
Joyce (2001). However, no formal statistical tests have been applied to
explore possible spillovers in Japan. This assertion will be formally
tested below.
The paper, therefore, makes two significant contributions to the
existing literature. The first is that we re-visit the widely assumed
Japanese asset price bubble episode and subject it to the rigours of the
PSY approach which allows us to ‘date-stamp’ the identification of start-
and -end dates of a bubble, from which we can then focus on identifying
whether it is based upon its irrationally exuberant stock and real estate
markets or on economic fundamentals. To anticipate, we will present
significant evidence of bubbles in Japan’s stock price-earnings and
house price-rent ratios and identify the origination and collapse dates of
both stock and real estate bubbles, which coincide with the traditional
stories of Japan’s asset price bubble. The second important contribution
is that by utilizing the recently developed time-varying regression
methodology of Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016) we can es-
tablish for the first time that there is robust and rigourously determined
evidence of bubble spillovers between the stock and real estate markets
during the Japanese bubble economy period.3 Our results clearly show
signs of migration from a stock price bubble to a real estate bubble.4
This should help understand why the real estate bubble bursts after the
stock price bubble, as the stock market activity not only migrates to, but
fuels, the booming real estate market as well.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some back-
ground on this unique period in Japan’s history and then reviews the
existing relevant literature. Section 3 provides a brief description of
rational bubble models and econometric methods of
Phillips et al. (2015a) and Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016) and
Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the empirical findings
and Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review
2.1. Overview
It now seems clear that there has been an unprecedented rise in
Japan’s land (real estate) and stock prices. According to Malkiel (2003,
p.77), the value of real estate and stocks increased over 75 and 100
times from 1955 to 1990. Two ‘myths’ emerged and were associated
with the inflated Japanese real estate and stock markets. The first was
that land prices could never fall, and the second was that stock prices
could only rise. Both myths were fueled by large amounts of cash
savings (Malkiel, 2003, p.78). A common belief related to Japan’s price-
earnings ratio, was that stock prices were too high or over-valued, see
Ueda (1990) and French and Poterba (1991). In particular, Japan’s
price-earnings ratio during the 1980s was several times higher than in
the US. French and Poterba (1991) also suggest that accounting dif-
ferences alone, cannot explain the doubling of the Japanese price-
earnings ratio in 1986, nor its decline in 1990. This provides some
support for Ueda (1990) and French and Poterba (1991) believe that
‘irrationally exuberant stock prices’ produced a bubble. Moreover, the
value of the stock market achieved remarkable growth. Stone and
Ziemba (1993) stated that the stock market had a value of approxi-
mately US$ 4 trillion at its peak in December 1989, which represented
approximately 44% of the world’s stock market value. Turning to the
sharp rise in land prices especially during the late 1980s, see
Noguchi (1994), Stone and Ziemba (1993) further conclude that the
total value of all Japanese property was valued at approximately 20
trillion US Dollars at the end of 1991, which equated to over 20% of the
world’s total wealth and almost double the total value of the world’s
stock markets. This led Malkiel (2003, p.77) to suggest that if this were
the case, the Japanese could have brought all the property in America
by only selling the Tokyo area. It is generally believed, therefore, that
both markets are characterised by bubble-like behaviours, see for ex-
ample, Hardouvelis et al. (1988), Lee (1995), French and
Poterba (1991), and Chirinko and Schaller (2001).5
The bursting of Japan’s asset price bubble in the early 1990s de-
stroyed these two myths. According to Okina et al. (2001), the Nikkei
225 reached a historical high of 38,130 in December 1989 from a start
of 12,598 in September 1985, and then dropped sharply to 14,309 in
August 1992, which represented a more than 60% decline from the
peak. When we consider land prices in September 1990, they were
around four times higher than the level in September 1985, only to drop
in 1999 by approximately 80% from the peak in 1990. Alan Greenspan
described the sudden and dramatic decline in the Japanese stock
market as “a correction of the bubble in asset prices”.6
2.2. Empirical studies on Japan’s asset price bubble
A number of studies have attempted to detect a bubble in asset
prices using various approaches. Several studies present evidence of
bubbles in Japan’s exuberant stock market, for example,
Hardouvelis et al. (1988), Ueda (1990), Chung and Lee (1998),
Chirinko and Schaller (2001), Binswanger (2004) and Asako and
Liu (2013). Chan et al. (1998) is one of the few to argue there is no
overwhelming evidence of rational speculative bubbles in Japan’s stock
3 In economics, the notion of a spillover has been applied to a range of cir-
cumstances. The general characteristic of a spillover is that economic events in
one context occur because of something else in a seemingly unrelated context.
In this sense it is another type of externality, however, spillovers can generate
positive as well as negative externalities.
4 In terms of finance, migration relates to e.g., the movement of assets, in-
cluding the effects of some of their characteristics (i.e. riskiness) from one
market and/or region to another. Migration may involve a series of movements
through a range of markets, where the effects could be large or small, negative
or positive. Migration typically occurs in response to normal economic/finance
drivers e.g., expected profitability, risk diversification and is regarded as quite
normal characteristics of dynamic financial markets.
5 Apart from speculation in the stock and real estate or land price markets,
another very famous example of Japan’s bubble economy is the price of golf
course membership. The land market can be proxied by the golf course mem-
bership index, which is created by Nikkei on a weekly basis from 1981 for
various parts of Japan. The golf index becomes essentially an indicator for the
overheated land or real estate market. Stone and Ziemba (1993) conclude that
the total value of all golf courses in Japan was approximately US$500 billion by
1989, a value that equates to the sum of the Australian and Swiss stock ex-
changes. Not only does the membership allow the membership holder and
guests to play, but it becomes more importantly as an investment tool for
membership holders. Memberships are actively traded like securities by brokers
who earn a 2% commission per transaction (Chancellor, 2000, p. 315). Ac-
cording to the Economist(“Golf holes,” in 21 Jan 1999), the price of member-
ship in one of Japan’s most exclusive golf clubs was more than ¥400 million (US
$ 2.8 million) during the peak of the early 1990. The quarterly golf course
membership index in Tokyo peaked in early 1990 at 600 from a starting value
of 100 in 1981. It then declined to around 250 at the end of 1992, which re-
presented more than 60% fall, see Stone and Ziemba (1993).
Shiryaev et al. (2015) also argue that the golf course memberships market
contains a larger bubble than the Nikkei stock market. Overall, Japan’s golf
course membership price boom, seems to be, another symbol of the bubble era
and worthy of special mention here.
6Washington Post, April 18, 1992.
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market. Previous studies have also provided some empirical evidence to
support the existence of bubbles in the land market, for instance,
Noguchi (1994) and Sato (1995).7 Lee (1995) and Ito and
Iwaisako (1996) also investigate the behaviour of stock and land prices
during Japan’s bubble economy, indicating the presence of bubbles. It
therefore seems clear that there have been previous attempts to detect
bubbles in Japan, however, none has sought to test the possibility of
potential bubble contagion between stock market and real estate market in
Japan using a rigorous and appropriate statistical test that is designed
to identify migration.
2.3. Empirical studies on bubble contagion
Despite numerous studies seeking to identify asset price bubbles
using a range of econometric methods, research on bubble contagion
across markets is much less frequently investigated. Basile and
Joyce (2001) do investigate potential linkages between asset price
bubbles (stock and land bubbles), monetary and bank lending variables
in Japan during the bubble period. Both the Granger-causality tests and
variance decompositions suggest that these two asset markets are re-
lated and changes in stock market speculation lead to changes in land
market speculation for the period of 1986–1991. Riddel (2011) suggests
that housing bubbles are contagious as house prices in Los Angeles
contribute to a rapid growth and subsequent decline of house prices in
Las Vegas between 2001 and 2008. Shih et al. (2014) identify real es-
tate bubbles in China for most provinces and document evidence of
spillovers in surrounding regions of Beijing and Shanghai.
Nneji et al. (2015) confirm evidence of speculative bubbles in five of the
nine US regions and also show spillovers of speculative bubbles across
both contiguous and non-contiguous regions. Teng et al. (2017) also
find housing bubbles spillovers from Taipei City (city centre) to New
Taipei City (suburbs) based on an empirical analysis of Taipei me-
tropolitan area from 1973 to 2014 using Engle-Granger cointegration
and Granger causality tests.
Recently new econometric methods including the migration test of
Phillips and Yu (2011) and time-varying regression approach of
Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016) have been developed to study
the effects of bubbles across different markets. In particular,
Phillips and Yu (2011) detect the presence of bubbles in the US real
estate and a selection of commodities. Their finding shows that the US
real estate bubble in the early 2000s migrates to the oil and bond
markets after the subprime crisis, separately. Gomez-
Gonzalez et al. (2017) also apply this method to explore evidence of
bubble migration in the housing, currency and stock markets for seven
countries. They report evidence of spillovers in these financial markets
for some selected countries. The time-varying regression approach of
Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016) shows evidence of bubble
spillovers from the Auckland housing markets to the other regional
housing markets in New Zealand. The main advantage of new method
of Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016) over Phillips and Yu (2011)
is that the former one allows time-varying effects of bubbles transmis-
sion. To our knowledge, only two studies have employed the methods
of Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016) to examine spillovers of
market contagion. The first is Gomez-Gonzalez et al. (2016), who apply
the PSY approach to date-stamp housing bubbles using quarterly data of
20 OECD countries from 1970 to 2015 and investigate further for po-
tential international bubble transmissions from the US to European
countries. The second and more closely aligned study is
Deng et al. (2017), who find signs of bubble migration from China’s
stock market to its housing market between 2005 and 2010.
3. Econometric methods
Here we use a two-stage testing procedure. The first stage is to apply
the bubble detection test of Phillips et al. (2015a) to identify the ori-
gination and collapse dates of bubbles in Japan’s stock and real estate
markets. The PSY procedure is widely used as an early warning diag-
nostic of bubble-like behavior. The second stage utilises the new time-
varying regression methodology of Greenaway-McGrevy and
Phillips (2016) to consider market contagion between these two mar-
kets.
Date-stamping the origination and collapse dates of a financial
bubble has recently received considerable attention in the literature.
Since the development of econometric tools for assessing mildly ex-
plosive behavior in a price-fundamental ratio (e.g., Phillips et al. (2011,
PWY) and Phillips et al. (2015a, PSY)), these methods have become
popular for identifying the presence of financial bubbles as they provide
real-time monitoring of financial market exuberance. In addition to
PWY and PSY, CUSUM monitoring techniques are an alternative ap-
proach for detecting bubbles, see Homm and Breitung (2012).
Harvey et al. (2016) propose and develop a wild bootstrap-based im-
plementations of the PWY test, which can reduce spurious indications
of explosive behaviour. Phillips and Shi (2017, forthcoming) also pro-
vide the latest work of theoretical developments on bubble detection
procedures. The PSY procedure is extended from the PWY recursive
testing approach. Both the PWY and PSY tests are shown to have sig-
nificant power in identifying bubbles for a range of financial applica-
tions, for example, see Gutierrez (2012) and Etienne et al. (2014) for
commodities, Bohl et al. (2013) for stock markets, and Yiu et al. (2013)
and Shi et al. (2016) for real estate. Two studies on historical bubble
episodes using the PSY approach are Hu and Oxley (2018b) who subject
the South Sea and Mississippi Bubbles during 1719–1720 to test for
bubbles and contagion whereas Hu and Oxley (2017) find signs of ex-
plosive behavior in British railway shares in the 1840s, which are re-
lated to the famous British Railway Mania.
We, therefore, first apply the right-tailed unit root test of PSY to
examine evidence of explosive behaviour in stock and real estate
markets. The popular PSY procedure is based on a test statistic that is
designed for examining mildly explosive behaviour in a price-funda-
mental ratio time series. The PSY is also extended from an early bubble
detection test of Phillips et al. (2011). The martingale null with an
asymptotic drift is specified as:
= + + ∼− −H y dT y σ: ɛ , ɛ NID(0, ),t η t t t0 1 2 (1)
where d is a constant, the localizing coefficient η is greater than 1/2 and
T is the sample size. The alternative hypothesis is a mildly explosive
process:
= +−H y δ y: ɛ ,t T t t1 1 (2)
where = + −δ cT1T θ with c>0 and θ∈ (0, 1).
The following regression model is estimated:
̂̂ ∑= + + +−
=
−y α β y γ yΔ Δ ɛ̂ ,t t
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where ̂α is an intercept and k is optimum lag length.
The generalized sup ADF (GSADF) test relies on repeated estimation
of the ADF test regression of Eq. (3) on subsamples of the data in a
recursive fashion. The window size rw ( = −r r rw 2 1) expands from r0 to
1, where r0 is the minimum window size. The end point r2 varies from r0
to 1 and the starting point r1 varies from 0 to −r r2 0. The GSADF sta-
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The GSADF test is used for assessing explosive behavior for the
entire sample period, however, it does not provide the origination and7 Asako (1991) concludes that the land price bubble is not always rational.
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termination dates of identified bubble episodes. We will use the back-
ward SADF (BSADF) test to detect the origination and termination dates














where the BSADF statistic and its corresponding critical value are used
for dating the origination and termination dates of a bubble. The BSADF
test provides more information and improves detective capacity for
bubbles within the sample. This approach, therefore, has greater power
in the detection of multiple bubbles. Phillips et al. (2015b) also derive
the asymptotic distribution of this test statistic under the null. The
minimum window size r0 needs to be large enough to allow initial es-
timation but not too large to miss an early bubble episode. As re-
commended in PSY, the minimum window size r0 is set equal to
+ T0.01 1.8/ and a fixed lag order of =k 0 is chosen for Eq. (3).
Critical values are simulated using 2000 replications.
We then apply the time-varying regression approach of Greenaway-
McGrevy and Phillips (2016) to examine evidence of bubble contagion.
Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016) estimate a series of regres-
sions as follows. They first estimate autoregressions of the form in
Eq. (3) for each region recursively, generating the slope coefficient
estimates β ,i s, where i indexes the geographic region and s indexes the
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for some initialization date S for j≠ core, where core denotes a core
market where the asset bubble is hypothesized to originate. The non-
negative delay parameter d that captures the lag in market contagion
from the core market to other regions. In empirical analysis, d is an
integer.
The primary coefficient δ2j of the functional regression (Eq. (4)) is
time-varying. Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016)’s procedure
checks the time series order of the recursively estimated autoregressive
coefficients for the core market and market j. Eq. (4) allows the con-
tagion effect to evolve smoothly over time. The time-varying coefficient
δ2j captures the contagion effect during the pre- and post-bubble epi-
sodes. The phenomenon of bubble migration can be observed for an
inverted U shape of δ2j as the contagion effect of the core market to the
market j can increase over certain time when two bubbles merge and
then decline when bubbles burst. For the details of estimating δ2j,
please refer to Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016).
4. Data
We obtain the house price-rent ratio for Japan between 1970Q1 and
1999Q4 (2010=100) from the OECD Main Economic Indicators. A
price-rent ratio is a measure of the profitability of owning a house. The
rent is commonly used as a proxy for the housing market (e.g.,
Yiu et al. (2013), Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016) and
Shi et al. (2016)). The 10-year cyclically adjusted price-earnings (CAPE)
ratio (also known as Shiller PE Ratio) for Japan between 1970M1 and
1999M12 is obtained from the Global Financial Data and is used for
assessing explosive behaviour in the stock market.8 Due to different
data frequencies, we create a quarterly price-earnings ratio by aver-
aging and re-scaling to 2010=100. Both price-rent ratio and price-
earnings ratio are then transformed to natural logarithms. A time series
plot for both ratios is provided as Fig. 1. It can be seen from Fig. 1 that
both ratios rise dramatically after the mid-1970s, where the price-
earnings ratio and house price-rent ratio climb to peaks in 1989 and
1991 and then decline suddenly and sharply.9
5. Results
This section reports empirical findings of the bubbly stock and real
estate markets in Japan using the PSY method and a time-varying re-
gression approach for analysing market migration. Date-stamping out-
comes are provided for both Japan’s stock and real estate markets in
Fig. 2. It is important to emphasize that the origination (termination) of
a bubble episode is defined as the first chronological observation whose
the BSADF test statistic (blue solid line) exceeds (goes below) its cor-
responding critical value (red dash line) if the actual data series (green
dash line) grows significantly and then decline suddenly during this
episode.10
We firstly focus on date-stamping outcomes of the exuberant stock
market in Fig. 2 a. The null of no explosive behaviour in Japan’s stock
price-earnings ratio is strongly rejected at the 1% level as the GSADF
statistic (3.7536) exceed the respective 1% right-tail critical value
(2.6738), which suggests very strong evidence of bubbles. As shown in
Fig. 2 a, we successfully identify a stock market bubble between
1983Q2 and 1990Q3. The timing of such a bubble episode is clearly
related to a period of rapid expansion and sudden collapse of Japan’s
asset price bubble. During this identified bubble episode, the price-
earnings ratio grew remarkably in the 1980s and climbed to the peak in
1989, and then declined sharply after the peak.
When we look at Japan’s real estate market, it also exhibits bubble-
like behaviour as shown by Fig. 2 b. In this case, the null of no explosive
behaviour in Japan’s house price-rent ratio is also rejected at the 1%
level (GSADF statistic: 8.2139> critical value: 2.6738), indicating the
presence of bubbles. As presented as Fig. 2 b, the PSY procedure detects
two bubbles in the 1980s (e.g., 1981Q2-1984Q2 and 1987Q2-1992Q2).
Of particular interest in the real estate market is that the second iden-
tified bubble, which originated in 1987Q2 and collapsed in 1992Q2, is
widely believed to be linked with Japan’s asset price bubble. During
this period in Japan’s history, the sudden decline in the real estate
market is quite substantial as the price-rent ratio is continuously de-
clining after its peak in 1991 until the end sample of 1999.
A question may arise here as to why we focus on the second bubble
rather than the first. First, it is generally accepted that Japan’s asset
price bubble started from the latter half of the 1980s, see Ito and
Iwaisako (1996), Chirinko and Schaller (2001) and Okina et al. (2001).
Second, the first bubble doesn’t reach the same level of speculation and
magnitude as the second bubble if we compare the relevant price-rent
ratio for two periods in Fig. 2 b. We, therefore, concentrate on the
second identified bubble (1987Q2-1992Q2) rather than the first
(1981Q2-1984Q2). It is also worth mentioning that some false positive
identification episodes (collapse episodes) are also detected at the end
of the sample data. This is due to the fact that the actual data series
(house price-rent ratio) is continuously declining from 1994 to 1999
while the BSADF test statistic (blue solid line) crosses the critical value
sequences (red dashed line) as shown in Fig. 2 b. Phillips and Shi (2017,
forthcoming) recommend users identifying false positive identification
episodes ex-post using the PSY procedure, we therefore only report the
presence of a bubble (not collapse episodes) in this paper. Therefore it is
very important to interpret PSY’s results with care to avoid identifying
collapse episodes as bubbles.
Overall, we provide evidence of bubbles for two of the most inflated
asset prices during Japan’s bubble economy based on a recent
8 Deng et al. (2017) also treat a price-earnings ratio as the price-fundamental
ratio when applying the PSY to detect bubbles in China’s stock market.
9 It should be emphasized that both ratios reach its maximum at a height that
it never climbs to even almost 30 years later now.
10 If the data is continuously declining, we would detect some collapse epi-
sodes. It is important to distinguish between a bubble and a collapse episode,
see Hu and Oxley (2018a).
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Fig. 1. The time series plot of Japan’s house price-rent ratio and cyclically adjusted price-earnings (CAPE) ratio in log scale between 1970Q1 and 1999Q4.
Fig. 2. Date-stamping strategy of cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio and house price-rent ratio in Japan between 1970Q1 and 1999Q4.(For interpretation of the
references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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econometric test of PSY.11 For both markets, we identify the origination
and collapse dates of so-called ‘double bubbles’, which coincide with
the traditional view of the well-known Japan’s asset price bubble. We
can clearly see that a bubble emerged in the stock market in 1983Q2
before spreading to its real estate market. During the 1980s, our results
seem to suggest that the bubble-like behaviour in stock market mi-
grated to the real estate market, creating a bubble in 1987Q2 that
collapses in 1992Q2. However, does rigourous testing confirm these
‘eyeball based tests’- we next consider the application of the time-
varying regression approach of Greenaway-McGrevy and
Phillips (2016).
The stock market is regarded as the core market hence we believe
that the bubble migrates from the stock market to the real estate market
for four reasons.12 First, Japan’s stock market seems to hit a historical
market high earlier than the real estate market as the stock price-
earnings ratio reached its peak in 1989 while the price-rent ratio
climbed to its maximum in 1991. Second, the stock market exhibits
bubble-like behaviour earlier than the housing market during the late
1980s, which is clearly shown by comparing Fig. 2 a and Fig. 2 b. Third,
the stock price bubble bursts earlier than real estate bubble. In parti-
cular, we can see from Fig. 1 that the stock price-earnings ratio started
to decline after 1989Q4 while the house price-rent ratio started to fall
after 1991Q1. Fourth, transaction costs are much lower in the stock
market as people can simply and quickly sell off their shares and then
invest in the housing market. Hence it is reasonable to assume Japan’s
stock market as a core market, and a similar view is also noticed in the
literature. Voth (2003) points out that Japan’s asset bubble episode
migrates from the stock market into the real estate market in the
1980s.13 Basile and Joyce (2001) also show that changes in stock price
bubble lead to changes in the land market bubble during the bubble
period.
Using the time-varying regression approach of Greenaway-
McGrevy and Phillips (2016), we let the fixed window size S be 50 and
delay parameter d be 4. A fixed window subsample method is utilized
for selecting the subsample sequence of estimated autoregressive
coefficients as suggested by Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016).
An important feature of this econometric method is that the primary
coefficient δ2j is time-varying in the proposed regression Eq. (4), in-
dicating contagion effects from the core market to the other market
vary smoothly over time.
If a bubble in the stock market migrates to the real estate market, we
would expect to see a particular pattern of contagion effects i.e., an
inverted U shape of contagion coefficients δ2j due to the intensity of
transmission increasing when two bubbles merge, and then decreases
when bubbles burst. This is the reason why the so-called inverted U-
shape of contagion coefficients δ2j demonstrates the presence of bubble
migration as discussed in the method section. In our example, the
sensitivity of Japan’s real estate market to its stock market is clearly
shown in Fig. 3 and it clearly exhibits an inverted U shape as ex-
pected.14 The sensitivity rises gradually and reaches a peak in 1993
(slightly after the peak in Japan’s real estate), then declines suddenly,
as the response to the core market gets smaller and smaller. Fig. 3
clearly demonstrates signs of bubble migration from the stock market
(core market) to the real estate market due to an inverted U shape of the
contagion effect, which is a major finding that contributes to the lit-
erature. A finding of a bubble migration phenomenon in this paper
supports the traditional notions of Japan’s asset price bubbles. Our
results help to understand why Japan’s real estate bubble collapse after
Japan’s stock market bubble as the stock price bubble migrates to the
real estate market.
6. Conclusions
Japan’s asset price bubble during the 1980-90s was one of the most
significant financial bubbles in history. During the speculative growth
of bubble period, Japan’s asset prices rose without precedent (e.g.,
stocks, land, real estate, golf course memberships). With the additional
evidence presented here, there remains no doubts that these asset prices
were a bubble. However, in the later half of the 1980s, the rise of asset
prices was thought to be associated with economic fundamentals rather
than irrational exuberance in stock and real estate markets.
This current paper makes two significant contributions to the
Fig. 3. Time-varying contagion coefficient δ2j from the Japanese stock market to the real estate market.
11 In addition, we also apply the PSY procedure to Japan’s CAPE and house
price-rent ratios to take into account the presence of possible heteroscedasticity
using wild bootstrapping of Harvey et al. (2016). We identify a bubble in the
stock market (1980Q4-1995Q2) and two bubbles in the real estate market
(1981Q1-1986Q4 and 1987Q3-1993Q1). The conclusion of bubbles in both
markets still holds. Results are not shown here to conserve the space, but are
available upon request.
12 Deng et al. (2017) also treat the stock market as the core market.
13 On page 84 of Voth (2003), he notices that ‘most other major asset bubble
episodes saw “spillovers” from the stock market into the real estate market-such
as in Britain and Japan in the 1980s’.
14We also try different choices of the fixed window size S and delay para-
meter d to adjust the sampling period. The results remain unchanged as a si-
milar inverted U shape of the contagion effect is also obtained.
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literature. First, it presents empirical evidence to support the existence
of an asset price bubble in Japan in the late 20th century using the
right-tailed unit root test of PSY as we document overwhelming evi-
dence in both stock and real estate markets between the 1980s and the
early 1990s. Second and more importantly, we then apply the
Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016)’s methodology to detect pos-
sible contagion between the two markets. Japan’s stock market is
treated as the core for several reasons to allow the contagion effect to
transmit to real estate market. It is expected to see that the contagion
effect of the core market on the other market exhibits an inverted U
shape, in which the contagion effect increases when two bubbles merge
and declines when two bubbles burst. Our results clearly show signs of
spillovers from the Japan’s stock market to its real estate market for the
first time in the literature due to an inverted U shape of contagion effect
as shown in Fig. 3. The results we present contribute to the small, yet
growing empirical literature that combines PSY type tests with
Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016)’s time-varying regression ap-
proach and provides the final set of empirical results to rigourously
confirm contagious, spillovers across asset and real estate markets in
Japan. In terms of potentially fruitful areas for future research which
may offer some new, unique empirical findings, one could consider
investigating the presence of housing bubbles in Japan’s regional and
metropolitan real estate market. In particular evidence of contagion
from a core area or market to other markets and/or areas may be lo-
calised or more widespread. This may offer valuable insights in our
understanding of how Japan’s real estate bubble developed and spread,
spatially, during the 1980s and 90s. This new knowledge could be in-
valuable for stemming the development and subsequent migration of
bubble effects in Japanese markets in the future.
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Chapter 8





In this chapter, we re-visit the long-run relationship between house prices and
economic fundamentals using the US data for the period 1978M1-2016M12. Un-
like the existing studies that employ conventional cointegration tests, this chapter
applies two recent quantile ARDL models of Cho et al. (2015) and Greenwood-
Nimmo et al. (2011) to explore the equilibrium relationship at the national and
state levels. The empirical results from this paper also suggest that the coin-
tegrating relationship may be absent for conventional cointegration tests, but it
may be established by quantile based models, and vice versa.
Keyword
Quantile cointegration; ARDL; US house prices
JEL classifications: C59; R19; R39
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8.1 Introduction
Possible cointegration between house prices and fundamentals is important for
understanding house price dynamics. The presence of cointegration between house
prices and fundamentals would imply convergence to a stable long-run equilibrium
relationship. In other words, cointegration would indicate whether a temporary
increase or drop in house prices would eventually come back to an equilibrium.
Among many housing markets, US housing market has drawn a lot of attention
in the literature. Glaeser (2013) concludes that the United States seems to have
a long history of real estate speculation as the nation experienced several periods
of speculation. This chapter, therefore, aims to explore the existence of a stable
long-run relationship between house prices and economic fundamentals using US
aggregate and disaggregate data, by utilising quantile cointegration approaches.
An important question that has been researched extensively in the literature is
whether US house prices reflect their economic fundamentals. There have been
many studies that attempted to answer this question. However, the existing stud-
ies have mainly focused on cointegration analysis do not reach a firm conclusion.
This chapter, therefore, tries to address this issue by applying several autoregres-
sive distributed lag (ARDL) based conditional mean- and quantile cointegration
tests. Two conditional mean cointegration models are considered in this study
including the linear ARDL cointegration model of Pesaran and Shin (1998) and
Pesaran et al. (2001) and the non-linear ARDL version of Shin et al. (2014). These
two conditional mean-based models are abbreviated as ARDL-M and NARDL-M,
respectively. The ARDL model of Pesaran and Shin (1998) and Pesaran et al.
(2001) have become popular in analysing a long-run cointegrating relationship.
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Shin et al. (2014)’s model is an asymmetric extension of the linear ARDL ap-
proach to modelling long-run cointegrating relationship based on partial sum de-
compositions suggested by Schorderet (2003). Not only does this paper explore a
long-run cointegrating relationship at the conditional mean, but also investigates
the relationship for the whole conditional distribution. Two quantile ARDL coin-
tegration models of Cho et al. (2015) and Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2011) are
also employed in this study. These two quantile-based models are abbreviated as
NARDL-Q and QARDL, respectively. Apart from the mean, other locations in
the distribution affect the cointegration analysis, which is well demonstrated by
several empirical studies in the literature especially since the work of Xiao (2009),
for example, see Lee and Zeng (2011), Burdekin and Siklos (2012) and Tsong
and Lee (2013). Conventional cointegration approaches focus on the conditional
mean behaviour, which is perhaps not informative (Cho et al., 2015). As noted
in Chevapatrakul et al. (2009), conventional estimation methods such as LS, IV,
or GMM evaluate the relationship between these observations at the mean of the
conditional distribution. It is assumed that the estimated relationship holds at
the mean and even in the tails. Xiao (2009) further points out that the absence
of cointegration has frequently been observed in many applications using con-
ventional cointegration despite the fact that economic variables are supposed to
be cointegrated. Xiao (2009) explains that this phenomenon may be explained
by the existence of time-varying cointegrating coefficients, which characterise the
long-run relationship but vary over the time. Conventional cointegration tests
focus on the conditional mean relationship between variables while quantile coin-
tegrating models concentrate on a long-run relationship in a range of quantiles.
The quantile-based cointegration tests are potentially more informative as they
provide additional insights.
Several ARDL based cointegration tests are employed in this chapter to model a
long-run equilibrium relationship. There have been increasing interests in mod-
elling economic phenomenon by non-linear models. Three regime-switching mod-
els have been popularised in the literature including the threshold ECM of Balke
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and Fomby (1997), the Markov-switching ECM of Psaradakis et al. (2004) and the
smooth transition regression ECM of Kapetanios et al. (2006). It is known that
linear models do not always provide optimal inference. The majority of studies
on cointegration analysis rely on the assumption that the long-run relationship
may be represented as a symmetric linear combination of nonstationary stochastic
regressors. However, such an assumption may be too restrictive.
There has been little research on non-linear cointegration with a few exceptions.
Two approaches are worth special mention to modelling non-linear cointegration
using similar ideas. The first approach is asymmetric cointegration by Schorderet
(2003), who introduces a nonlinear version of a cointegration test by decomposing
a time series into its positive and negative partial sums. This new generalisa-
tion of cointegration is appealing to model asymmetric behaviour. Schorderet
(2003) applies this technique to the European exchange rate data yielding ev-
idence of asymmetric cointegration. In contrast, Johansen’s (1991) maximum
likelihood procedure shows no linear cointegration. This asymmetric cointegra-
tion approach has been applied to several empirical applications. For example,
Lardic and Mignon (2006) and Lardic and Mignon (2008) investigates the exis-
tence of a long-term relationship between oil prices and GDP in 12 European
countries, and G7 countries and the US, respectively. The second approach is the
hidden cointegration of Granger and Yoon (2002). Granger and Yoon’s (2002)
hidden cointegration decomposes the positive and negative components of each
time series and tests for cointegration in these components. If the components of
two data series (negative or positive) are cointegrated, then the data are said to
have a hidden cointegration. Hidden cointegration is a type of nonlinear cointe-
gration. Granger and Yoon (2002) demonstrate the usefulness of hidden cointe-
gration using two sets of US data- short-term and long-term interest rates, output
and unemployment. The hidden cointegration approach has also been applied in
other area, for instance, Richard (2012) examines the energy-growth nexus in sub-
Saharan Africa countries using annual data from 1971 to 2008. Honarvar (2009)
studies asymmetry in crude oil and retail gasoline price movements for the period
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1981M09-2007M12. Tiwari et al. (2015) investigate the hypothesis of asymmetric
effects between economic growth and renewable and nonrenewable energy pro-
duction in sub-Saharan Africa using the annual data 1971-2011. Alexakis et al.
(2017) explore a long-run relationship between Islamic and conventional equity
indices based on daily data from 2000M03 to 2014M06.
Apart from cointegration tests of Pesaran et al. (2001) and Cho et al. (2015), this
chapter will investigate whether US house prices cointegrate with several economic
fundamentals using two non-linear cointegration models-the NARDL model of
Shin et al. (2014) and the quantile NARDL model of Greenwood-Nimmo et al.
(2011). To the best knowledge, this study is also the first to attempt to examine a
long-run quantile-varying cointegration relationship between US house prices and
economic fundamentals using the development of linear (symmetric) and non-
linear (asymmetric) quantile ARDL cointegration models of Cho et al. (2015) and
Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2011). By applying the linear and non-linear quantile
autoregressive distributed-lag models of Cho et al. (2015) and Greenwood-Nimmo
et al. (2011), quantile cointegration models allow us to study the entire conditional
distribution of the dependent variable compared with those of conditional mean-
based cointegration models. As the housing market is our core focus, we may
interpret the conditional distribution of housing market with lower quantiles (at
a relatively low price level) as a bear market, the median quantiles as the normal
phase of the market, and the upper quantiles (at a relatively high price level) as
a bull market. A similar interpretation can be found in Christou et al. (2018).
This chapter makes several contributions to the existing literature. The first con-
tribution is that formal cointegration testing procedures for two quantile ARDL
models of Cho et al. (2015) and Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2011) are utilised. By
applying two quantile cointegration models, this research is the first to explore
US house price dynamics. Cho et al. (2015) extends Pesaran and Shin’s (1998)
autoregressive distributed-lag approach into quantile regression, resulting a new
quantile autoregressive distributed-lag (QARDL) model. Similarly, Greenwood-
204
Nimmo et al. (2011) also develop a non-linear autoregressive distributed-lag quan-
tile (NARDL-Q) regression model, which is extended from the non-linear autore-
gressive distributed lag (NARDL) model by Shin et al. (2014). However, a formal
cointegration testing mechanism that could address the existence of the long run
cointegration relationship at each quantile is provided in neither Cho et al. (2015)
nor Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2011). This paper makes use of the t-test and Wald
test to jointly test for quantile cointegration at each quantile. The first testing
procedure of Banerjee et al. (1998) is to carry out a t-test. The second testing
procedure is a Wald test, which is used to test for quantile cointegration based on
asymptotic theory. Existing studies have not adopted formal cointegration test-
ing procedures using the QARDL model, see Zhu et al. (2016) and Lahiani et al.
(2017). This research formally tests for the long run cointegration relationship at
each of quantiles by two formal testing procedures of the two linear and non-linear
quantile ARDL based models for the first time in the literature.
The second contribution of this chapter is to make use two forms of non-linear
(asymmetric) cointegration tests at the conditional mean and conditional quan-
tile applied to the US housing market. Prior empirical studies in the literature
mainly employ the linear model based cointegration tests or panel version tests
to test for a long-run cointegrating relationship. Little research has focused on
non-linear (asymmetric) versions of cointegration models excluding Zhou (2010)
and Bahmani-Oskooee and Ghodsi (2016). Adoption of the NARDL-Q model of
Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2011) makes it empirically possible to examine non-
linear (asymmetric) quantile cointegration at the conditional quantile for the first
time. Moreover, none of the existing studies has adopted quantile cointegrating
models to investigate the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between
house prices and fundamentals. Therefore this chapter certainly contributes to
this literature by applying two new quantile cointegrating models to explore a
long-run cointegrating relationship between house prices and fundamentals across
the whole conditional distribution.
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The third contribution of this paper is that it presents several interesting findings
based on empirical evidence. The US national house prices are not cointegrated
with economic fundamentals using both conditional mean- and quantile ARDL
based models. The empirical results from this paper also suggest that the cointe-
gration relationship may be absent at the conditional mean-based model, but it
may be established at the quantile based model. Under some instances, cointe-
gration may be established based on the conditional mean model, but there is no
overwhelming evidence of cointegration based on its quantile model. Addition-
ally, it is also possible to identify a cointegration relationship at the conditional
mean and the relationship may be held for the whole conditional distribution by
quantile models.
The following paper is organized as follows. Section 8.2 reviews the existing
studies in the literature. Section 8.3 describes the data. Section 8.4 gives a
brief description of several autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) based models.
Section 8.5 presents the empirical findings and Section 8.6 concludes.
8.2 Literature Review
8.2.1 A review of quantile cointegration models
This section reviews several quantile cointegrating models in the literature in-
cluding Xiao (2009), Kuriyama (2016), Cho et al. (2015) and Greenwood-Nimmo
et al. (2011). Xiao’s (2009) work has made a significant contribution to the quan-
tile regression with non-stationary variables. Xiao (2009) advances a quantile
cointegration approach based on the estimators proposed by Phillips and Hansen
(1990) and Saikkonen (1991). A Phillips-Hansen type quantile estimator is used
for removing serial correlation and long-run endogeneity.
Xiao (2009) considers quantile regression of the following cointegration model:
yt = α + β
′xt + ut = θ
′zt + ut, (8.1)
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where xt is a k-dimensional vector of integrated regressors, zt = (1, x
′
t)
′, and ut is
mean zero stationary.
To extend the model of Equation (8.1), Xiao (2009) applies the idea proposed
by Saikkonen (1991) that decomposes ut into lead-lag terms
∑K
j=−K ∆xt−j and
a pure innovation component εt to deal with endogeneity in traditional cointe-
gration models and also model the time varying cointegrating coefficient βt as a
function of the pure innovation component. The following model is extended from
Equation (8.1):





∆x′t−jΠj + εt (8.2)
If we denote the τ -th quantile of εt, as Qε(τ), let Ft = σ{xt,∆xt−j, ∀j}, then,
conditional on Ft, the τ -th quantile of yt is given by:






where Fε(·) is the c.d.f of εt. Let Zt be the vector if regressors consisting zt = (1, x′t)
and (∆x′t−j, j = −K, ...,K), Θ = (α, β′t,Π′−K , ...,Π′K)′, Θ(τ) = (α(τ), β(τ)′,Π′−K , ...,Π′K)′,
where α(τ) = α + F−1ε (τ), then, we can re-write the above regression as:
yt = Θ
′Zt + εt = Θ(τ)
′Zt + εtτ , (8.4)
Qyt(τ |Ft) = Θ(τ)′Zt. (8.5)
If εtτ = εt − F−1ε (τ), then Qεtτ (τ) = 0. In the above model, the value of the
cointegration coefficients are affected by the innovation received at each period.
The cointegrating vector may be quantile dependent. This model can be referred
to as the “quantile cointegration model”. Xiao’s (2009) model can be treated as
a stochastic cointegration model which includes conventional cointegration as a
special case where β(τ) is a vector of constants. This special case can be presented
as:




∆x′t−jΠj + εt, (8.6)
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and






In Xiao’s (2009) application to US S&P stock price and dividend data from Jan-
uary 1974 and September 1998, the null hypothesis of constant cointegrating
coefficients is rejected at the 1% level, displaying strong evidence of time-varying
cointegrating coefficient behaviour.
Xiao’s (2009) approach has gained popularity in recent years. As shown in Ta-
ble 8.1 and Table 8.2, below this approach has been applied to many interesting
applications including the relationship between spot and futures oil prices; stock
market integration; the validity of the Fisher hypothesis for six OECD countries;
the relationship between globalization and economic performance; the relationship
between government expenditures and revenues in US; the classic PPP hypothesis
in China, Japan and South Korea and the relationship between spot and futures
prices of gold and silver.
More recently, Kuriyama (2016) suggests a cumulated sum (CUSUM) test for the
null hypothesis of quantile cointegration. Kuriyama (2016) extends the analysis
of Xiao and Phillips (2002) to the case of conditional quantiles. A residual-based
test for the null of cointegration is proposed in Xiao and Phillips (2002) using
a conventional cumulated sum (CUSUM) test for structural change. The linear
model is considered in Xiao and Phillips (2002) as follows:
yt = α
′dt + β
′xt + ut = θ
′zt + ut, (8.8)





′ and dt is a vector of deterministic trend compo-
nent. A CUSUM statistic is constructed based on the fully modified OLS residuals
to test cointegration between yt and xt.
The highlight of Kuriyama’s (2016) approach is that it allows the cointegrating
coefficient to change across the whole conditional distribution of the dependent
variable and simultaneously test for the null of cointegration at each quantile.
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Kuriyama (2016) introduces the quantile version of Equation (8.8) as:
yt = α
′(τ)dt + β
′(τ)xt + ut(τ) = θ
′(τ)zt + ut(τ), (8.9)
where θ(τ) = (α′(τ), β′(τ))′. The quantile dependent regression coefficient vector
θ(τ) can characterize the possibly non-linear long-run relationship between yt and
xt.
Kuriyama (2016) uses a Phillips-Hansen type fully modified estimator to correct



















where x′dt denotes the demeaned or detrended regressors, and
̂f(F−1(τ)) is a non-
parametric consistent estimator of the density function f(F−1(τ)).
For the quantile regression model, the residuals from the fully modified quantile
regression are calculated as û+t (τ) = y
+
t −z′tθ̂+(τ). The cumulated sum of ψτ (ût(τ))










∣∣∣∣∣ = Op(1) under H0,
= Op(T ) under H1. (8.11)
The CUSUM test statistic for the null hypothesis of quantile cointegration is given
by:













This new approach has been applied to several sets of US interest rates. In partic-
ular, the expectation hypothesis for the term structure is retained only in part of
the distribution for certain data sets. In addition, Christou et al. (2018) applies
Kuriyama’s (2016) approach to examine a quantile-varying long-run relationship
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between US house prices and non-housing Consumer Price Index from 1953 to
2016, which both variables are cointegrated at lower quantiles only.
Cho et al. (2015) extends Pesaran and Shin’s (1998) autoregressive distributed-
lag approach into a quantile regression context, which allows us to jointly address
short-run dynamics and long-run cointegrating relationships across a range of
quantiles of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. The result-
ing QARDL framework has been applied to analyse US dividends and earnings
for the period 1871Q3-2010Q2. There has been growing interest in using the
QARDL model. Zhu et al. (2016) employ the QARDL model to explore quantile
cointegration relationship between silver and gold prices and their results suggest
that the prices of silver and gold are cointegrated in tail quantiles but not in the
middle quantiles. This shows the cointegration holds when the silver price is at
a relatively low price level (lower quantiles) or relatively high price level (upper
quantiles)-conditional on gold prices. Lahiani et al. (2017) also apply the QARDL
model to investigate the short- and long-run linkages between oil prices and a set
of energy prices (e.g., gasoline, diesel, heating and natural gas). They find that
all considered energy prices are shown to be cointegrated with the oil price across
quantiles and the oil price is a predictor of individual energy prices in the short
run.
Shin et al. (2014) propose a non-linear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL)
model to model short- and long-run asymmetries jointly based on partial sum
decompositions suggested by Schorderet (2003). Based on this new develop-
ment, Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2011) further develop a non-linear autoregressive
distributed-lag quantile (NARDL-Q) regression model, which is capable of simul-
taneously identifying three fundamental forms of asymmetry: long-run (reaction),
short-run (adjustment) and quantile-specific (location) asymmetry. A set of hy-
potheses are proposed regarding testing for each type of asymmetry. In their
application to US monetary policy, the NARDL-Q model provides more insights





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8.2.2 A Review of Cointegration Relationship between US
House Prices and Fundamentals
Table 8.4, Table 8.5, Table 8.6 and Table 8.7 present results from the previous
literature considering the existence of a cointegration relationship between US
house prices and fundamentals. Those studies typically conclude that cointegra-
tion exists and have a long-run equilibrium likewise from then they adopt and
estimate an error-correction model see, for example, Abraham and Hendershott
(1996), Malpezzi (1999), Meen (2002) and Gallin (2008).
However, Gallin (2006), Mikhed and Zemč́ık (2009a), Mikhed and Zemč́ık (2009b)
and Clark and Coggin (2011) provide conflicting results on a long-run cointegrat-
ing relationship. Gallin (2006) finds no evidence of cointegration between house
prices and fundamentals at the national level between 1975Q1 and 2002Q2. More
importantly, Gallin (2006) concludes no evidence of cointegration in a panel of 95
metro areas from 1978 to 2000 using the panel test of Maddala and Wu (1999)
and Pedroni (1999). Both Mikhed and Zemč́ık (2009a) and Mikhed and Zemč́ık
(2009b) apply the panel test of Pedroni (1999) for cointegration between house
prices and various economic fundamentals, concluding no evidence to support
a long-run cointegrating relationship. Moreover, Clark and Coggin (2011) also
present no evidence of cointegration from 1975Q1 to 2005Q2 at the national and
regional levels using the Engle and Granger (1987) and Gregory and Hansen (1996)
approaches.
On the other hand, several studies show that house prices and fundamentals
are cointegrated, for example, McCarthy and Peach (2004), Gallin (2008), Duca
et al. (2011), Arestis and González (2014) and Chen and Cheng (2017). Zhou
(2010) and Bahmani-Oskooee and Ghodsi (2016) argue that ignoring non-linear
cointegration may lead to no cointegrating relationship. For example, Zhou (2010)
shows that the non-linear cointegration approach of Granger and Hallman (1991)
and Granger (1991) presents overwhelming evidence of cointegration at the US
city level. A similar conclusion can be drawn from Bahmani-Oskooee and Ghodsi
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(2016) as the non-linear ARLD model of Shin et al. (2014) shows more evidence
of cointegration in the US states. These two studies highlight the importance of
non-linear cointegration in modelling the long-run relationship.
8.3 Data
As the US regional housing market could behave differently at the aggregated
national market, the focus of this research is to explore the possibility of a long-
run cointegrating relationship between house prices and fundamentals at the both
national (aggregate) and State (disaggregate) levels. The eight regional states
and District of Columbia (DC) are selected for this study including Arizona (AZ),
California (CA), Florida (FL), Hawaii (HI), Massachusetts (MA), Nevada (NV),
New York (NY) and Pennsylvania (PA).1 In summary, these selected States have
potential to exhibit bull & bear characteristics of Christou et al. (2018) at lower
and upper quantiles. If these States do not support quantile cointegration, it is
unlikely that other States would.
These states are located in different parts of the US and are selected for their
distinguishing features. For example, California is the most populous state and
the largest economy in the United States. Notably, the San Francisco Bay Area
and the Greater Los Angeles Area in California are famous as centres of the
global technology and entertainment (firm) industries, respectively. The District
of Columbia is the capital of the US. Florida has the longest coastline in the United
States. Florida has the nickname of “Sunshine State” as it is well-known for its
balmy weather in the world and preference for retirement. Hawaii is the only U.S.
state located in Oceania and is a world-renowned vacation spot. Massachusetts is
a true hub of higher education. The Medicine and the life science industry are also
1We focus on regional data at the state level rather than city level as economic variables
(personal income, construction costs and the corresponding CPI) are more easily obtained at
the monthly or quarterly frequency without resorting to interpolation. When an economic




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































one of the top sectors as they are surrounded by world-class universities, research
institutes and hospitals. Massachusetts is also famous for its high-tech industry.
New York state is known as the Empire State. The largest city and the most
populous city in New York state is New York City, which has more than 40% of
the state’s population. New York city is well-known as a global hub of business,
commerce and high-tech industries. New York City’s most important economic
sector is its financial industry, where the New York Stock Exchange and the
NASDAQ represent the world’s largest and second largest stock exchanges. Silicon
Alley in Manhattan is an area of New York City, which is associated with high-tech
industries. Nevada is famous for its tourism and gaming industry, especially, Las
Vegas, which is an internationally renowned major resort city, known primarily
for its gambling, shopping, fine dining, entertainment, and nightlife.
The Freddie Mac House Price Index (FMHPI), January 1978 and December 2016,
is used to measures home price inflation at the both national and state level in
this study, where the house price index represents the value of single-family hous-
ing.2 These aggregated national and disaggregated state indices are not season-
ally adjusted. The FMHPI is calculated using a repeat-transactions methodology.
Repeat transactions indices measure price appreciation while holding constant
housing type and location, by comparing the price of the same property over two
or more transactions. As we work at a quarterly frequency, we create a quarterly
house price index from 1978Q1 to 2016Q4 by averaging.
Apart from house prices, the choice of housing fundamentals is also crucial. Fol-
lowing Zhou (2010), three critical economic fundamentals are also selected in
this research: personal incomes, construction costs and mortgage rates. Follow-
ing Mikhed and Zemč́ık (2009a), Zhou (2010) and Bahmani-Oskooee and Ghodsi
(2016), total personal income from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) is
used at the state level, where the total personal income is reported as the product
2The national index is defined as a weighted average of the 50 states and Washington, D.C.
indices.
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of per-capita and population.3
In order to take account of construction costs, we use the relevant indexes at the
national- and regional-level from United States Census Bureau. For the national
data, the monthly indexes for houses under construction are used. The under
construction indexes are based on data for a sample of all single-family houses.
However, land and other nonconstruction costs are not included. For individual
states, the house sold index, which incorporates the value of the land, is used for
measuring construction costs and is available annually by four regions (Northeast,
Midwest, South and West). A state located within the four areas is used as an
indicator. In particular, sold indexes are based on data for a sample of houses
that are built for sale with the land upon which the house is situated. A quarterly
house sold index is interpolated by region.
The weekly 30-year fixed mortgage rates are available from Freddie Mac since
1971. Freddie Mac surveys approximately 125 lenders with a mix of lender types
thrift institutions, credit unions, commercial banks and mortgage lending compa-
nies for their most popular mortgage products. The survey is based on first-lien
prime conventional conforming home purchase mortgages with a loan-to-value of
80 percent. The 30-year fixed mortgage rates on a quarterly basis between 1978Q1
and 2016Q4 are created by averaging.
The respective CPI less shelter in four regions (Northeast, Midwest, South and
West) and the national are obtained from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to
deflate the house price indexes, personal incomes, and construction costs into real
values. These variables are then normalized to 100 at 1978Q1. A real series
of mortgage rates can be derived using the inflation rates calculated from the
respective CPI series by four regions as well. All variables are then converted into
natural logarithm. 4
3Personal income are available at the state level for our sample chosen period. However, BEA
does not allow us to separate per-capita and population variables during our selected sample
period.
4For mortgage rate variable, it is common to take log of one plus the mortgage rates.
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8.4 Method
This section reviews the conditional mean and quantile based cointegration models
of Pesaran and Shin (1998) and Pesaran et al. (2001), Shin et al. (2014), Cho et al.
(2015) and Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2011).
8.4.1 ARDL Model
According to Pesaran and Shin (1998) and Pesaran et al. (2001), the error cor-
rection model of the ARDL specification can be defined as:






ψj∆xt−j + ut. (8.13)
The long-run cointegration relationship can be tested using: the t-test of Banerjee
et al. (1998) on ECM coefficient for testing the restriction ρ = 0 and the F
test for testing the restriction ρ = θ = 0. Both the asymptotic distribution
of the F-statistic and t-statistic are non-standard under the null hypothesis of
no cointegration. The relevant critical values are obtained from Pesaran et al.
(2001). The ARDL approach can be applied regardless of whether the underlying
regressors are integrated of order one I(1), I(0) or mutually integrated.
8.4.2 QARDL Model
The autoregressive distributed lag process can be defined as:








j∗xt−j + Ut. (8.14)
The quantile autoregressive distributed lag (QARDL) process is given by:








j∗(τ)xt−j + Ut(τ), (8.15)
where τ ∈ (0, 1) is a quantile index, p and q are lag orders, and |
∑p
j=1 φj∗(τ)| < 1
for τ ∈ (0, 1).
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The quantile ARDL error correction model allows us to investigate the quantile-
dependent long-run relationship and the associated dynamic adjustments, simul-
taneously.








No long-run relationship testing procedure is discussed in Cho et al. (2015) as they
assume the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship. The null hypothesis
of no (linear) quantile cointegration in Equation (8.15) can be tested in two ways:
a Wald test for the joint restriction ρ∗(τ) = θ∗(τ) = 0 and the t-test of Banerjee
et al. (1998) for the restriction ρ∗(τ) = 0. It should be pointed out that Prof
Yongcheol Shin suggests to use a Ward test for the joint restriction ρ∗(τ) =
θ∗(τ) = 0 rather than the F test under the null of no quantile cointegration.
8.4.3 NARDL Model
Shin et al. (2014) advance a simple technique for modelling both short- and long-
run asymmetries based on extension of the linear ARDL approach of Pesaran and




−′x−t + ut, (8.18)
where xt is a k × 1 vector of regressors decomposed as:






where x+t and x
−
t are partial sum process if positive and negative values changes
















and β+ = −θ+/ρ and β− = −θ−/ρ are the associated asymmetric long-run
parameters. Using a similar idea, the corresponding asymmetric ARDL error
correction model may be defined as:



















Shin et al. (2014) refer to Equation (8.21) as the “asymmetric or non-linear
ARDL (NARDL) model”. They also demonstrate that the NARDL approach
has overwhelming advantages over regime-switch models. First, Equation (8.21)
can be estimated by OLS. Second, the null hypothesis of no long-run relation-




t can be tested using the F bounds-testing procedure
(ρ = θ+ = θ− = 0) and the procedure remains valid irrespective of whether the
regressors are I(0), I(1) or mutually cointegrated. The long-run relationship can
be also tested using the t-statistic of Banerjee et al. (1998) for the restriction
ρ = 0. If ρ = 0, Equation (8.21) reduces to regression only involving first dif-
ference terms, indicating that there is no long-run relationship between yt, x
+
t
and x−t . Third, both the long-run reaction symmetry and short-run adjustment
symmetry can be tested using standard Wald tests.
8.4.4 NARDL-Q Model
By allowing non-linearity of the form modelled by Equation (8.21) into the con-



























where κ is a given quantile index in (0,1). The details of the NARDL-Q model
can be found in Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2011). Similar to the NARDL and
QARDL model, the null of no cointegration can be tested using the t-test for the






For the ARDL and NARDL models, the t-statistic and F-statistic testing proce-
dures can be used for the existence of a long-run relationship. For the QARDL
and NARDL-Q models, the t-statistic and Wald-statistic testing procedures are
used for testing the existence of a long-run relationship. A ‘spurious’ cointegrating
relationship may arise if the relevant testing procedures yield conflicting results.
It should be pointed out that a finding of cointegrating relationship is valid only
if the relevant statistics are simultaneously significant.
8.5 Results
This section presents the results of various cointegration models at the both na-
tional and State levels. Two conditional mean-based ARDL models and two
quantile versions of ARDL models are applied to explore a long-run cointegrating
relationship between house prices and fundamentals in the US at the (aggregate)
national and (disaggregate) State levels. It is well-known that the F and t test-
ing procedures have a non-standard distribution which depends on the number
of regressors, inclusion/exclusion of an intercept or a trend and the sample size.
Following the standard practices in the literature, the relevant critical values are
obtained for tBDM and FPSS statistic from Pesaran et al. (2001). As the economic
fundamentals include three variables, it is reasonable to set k = 3 and k = 6 in
obtaining critical values for linear and non-linear models.5 Pesaran et al. (2001)
tabulate the k = 3 critical values of tBDM at the 10%, 5% and 1% as -3.46, -3.78
5Due to the decomposition for the non-linear models of Shin et al. (2014) and Greenwood-
Nimmo et al. (2011), we have 6 exogenous variables. The critical values are selected for k = 6.
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and -4.37, respectively. They also tabulate the relevant critical values of FPSS as
3.77, 4.35 and 5.61 at the 10%, 5% and 1% level for k = 3. For the non-linear
models of NARDL-M and NARDL-Q, we select the k = 6 critical values due to the
partial sum decompositions from Pesaran et al. (2001). The k = 6 critical values
of tBDM are -4.04, -4.38, -4.99 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level and the
equivalent values of FPSS are 3.23, 3.61 and 4.43, respectively. All the analysis
is implemented by Gretl. The general-to-specific lag selection is performed with
a maximum lag length of 4 using a sequential 10% rule. As we work with the
quarterly data, it is reasonable to set the maximum lag order to be 4.
8.5.1 Unit Root Tests
We first apply unit root tests of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-
Perron (PP) and KPSS to check the stationarity of time series. Results are based
on the model specification of a constant, and a constant with a trend and are
presented in Table 8.14 through Table 8.23. In addition, the quantile Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (QKS) test from Koenker and Xiao (2004) is also utilised to assess the
unit root behavior across quantiles. The conventional unit root tests concentrate
on the conditional central tendency of the time series while the QKS test provides
a general perspective of the unit root behavior over all the quantiles. Among these
above mentioned tables, the house price, income, construction costs and mortgage
rates are abbreviated as HP, IC, CC and MR, respectively. The relevant partial
sum process of positive and negative changes in the regressors are denoted by
adding a P or a N after its variable name. For example, the partial sum process
of positive and negative changes in income are denoted as ‘ICP’ and ‘ICN’.
Unit root results at the national level are shown in Table 8.14. The house price
(HP) seems to be I(1) under most unit root tests. However, there is evidence to
suggest that this variable is I(0) under the model specification with a constant and
a trend for ADF and KPSS tests. The income variable (IC) is I(1) as suggested
by all tests. The construction cost (CC) is I(1) except the KPSS test under
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the assumption with a constant and a trend. The mortgage rate (MR) is I(0)
under the assumption with a constant and trend for ADF, PP and KPSS tests.
The partial sum process of positive and negative changes in income are denoted
in ICP and ICN, respectively. ICP and ICN are I(1) in most cases. A similar
conclusion may be drawn for the partial sum process of positive and negative
changes in construction costs (CCP and CCN) and in mortgage rates (MRP and
MRN). Overall, there is no overwhelming evidence to suggest that all variables
are I(1) at the national level except the income variable.
Table 8.15 shows unit root results for Arizona. HP is I(1) except the KPSS test
under the assumption with a constant and trend, and the QKS test. IC, ICP
and CCP variables are I(1) as suggested by all tests. CC and ICP are likely to
be I(1) except the quantile-based QKS test. It is not clear that the exact order
of integration for MR as MR is hardly likely to be I(1). CCN, MRP and MRN
are likely to be I(1) except based upon the KPSS test. Overall, there is strong
evidence that all variables are I(1) based on ADF and PP tests only except the
MR variable. When additional KPSS and QKS tests are considered, there is no
firm evidence to conclude the presence of I(1) variable except IC, ICP and CCP.
Table 8.16 presents unit root results for California. HP is I(0) as the ADF and
KPSS tests under the assumption with a constant and trend. QKS also indicates
that HP is I(0). IC and CCN are strongly supported to be I(1) variable by all tests.
There is no clear evidence to conclude that MR and ICP are I(1) variables based
on three conventional unit root tests. The ADF and PP unit root tests suggest
that CC, ICN, CCP, MRP and MRN are I(1) under different cases. However,
the KPSS test does not provide the same conclusion regarding the order of these
variables. Overall, there is no firm evidence to suggest that all variables are I(1)
except IC and CCN.
Table 8.17 also shows mixed order of integration results among variables for the
District of Columbia. There is evidence that HP, IC, CC and CCN are I(1) based
on most tests. ICP is I(1) except for the QKS test. All tests suggest that MRP
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and MRN are I(1). It seems that MR and ICN are I(0) for conventional unit root
tests especially with an estimated equation with a constant and trend.
According to Table 8.18, there is strong evidence that ICP, CCN and MRP for
Florida are I(1) variables based on three conventional unit root tests but not the
QKS test. HP is I(1) under most cases except ADF and KPSS tests with a a
constant and a trend. The QKS test also supports an I(0) variable for HP. Thus
the exact order of HP is not clear. Similar conclusion may be drawn for MR as
well, as it seems to be an I(1) variable under a constant only in the equation
while it is an I(0) variable under a constant and a trend in the equation. There
are ambiguous results for IC as it is an I(0) variable for the ADF test and an I(2)
variable for the KPSS test under the assumption of a constant only. CC, ICN,
CCP and MRN are all identified as I(1) variables under the ADF and PP tests
only. When the KPSS is applied, the exact order of these variables is not sure.
As presented in Table 8.19, there is strong evidence that IC, CC and CCN for
Hawaii are I(1) by all three conventional unit root and QKS tests. There is
evidence that HP, ICP, ICN, MRP are I(1) as suggested by three conventional
unit root tests except the KPSS test with a constant and a trend in the equation.
On the other hand, CCP and MRN are I(1) except based on the KPSS test with
a constant only in the equation.
As shown in Table 8.20, several variables for Massachusetts are I(1) based on all
three conventional unit root and QKS tests including IC, ICP, CCP, MRP and
MRN. ICN also shows strong signs of I(1) except the QKS test. CC and CCN are
I(1) variables except the KPSS test with a constant and a trend. HP and MR are
I(0) only for the ADF and KPSS tests with a constant and a trend. Hence the
exact order of these two variables is not certain.
As indicated in Table 8.21, ICP and CCN for Nevada are clearly I(1) variables.
CC can be regarded as an I(1) variable by three conventional unit root tests. It
is reasonable to believe that HP is an I(0) variable as the ADF, KPSS and QKS
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tests suggest. IC, ICN, CCP, MRP and MRN are I(1) based on the ADF and PP
tests only. All three conventional unit root tests indicate that MR is I(0) under
the assumption of a constant and a trend in the equation together with the QKS
test.
As illustrated by Table 8.22, there is strong evidence that all variables for New
York are I(1) in most cases except the HP and MR. Both HP and MR exhibit
evidence of I(0) variables based upon conventional unit root tests.
Table 8.23 provides a clear order of integration for most variables in Pennsylvania.
There is strong evidence that IC, ICP, CCP, MRP and MRN are I(1). CC, MR
and CCN are also believed to be I(1) variables for most cases. The only exception
is the HP variable. It is identified as an I(0) in certain cases. In short, there is
mixed evidence to suggest that HP is an I(1) variable.
8.5.2 Johansen Cointegration Tests
If all variables are assumed to be I(1), we can then apply Johansen cointegration
tests to explore a long-run relationship between house prices, and economic fun-
damentals at the conditional mean. There are five different assumptions regarding
trend specification in Johansen (1995). In this paper, we choose trend assumption
3 and 4 as discussed in Johansen (1995), which are the most widely chosen trend
specification in applying the test. The trend case 3 assumes the level data assumes
to have linear trend but the cointegrating equations have only intercept while the
case 4 assumes the level data and the cointegrating equations have linear trends.
The corresponding cointegration results are presented in Table 8.8 based on both
trace and maximum eigenvalue tests.
As illustrated in Table 8.8, under the trend assumption of case 3, the Johansen
test identifies at least one cointegrating relationship at the both national and
regional levels except for the District of Columbia (DC), indicating a long-run
equilibrium relationship among house prices and fundamentals for these States.
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Under the assumption of trend specification 4, the Johansen test identifies at
least one cointegrating relationship based on the trace test at the both national
and regional levels except the District of Columbia (DC), supporting the cointe-
gration relationship between house price and fundamentals. However, the maxi-
mum eigenvalue statistics suggest that the cointegration relationship holds only
in Florida (FL), Hawaii (HI), Massachusetts (MA), New York (NY) and Pennsyl-
vania (PA).
8.5.2.1 Other Relevant US Studies using Johansen Cointegration Tests
Several previous studies attempted to examine a long run relationship between
the US house prices and fundamentals using Johansen cointegration tests. For
example, Duca et al. (2011) conclude that the US price-to-rent ratio, user costs and
loan-to-value ratio (LTV) are cointegrated at the national level based on the trace
and maximal eigenvalue statistics between 1981Q1 and 2007Q2. However, Zhou
(2010) shows that the house price is not cointegrated with fundamentals (income,
construction costs, mortgage rates) at the national and city levels except Cleveland
covering the period 1978Q1-2007Q4. Arestis and González (2014) present evidence
of a long-run relationship at the national level between the real house price and a
set of fundamentals (real disposable income, real residential investment, volume
of banking credit, mortgage rate, ratio of taxation to property/house price, the
rate of unemployment and the evolution of population) for the period 1970-2011.
Chen and Cheng (2017) argue that the US house price-to-income ratio, interest
rate, inflation rate, real income growth rate and housing demand are cointegrated
from 1979Q1 to 2015Q3 at the national level.
8.5.3 ARDL Model Results
8.5.3.1 National-level
Results for the US national data are presented as Table 8.9. The tBDM statistic
testing ρ = 0 based on Equation (8.13) and Equation (8.21) for the ARDL-M
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Table 8.8 – Number of cointegrating relationships based on Johansen cointegrating
test based on different trend assumptions for the US and a selection of states.
Trend assumption US AZ CA DC FL HI MA NV NY PA
Case 3: the level data have linear trends
but the cointegrating equations have only intercepts
No. of cointegrating relationships
Trace 1 2 1 0 3 1 1 4 1 1
Maximum-Eigenvalue 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1
Case 4: the level data and the cointegrating
equations have linear trends
No. of cointegrating relationships
Trace 1 1 1 0 3 1 1 1 1 1
Maximum-Eigenvalue 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
and NARDL-M models is -1.746 and -1.664, where both test statistics are not
significantly different from zero at the 10% level, meaning that no cointegration.
Although the FPSS statistic is significant at the 5% level for both models, it
seems to provide evidence of cointegration. However, the two testing procedures
yield conflicting results, indicating ‘spurious’ cointegration relationship. A key
assumption regarding the ARDL model is that the model is dynamically stable,
suggesting ρ needs to be non-zero. Apart from the well-known FPSS statistic,
the t-test on ρ = 0 can also be regarded as one way of testing cointegration.
Due to the inconsistent results from tBDM and FPSS tests, we conclude that no
cointegration exist between house prices and fundamentals. Despite using the
powerful NARDL-M model to take into account non-linearity, the above results
still suggest no overwhelming evidence of cointegration between house prices and
fundamentals at the national level.
We then investigate whether the non-cointegration relationship holds at the con-
ditional quantile using two quantile models. From the upper panel of Table 8.9,
the tBDM statistic is not significantly different from zero at all quantiles across
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the whole conditional distribution of the house price for both the QARDL and
NARDL-Q models, where the critical values are -3.46 and -4.04, respectively. The
non-significant tBDM statistic implies that house prices are neither symmetrically
nor asymmetrically cointegrated with economic fundamentals at the national level.
Results from two quantile models suggest that, for either low house prices (when
house prices are at low quantile level), average house prices (when house price at
the middle quantile level) or higher house prices (when house prices are at high
quantile level), they are not cointegrated with economic fundamentals, indicating
no long-run equilibrium relationship at the conditional quantile.
Meen (2002) argues that house prices and fundamentals are cointegrated in the US
using the error correction model. Zhou (2010) and Clark and Coggin (2011) also
draw the same conclusion at the national level using cointegration tests of Engle
and Granger (1987), Johansen (1991), Gregory and Hansen (1996) and Granger
and Hallman (1991). The finding of no stable long-run relationship at the aggre-
gate national-level is consistent with the conclusion of Gallin (2006), Zhou (2010)
and Clark and Coggin (2011). We then concentrate on empirical results from
ARDL models. More importantly, the non-cointegrating relationship not only
holds for the two conditional mean based linear and non-linear ARDL models
but also establishes at two recently proposed quantile versions of ARDL models.
Our results from Table 8.9 show neither lower, average nor higher house prices
cointegrate with economic fundamentals. For a bear, normal, or bull market,
house prices do not move towards to economic fundamentals. A key contribu-
tion from this paper is that we provide additional evidence to support further
the hypothesis of no cointegration between house prices and various fundamen-
tals at the national level using two quantile-based ARDL models. Given the fact
that no stable long-run relationship can be established for both symmetric and
non-symmetric quantile ARDL models, as argued by Gallin (2006), it would be in-
appropriate to model house price dynamics using an error-correction specification.
Hence these studies on house price dynamics of Abraham and Hendershott (1996),




Results for Arizona are presented as Table 8.9. Both the ARDL-M and NARDL-
M models indicate the presence of either a symmetric or an asymmetric long-run
cointegrating relationhsip between house prices and their economic fundamentals
based on the t-statistic testing procedure of Banerjee et al. (1998) and F-test of
Pesaran et al. (2001). For the ARDL-M model, both the tBDM and FPSS statistic
are significant at the 1% level (e.g., tBDM statistic:−5.933; FPSS statistic: 9.051).
Similarly, an asymmetric long-run relationship can also be observed between house
prices and their economic fundamentals in Arizona as the tBDM and FPSS tests
are significant at the 1% level. Overall, two conditional mean-based ARDL coin-
tegration models present strong evidence of a long-run cointegrating relationship
for Arizona.
Two quantile ARDL models also exhibit strong evidence of a cointegration rela-
tionship based on the t-statistic of Banerjee et al. (1998) and a Wald test for the
joint null at the conditional quantile. House prices in Arizona and their economic
fundamentals are cointegrated at a conditional quantile if the statistics from the
two testing procedures are simultaneously significant. In particular, Table 8.10
indicates a long-run relationship between house prices and economic fundamen-
tals for the whole conditional distribution except the 10% quantile based on the
ARDL-Q and NARDL-Q models. At the 10% quantile, there is no long-run re-
lationship between house prices and fundamentals. This means that, when house
prices in Arizona are at the 10% lower level (lower house price), it is neither
symmetrically nor asymmetrically cointegrated with economic fundamentals.
This probably means that, a rise or fall in lower house prices is not driven by
economic fundamentals as there is no long-run equilibrium relationship between
the bear housing market and fundamentals. Hence, market forces will probably
not significantly affect lower house prices. Changes in fundamentals are unlikely
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to lead to a stable long-run relationship with the bear housing market (lower house
prices). In other words, if house prices are far too low relative to fundamentals,
they lose their cointegration relationship.
8.5.3.3 District of Columbia (DC)
The ARDL-M model finds no long-run equilibrium relationship as the t-statistic
with a value of -3.122 is not significant at the 10% significance level. On the other
hand, the NARDL-M model shows some interesting results as both the tBDM and
FPSS statistic are significant at the 10% level, indicating an asymmetric long-run
cointegration relationship between house prices and fundamentals.
Interestingly, when we consider the quantile version model of QARDL, we identify
a long-run relationship at the lower quantile (e.g., from 10% to 30%) as both the
tBDM and FPSS statistic are significant. At the 20% quantile, the tBDM statistic
is -3.454, which is very close to the critical value of -3.46. It is perhaps acceptable
to conclude that house prices and fundamentals are symmetrically cointegrated in
the lower quantile between 10% and 30%. Results from the QARDL model suggest
that there is evidence of symmetric cointegration for a bear housing market as
the house price is lower. However, as stated earlier, the conditional mean based
ARDL-M model shows no evidence of cointegration, which assumes that the non-
cointegrating relationship holds for the whole conditional distribution. A valuable
lesson from this example is that the cointegration relationship may be absent at
the conditional mean-based cointegration model (e.g., ARDL-M model) while it
may be established at the conditional quantile-based cointegration model (e.g.,
QARDL model).
The asymmetric version of the NARDL-Q model presents some interesting results.
It seems that house prices are asymmetrically cointegrated with fundamentals at
the 10% quantile only based on the NARDL-Q model while asymmetric cointe-
gration is established based on two testing procedures for the NARDL-M model.
Interestingly, the NARDL-Q model shows that house prices reflect fundamentals
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in the lower quantile, indicating that a long-run stable relationship seems to hold
for a bear market. Although an asymmetric cointegrating relationship is identified
based on the conditional mean model of NARDL, no overwhelming evidence sup-
ports asymmetric cointegration at the conditional quantile. This is an important
example as it shows that the cointegration may be established based on the condi-
tional mean model (e.g., NARDL-M model) but there could be no overwhelming
evidence of cointegration based on its relevant quantile model (e.g., NARDL-Q
model). This is to say that the assumption of relationship does not hold at the
entire conditional distribution.
The lower house prices for a bear market in the District of Columbia are coin-
tegrated with economic fundamentals between the 10% and 30% quantiles based
on the QARDL model while house prices are asymmetrically cointegrated with
economic fundamentals at the 10% quantile only based on the NARDL-Q model.
These results indicate that lower house prices are driven by economic fundamen-
tals. A rise or drop in low house prices is likely to associated with changes in
fundamentals to catch up as there is long-run equilibrium relationship. There-
fore, changes in fundamentals are likely to be effective in maintaining lower house
price inflation.
8.5.3.4 Florida (FL)
Both conditional mean models indicate no long-run equilibrium relationship in
Table 8.11, where the t-statistics of Banerjee et al. (1998) for the two models
are not significant from zero (tBDM statistic:-2.878 and -3.185 for ARDL-M and
NARDL-M, respectively). Furthermore, the FPSS statistic for the two models
is not significant. As the ARDL-M and NARDL-M models are not dynamically
stable with non-significant FPSS statistics, we may conclude that house prices in
Florida and the relevant economic fundamentals are neither symmetrically nor
asymmetrically cointegrated.
The QARDL model reveals no evidence of a long-run equilibrium relationship as
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house prices and fundamentals are not cointegrated across the whole conditional
distribution. For either low, average or high house prices, there is no long-run
cointegrating relationship. This is an additional insight offered from the QARDL
model.
The NARDL-Q model shows some interesting findings, which indicates that house
prices and economic fundamentals in Florida are only asymmetrically cointegrated
at the lower tail (e.g., 10% and 20% quantile) in the long-run due to the significant
t- and Ward statistic at the 1% level. House prices in Florida is asymmetrically
cointegrated with personal income, constriction costs and mortgage rates only
at the low quantile. This example also demonstrates that the conditional mean
based cointegration test may be unable to identify a long-run relationship while
the quantile-based cointegration may uncover some evidence at specific quantiles.
The above results likely mean that a low house price in Florida is asymmetri-
cally cointegrated with those economic fundamentals for low-income earners in
the long-run as these people with low income are more likely to purchase low
priced houses. For those people who earn a reasonable salary or can afford to
retire in Florida with a certain amount of wealth, they are more likely to pur-
chase an average house or a more expensive house than those low incomes. These
high-income earners’ or wealthy retirees’ buy relatively more expensive houses
which are not simply cointegrated with the relevant economic fundamentals in
the long-run as t- and Ward statistic are not simultaneously significant from the
30% to 90% quantile. An average and high house price in Florida does not seem to
reflect fundamentals including income, population growth, construction costs and
mortgage rates. Those houses owned by high-income earners or wealthy retirees
are unlikely to be significantly affected by changes in the economic fundamentals,
or at least, fundamentals will not catch up with the house price.
These results have strong policy implications to policy-makers. As our key se-
lection of economic fundamentals are not cointegrated with higher house prices,
changes in these economic fundamentals are less likely to be effective in control-
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ling higher house prices in Florida. However, changes in fundamentals will be
more likely to be effective in controlling those lower price houses as cointegration
is established in low price houses only.
8.5.3.5 California (CA)
Results for California are presented as Table 8.10. Based on two testing proce-
dures for the existence of a symmetric or an asymmetric long-run relationship at
the conditional mean, both the ARDL-M and NARDL-M models suggest no coin-
tegrating relationship as the t-statistic of Banerjee et al. (1998) is not significant
for the two models. The tBDM statistic is −2.823 and −1.787 for ARDL-M and
NARDL-M models while the 10% critical value is -3.46 and -4.04, respectively.
Neither the ARDL-M model nor NARDL-M model is dynamically stable as the
relevant tBDM statistic is not significant at the 10% level, indicating no long-run
relationship. Thus house prices in California are not cointegrated with the rel-
evant economic fundamentals (e.g., personal income (a combination of income
and population), construction costs and mortgage rates) at the conditional mean
based on linear and non-linear ARDL models.
The same conclusion can be drawn for the two quantile ARDL models. The
t-statistic test fails to identify the existence of a symmetric or an asymmetric
long-run relationship for the whole conditional distribution for the QARDL and
NARDL-Q models, indicating house prices are not aligned with economic funda-
mentals in California. For lower, average or higher house prices, these house prices
do not cointegrate with economic fundamentals. Based on the above, the results
show substantial evidence of no long-run cointegrating relationship between house
prices and relevant economic fundamentals in California based on both conditional
mean and quantile models.
Housing in California has long been more expensive than most of the rest of
the country. The critical conclusion perhaps suggests that Californian housing
market is not driven by economic fundamentals. For either, a bear, normal or
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boom market, house price in California does not reflect fundamentals. Hence,
the Californian housing market will probably not respond much in the changes of
economic fundamentals. In other words, policy regarding these fundamentals is
unlikely to be effective in fighting high house prices in California.
8.5.3.6 Hawaii (HI)
The two conditional mean models of ARDL-M and NARDL-M clearly indicate
no long-run relationship between house prices and their economic fundamentals
as the FPSS statistic and tBDM statistic are not significant under both models.
The tBDM statistic is -0.854 and -1.688 for the ARDL-M and NARDL-M models,
which are not significant at the 10% critical value of -3.46 and -4.04. Due to
consistent results of two testing procedures, it is reasonable to conclude no long-
run relationship between house prices and the relevant economic fundamentals in
Hawaii. Both conditional mean models seem to suggest that, for those beachgoers
in Hawaii, house prices are neither symmetrically nor asymmetrically cointegrated
income, population, construction costs and mortgage rates.
Neither the QARDL model nor NARDL-Q model offers overwhelming evidence
of cointegration across the whole conditional distribution as suggested by the two
testing procedures. We, therefore, have firm evidence to conclude that there is
no stable long-run relationship between house prices and fundamentals in Hawaii
based on both conditional mean- and quantile-based models.
8.5.3.7 Massachusetts (MA)
It is clear from Table 8.12 that house prices in Massachusetts are not cointe-
grated with economic fundamentals based on the two conditional mean models.
The tBDM statistic for ARDL-M and NARDL-M models is -0.115 and -1.313,
which are not significantly different from zero, suggesting no long-run relation-
ship. Despite a significant F-statistic of the joint null, we conclude no long-run
equilibrium relationship between house prices and fundamentals for the ARDL-M
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and NARDL-M models.
The same conclusions can be drawn from the two quantile models. The tBDM
statistic is not significant across the whole distribution for the two quantile-based
models. By applying the QARDL and NARDL-Q models, our results highlight
that for a low-, an average or high-value house in Massachusetts, house prices
are not cointegrated with the relevant economic fundamentals. This is the key
finding from the two quantile models. Based on the above results, there is firm ev-
idence to conclude no stable long-run relationship between house prices and these
fundamentals in Massachusetts based on several ARDL cointegration models.
8.5.3.8 New York (NY)
Based on the two conditional mean models, the tBDM statistic is -0.173 and -0.861
for the ARDL-M and NARDL-M models and is not significantly different from
zero, indicating no long-run equilibrium relationship. At the conditional mean
level, house prices in New York are neither symmetrically nor asymmetrically
cointegrated with economic fundamentals. Whatever the house price level is,
there is no stable long-run relationship.
Both the QARDL and NARDL-Q models confirm no long-run relationship be-
tween house prices and economic fundamentals across the whole conditional dis-
tribution as neither tBDM statistic nor FPSS statistic are simultaneously signifi-
cant. Results from New York are similar with those of Hawaii and Massachusetts,
where no cointegration is established for both the symmetric and non-symmetric
conditional mean- and quantile-based ARDL cointegration models.
Whatever the house price level is, house prices in New York state are neither
symmetrically nor asymmetrically cointegrated at the conditional quantile. This
indicates that, for a bear, normal or boom market, house prices in New York state
do not reflect economic fundamentals. Changes in the fundamentals are unlikely
to be effective in influencing house price inflation. Policy relating to economic
fundamentals will not impact much on house prices. A drift between house prices
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and fundamentals in New York is unlikely to come back to an equilibrium level.
For example, economic fundamentals are unlikely to catch-up the rise in house
prices.
8.5.3.9 Nevada (NV)
As shown as Table 8.12, the ARDL-M model identifies a symmetric long-run
relationship between house prices in Nevada and economic fundamentals as the
tBDM and FPSS statistic with values of -3.967 and 5.466 are significant at the 10%
and 1% level, respectively. The NARDL-M model also supports an asymmetric
long-run relationship due to the significant tBDM and FPSS statistic at the 5%
level. At the conditional mean level, the above results based on the two ARDL
models clearly show that house prices are cointegrated with fundamentals.
The QARDL model offers some interesting results. It can be seen from Table 8.13
that the tBDM and FPSS statistic are both significant for the 60% to 90% quan-
tiles. A higher house price or above-average price are cointegrated with economic
fundamentals as the cointegration is established between the 60% and 90% quan-
tile. At the conditional mean level, house prices are symmetrically cointegrated
with economic fundamentals as suggested by the ARDL-M model. Bear in mind
that the assumption of the ARDL-M and NARDL-M models is that the relation-
ship not only holds at the mean but in other parts of the conditional distribution
of the dependent variable (e.g., lower and upper tail quantiles). The cointegra-
tion established by the ARDL-M or NARDL-M model assumes that the long-run
relationship holds not only at the lower tail but also the upper tail. However,
it is clear that the cointegration does not hold at all quantiles as a symmetric
long-run cointegration relationship is absent between the 10% and 50% quantile
based on QARDL model. This example demonstrates the importance of consider-
ing quantile cointegration models as the estimated cointegration relationship from
the conditional mean-based cointegration models may not hold across the entire
conditional distribution.
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The NARDL-Q model confirms the existence of an asymmetric long-run relation-
ship at the 50%, 60% and 90% quantile due to the significant tBDM and FPSS
statistic. It should be pointed out that the tBDM statistic is -3.571 and -3.646 at
the 70% and 80% quantile. Although they are not significant at the 10% level
if k = 6 critical value of -4.04 is selected, they are significant at the 10% level if
k = 3 critical value of -3.46 is selected. Therefore, we have some weak evidence
of cointegration at the 70% and 80% quantile.
Based on the two quantile models, it is reasonable to conclude that house prices in
Nevada do not align with the relevant economic fundamentals in the lower quan-
tiles (e.g., 10%-40% quantiles). This is to say, there is no long-run relationship
between lower-value house prices and economic fundamentals. These results are
interesting. Nevada is famous for its tourism and gaming industry. Las Vegas is
an internationally renowned major resort city, known primarily for its gambling,
shopping, fine dining, entertainment, and nightlife. A large number of people pur-
sue careers in hospitality and tourism there. They are more likely to own lower
or average price houses than those high-income earners who probably own more
luxury houses. Results from two quantile models suggest that, for those people
who pursue careers in hospitality and tourism industry, their relatively lower price
houses are not cointegrated with economic fundamentals. Those people who work
in tourism and hospitality industries earn a relatively low salary, and their income
can be more sensitive to house prices. Their job is not as secure as those highly
trained/educated professionals as they could lose jobs for some unforeseen cir-
cumstances. The two quantile ARDL models indicate that these house prices in
the lower price level are not driven by economic fundamentals and are less likely
to be affected by changes in the fundamentals.
8.5.3.10 Pennsylvania (PA)
Cointegration results for Pennsylvania are presented in Table 8.13. Based on the
tBDM and FPSS statistic with values of -2.476 and 2.348, the ARDL-M model iden-
tifies no cointegration relationship at the conditional mean of the house prices in
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Pennsylvania. On the other hand, the NARDL-M model provides some interest-
ing results as it finds evidence of an asymmetric long-run equilibrium relationship
based on two testing procedures based on the tBDM and FPSS statistic at the 1%
level.
Cointegration seems to be established in the lower tail as suggested by the QARDL
model. As can be seen from Table 8.13, house prices are symmetrically cointe-
grated with economic fundamentals at the 10% and 30% quantiles only. At the
20% quantile, the tBDM statistic for the ECM parameter is -3.414 and is not sig-
nificantly different from zero. However, the tBDM statistic of -3.414 is very close
to the 10% critical value of -3.46. Therefore, it is probably acceptable to conclude
that cointegration is present in the lower quantiles.
Results from the NARDL-Q model indicates that house prices in Pennsylvania are
asymmetrically cointegrated with economic fundamentals at all quantiles across
the entire conditional distribution, which is a key feature. The NARDL-M model
finds asymmetric long-run cointegration, which is assumed to hold in the whole
conditional distribution. Our results from the NARDL-Q model further confirm
that the asymmetric long-run relationship holds in the entire conditional distri-
bution. For either lower or higher house prices, these prices are asymmetrically
cointegrated with fundamentals.
As suggested above, the linear models of ARDL-M and QARDL show no over-
whelming evidence of a symmetric cointegration relationship. Overall, as sug-
gested by the non-linear models of NARDL-M and NARDL-Q, house prices in
Pennsylvania are asymmetrically cointegrated with economic fundamentals based
on two testing procedures. This may indicate that, either house prices and fun-
damentals may drift apart temporarily from each other, but they will return to

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We investigate the long-run equilibrium relationship between US house prices
and economic fundamentals at the both national and selected State levels from
1978Q1 to 2016Q4 using several ARDL based cointegration tests. The presence of
cointegration between house prices and fundamentals suggests a stable equilibrium
relationship, indicating that a temporary increase or drop in house prices would
eventually come back to an equilibrium. If house prices and fundamentals are
not cointegrated, then the error-correction specifications are inappropriate. In
this case, house prices do not have to stagnate or fall to maintain an equilibrium
relationship even if house prices outpace fundamentals.
Both the conditional mean- and quantile-based cointegration test of ARDL-M of
Pesaran et al. (2001) and NARDL-M of Shin et al. (2014) are applied to exam-
ine the potential symmetric or asymmetric cointegration relationship. A crucial
contribution to the literature is that two recently proposed quantile-based ARDL
models are employed to test for cointegration across the whole conditional dis-
tribution. Based on the symmetric quantile ARDL model (QARDL) and the
non-asymmetric quantile ARDL model (NARDL-Q), two testing procedures for
examining a long-run cointegration relationship are utilised in this study as sug-
gested by Prof Yongcheol Shin. These two testing procedures are the t-statistic
of Banerjee et al. (1998) and a Wald-test for the joint null.
Some key findings have been presented in this study. The results above show no
cointegration between house prices and fundamentals at the national level based
on both conditional mean- and quantile-based cointegration tests. This finding is
consistent with the early view of Gallin (2006), who also identify non-cointegrating
relationship at the aggregate level. As argued by Gallin (2006), it would be inap-
propriate to model house price dynamics using an error-correction specification.
Hence those studies on house price dynamics of Abraham and Hendershott (1996),
Capozza et al. (2002) and Malpezzi (1999) based on error correction specifications
are likely misspecified. Empirical results show, under certain cases, that cointe-
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gration may be established based on the conditional mean-based model (e.g.,
ARDL-M or NARDL-M models) but there could be no overwhelming evidence
of cointegration based on the quantile-based model (e.g., QARDL or NARLD-
Q models). This particular phenomenon has been observed in the District of
Columbia and Nevada. The OLS estimation procedure assumes that the esti-
mated relationship holds not only at the mean but in other parts of the conditional
distribution as well. On the other hand, the conditional mean based cointegration
model may be unable to identify a stable long-run relationship while the quantile-
based model may uncover some evidence of cointegration at certain quantiles.
This phenomenon has been observed in District of Columbia and Florida. Based
on both conditional mean and quantile models, several examples demonstrate that
there is no stable long-run relationship between house prices and fundamentals
at the national and state levels including California, Hawaii, Massachusetts and
New York. This finding is of great interest as it provides strong evidence of a
non-cointegrating relationship. The corresponding results for Pennsylvania show
that house prices and fundamentals are asymmetrically cointegrated based on the
NARDL-M model. Such asymmetric cointegration relationship is also confirmed
by the NARDL-Q model, where the relationship holds at the whole conditional
distribution. It is quite a remarkable finding for Pennsylvania.
We re-visit the hypothesis between US house prices and the relevant economic fun-
damentals using advanced econometric methodologies. As mentioned above, this
research reports several interesting findings. The findings from this paper indeed
offer new meaningful insights from the point view of methodology development
and empirical evidence. Apart from two conditional-mean based cointegration
models, two quantile-based ARDL cointegration models essentially allow policy-
makers to understand house price dynamics under different phases (e.g., a bear,
normal and boom market). There have been no studies modelling a long-run rela-
tionship between house prices and fundamentals based on a quantile cointegration
approach in the prior literature. The conclusion provides further evidence of a
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Table 8.14 – Unit root tests for the national level.
Variables/test ADF (P-value) PP (P-value) KPSS (Stat) QKS(Stat)
US C C+T C C+T C C+T
HP (level) 0.2907 0.0224** 0.7013 0.5947 0.9667*** 0.0958 2.3724
(First Difference)0.0991* 0.2776 0.0000*** 0.0001***0.0699 0.0652 ⇓
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
IC (Level) 0.8665 0.8402 0.8707 0.7269 1.5089*** 0.2265***0.6523
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0940 0.0693 ⇓
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
CC (Level) 0.3685 0.2296 0.6106 0.6834 0.4851** 0.1095 2.6817
(First Difference)0.0005*** 0.0018***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1311 0.0602 ⇓
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
MR (Level) 0.7108 0.0191** 0.3703 0.0001***1.2397*** 0.0701 1.3482
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1131 0.0589 ⇓
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1)
ICP (Level) 0.9634 0.5368 0.9612 0.3757 1.5119*** 0.1033 0.8897
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0518 0.0530 ⇓
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
ICN (Level) 0.9923 0.9749 0.9858 0.9532 1.2609*** 0.2737***3.6952
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.2481 0.1258
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
CCP (Level) 1.0000 0.9998 1.0000 0.9999 1.4667*** 0.3352** 0.6048
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.7364** 0.1064
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1)
CCN (Level) 0.8596 0.2927 0.9856 0.8492 1.3970*** 0.2153** 0.3290
(First Difference)0.0578* 0.2129 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1643 0.0762
I(1) I(2) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
MRP (Level) 0.9918 0.9546 0.9922 0.9529 1.4693*** 0.3002***0.5757
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.2437 0.1334*
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1)
MRN (Level) 0.9990 0.8876 0.9995 0.9091 1.4769*** 0.2973***0.9725
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.3865* 0.0815
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(1)
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Table 8.15 – Unit root tests for Arizona (AZ).
Variables ADF (P-value) PP (P-value) KPSS (Stat) QKS (Stat)
Arizona (AZ) C C+T C C+T C C+T
HP (level) 0.1087 0.1753 0.3228 0.5163 0.3512* 0.1149 4.4617
(First Difference)0.0027*** 0.0147** 0.0027*** 0.0150** 0.0609 0.0513
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0)
IC (Level) 0.7752 0.6788 0.4531 0.8612 1.5032*** 0.2270***1.4039
(First Difference)0.0081*** 0.0347** 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.2371 0.0565
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
CC (Level) 0.5358 0.1617 0.7791 0.5983 0.8720*** 0.1291* 4.4367
(First Difference)0.0089*** 0.0315** 0.0000*** 0.0002***0.1245 0.0597
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
MR (Level) 0.8575 0.0126** 0.3709 0.0001***1.2439*** 0.069592 1.6025
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1308 0.093022
I(1) I(2) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(0) I(1)
ICP (Level) 0.2828 0.4659 0.5328 0.6652 1.5108*** 0.1731** 1.9726
(First Difference)0.0046*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.2049 0.0441
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
ICN (Level) 0.9501 0.8357 0.9867 0.9330 1.2299*** 0.2522***4.0128
(First Difference)0.0019*** 0.0092***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.2202 0.0982
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
CCP (Level) 0.9993 0.9117 0.9999 0.9627 1.4575*** 0.3167***2.1131
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0001***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.4845 0.0534
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
CCN (Level) 0.8814 0.5761 0.9583 0.8124 1.3293*** 0.2125 0.2858
(First Difference)0.0036*** 0.0199** 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1247 0.0771
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
MRP (Level) 0.9788 0.8914 0.9908 0.9617 1.4649*** 0.3075***1.3141
(First Difference)0.0011*** 0.0062***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.2521 0.1565**
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1)
MRN (Level) 0.9994 0.9516 0.9998 0.9695 1.4774*** 0.3248 1.0784
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.4723** 0.0927
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(0) I(1)
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Table 8.16 – Unit root tests for California (CA).
Variables ADF (P-value) PP (P-value) KPSS (Stat) QKS (Stat)
California (CA)C C+T C C+T C C+T
HP (level) 0.1800 0.0094***0.6423 0.5337 0.9522*** 0.0760 3.8098
(First Difference) 0.0391** 0.1428 0.0068*** 0.0337** 0.0586 0.0556
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0)
IC (Level) 0.8883 0.7784 0.8868 0.5624 1.5026*** 0.1403* 1.6149
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0702 0.0610
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
CC (Level) 0.5358 0.1617 0.7791 0.5983 0.8720*** 0.1291 4.4367
(First Difference) 0.0089*** 0.0315** 0.0000*** 0.0002***0.1245 0.0597
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0)
MR (Level) 0.8575 0.0126** 0.3709 0.0001***1.2439*** 0.0696 1.6025
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1308 0.0930
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1)
ICP (Level) 0.9904 0.0028***0.9831 0.6713 1.5041*** 0.0769 1.4845
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0977 0.0742
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
ICN (Level) 0.9988 0.9692 0.9984 0.9631 1.3099*** 0.3016***0.3025
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.4007* 0.1000
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(1)
CCP (Level) 0.9993 0.9117 0.9999 0.9627 1.4575*** 0.3167***2.1131
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0001***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.4845** 0.0534
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(1)
CCN (Level) 0.8814 0.5761 0.9583 0.8124 1.3293*** 0.2125** 0.2858
(First Difference) 0.0036*** 0.0199** 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1247 0.0771
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
MRP (Level) 0.9788 0.8914 0.9908 0.9617 1.4649*** 0.3075***1.3141
(First Difference) 0.0011*** 0.0062***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.2521 0.1565**
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1)
MRN (Level) 0.9994 0.9516 0.9998 0.9695 1.4774*** 0.3248***1.0784
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.4723** 0.0927
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(1)
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Table 8.17 – Unit root tests for District of Columbia (DC).
Variables ADF (P-value) PP (P-value) KPSS (Stat) QKS (Stat)
District of
Columbia (DC)
C C+T C C+T C C+T
HP (level) 0.8746 0.0772* 0.9586 0.7521 1.2819*** 0.2117** 1.5591
(First Difference) 0.0631* 0.1532 0.0002*** 0.0007***0.1623 0.0719
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
IC (Level) 0.9999 0.1831 0.9998 0.1500 1.4702*** 0.2296***1.5436
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.4846** 0.0729
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(1)
CC (Level) 0.2432 0.1685 0.5597 0.5446 0.9019*** 0.0803 1.4077
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0002***0.0000*** 0.0002***0.0651 0.0643
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
MR (Level) 0.6892 0.0003***0.5176 0.0006***1.2494*** 0.0721 2.5637
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0716 0.0474
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1)
ICP (Level) 0.9995 0.9274 0.9996 0.9125 1.5062*** 0.2934***94.2994
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.3227 0.0502
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
ICN (Level) 0.0025*** 0.0003***0.0477** 0.0010***1.4990*** 0.0626 1.8124
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.3246 0.1238*
I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1)
CCP (Level) 0.8205 0.2917 0.8533 0.5260 1.4728*** 0.1843** 0.6075
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0001***0.0000*** 0.0001***0.0681 0.0514
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
CCN (Level) 0.8231 0.1075 0.8812 0.7648 1.4347*** 0.1157 0.3290
(First Difference) 0.0001*** 0.0005***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1020 0.0984
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
MRP (Level) 0.8574 0.5150 0.8583 0.4207 1.4939*** 0.2123** 0.6778
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1111 0.1147
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
MRN (Level) 0.9790 0.5644 0.9829 0.6225 1.4981*** 0.2253***0.8863
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0995 0.0562
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
261
Table 8.18 – Unit root tests for Florida (FL).
Variables ADF (P-value) PP (P-value) KPSS (Stat) QKS (Stat)
Florida (FL) C C+T C C+T C C+T
HP (level) 0.3511 0.0402** 0.4652 0.5866 0.4704** 0.1050 3.5686
(First Difference)0.0008*** 0.0048***0.0004*** 0.0024***0.0731 0.0591
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0)
IC (Level) 0.0589* 0.8726 0.1824 0.8075 1.4856*** 0.2969***2.6044
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.4048** 0.0516
I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(1)
CC (Level) 0.3267 0.6976 0.5289 0.8624 0.1717 0.1727** 3.0878
(First Difference)0.0001*** 0.0005***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1880 0.0669
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0)
MR (Level) 0.6949 0.0053***0.3784 0.0000***1.2521*** 0.0698 2.3276
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1182 0.0723
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1)
ICP (Level) 0.3935 0.4136 0.4779 0.3654 1.5069*** 0.2200***3.6517
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.2653 0.0784
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
ICN (Level) 1.0000 0.9899 0.9986 0.9672 1.0940*** 0.3068***39.6263
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.4890** 0.0869
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(0)
CCP (Level) 1.0000 0.9998 1.0000 0.9999 1.4261*** 0.3611***3.0128
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.7274** 0.1271*
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(2) I(0)
CCN (Level) 0.9584 0.3506 0.9631 0.7759 1.3817*** 0.1754** 9.7954
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1162 0.0781
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
MRP (Level) 0.9905 0.9740 0.9872 0.9484 1.4609*** 0.3021***4.3629
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.2379 0.1591**
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
MRN (Level) 0.9991 0.9607 0.9997 0.9766 1.4756*** 0.3200***1.0162
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.4380* 0.0993
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(1)
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Table 8.19 – Unit root tests for Hawaii (HI).
Variables ADF (P-value) PP (P-value) KPSS (Stat) QKS (Stat)
Hawaii (HI) C C+T C C+T C C+T
HP (level) 0.6892 0.3416 0.7044 0.5401 1.0676*** 0.0636 1.7834
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0588 0.0574
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
IC (Level) 0.9083 0.8169 0.9033 0.6992 1.4692*** 0.1374* 0.7391
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0838 0.0808
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
CC (Level) 0.5358 0.1617 0.7791 0.5983 0.8720*** 0.1291* 1.6025
(First Difference)0.0089*** 0.0315** 0.0000*** 0.0002***0.1245 0.0597
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
MR (Level) 0.8575 0.0126** 0.3709 0.0001***1.2439*** 0.0696 4.4367
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1308 0.0930
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(0)
ICP (Level) 0.8388 0.7986 0.8483 0.7290 1.4856*** 0.1610** 0.7358
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1487 0.1214*
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(0)
ICN (Level) 0.7492 0.3922 0.7806 0.5304 1.4404*** 0.1189 114.5816
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1023 0.0980
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0)
CCP (Level) 0.9993 0.9117 0.9999 0.9627 1.4575*** 0.3167***2.1105
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0001***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.4845** 0.0534
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(1)
CCN (Level) 0.8814 0.5761 0.9583 0.8124 1.3293*** 0.2125** 0.2792
(First Difference)0.0036*** 0.0199** 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1247 0.0771
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
MRP (Level) 0.9788 0.8914 0.9908 0.9617 1.4649*** 0.3075***1.3141
(First Difference)0.0011*** 0.0062***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.2521 0.1565**
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1)
MRN (Level) 0.9994 0.9516 0.9998 0.9695 1.4774*** 0.3248***1.0784
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.4723** 0.0927
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(1)
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Table 8.20 – Unit root tests for Massachusetts (MA).
Variables ADF (P-value) PP (P-value) KPSS (Stat) QKS (Stat)
Massachusetts (MA)C C+T C C+T C C+T
HP (level) 0.1111 0.0004***0.3412 0.5927 0.9805*** 0.1167 2.7552
(First Difference) 0.0338** 0.1000 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1232 0.0626
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0)
IC (Level) 0.6425 0.8706 0.7270 0.6459 1.4747*** 0.1826** 1.9646
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1138 0.0527
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
CC (Level) 0.2432 0.1685 0.5597 0.5446 0.9019*** 0.0803 1.4077
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0002***0.0000*** 0.0002***0.0651 0.0643
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
MR (Level) 0.6892 0.0003***0.5176 0.0006***1.2494*** 0.0721 2.5637
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0715 0.0474
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1)
ICP (Level) 0.6936 0.7699 0.7791 0.6418 1.4954*** 0.1938** 1.8824
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1292 0.0671
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
ICN (Level) 0.9809 0.7661 0.9785 0.6611 1.4554*** 0.1403* 3.9730
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1102 0.0594
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
CCP (Level) 0.8205 0.2917 0.8533 0.5260 1.4728*** 0.1843** 0.6075
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0001***0.0000*** 0.0001***0.0681 0.0514
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
CCN (Level) 0.8231 0.1075 0.8812 0.7648 1.4347*** 0.1157 0.3290
(First Difference) 0.0001*** 0.0005***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1020 0.0984
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
MRP (Level) 0.8574 0.5150 0.8583 0.4207 1.4939*** 0.2123** 0.6778
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1111 0.1147
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
MRN (Level) 0.9790 0.5644 0.9829 0.6225 1.4981*** 0.2254***0.8863
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0995 0.0562
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
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Table 8.21 – Unit root tests for Nevada (NV).
Variables ADF (P-value) PP (P-value) KPSS (Stat) QKS (Stat)
Nevada (NV) C C+T C C+T C C+T
HP (level) 0.0006*** 0.0039***0.1957 0.4733 0.0825 0.0844 3.1655
(First Difference)0.0333** 0.1207 0.0103** 0.0469** 0.0551 0.0527
I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0)
IC (Level) 0.6426 0.9643 0.4171 0.9886 1.4815*** 0.2938***2.2456
(First Difference)0.0151** 0.0411** 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.4074* 0.1525**
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(2) I(1)
CC (Level) 0.5358 0.1617 0.7791 0.5983 0.8720*** 0.1291* 4.4367
(First Difference)0.0089*** 0.0315** 0.0000*** 0.0002***0.1245 0.0597
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
MR (Level) 0.8575 0.0126** 0.3709 0.0001***1.2439*** 0.0696 1.6025
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1308 0.0930
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(0)
ICP (Level) 0.6987 0.9464 0.6837 0.9782 1.5056*** 0.2706***1.7532
(First Difference)0.0058*** 0.0208** 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.3093 0.1677**
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
ICN (Level) 0.9998 0.9915 0.9988 0.9789 1.0857*** 0.3124***3.7955
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.4911** 0.0934
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(0)
CCP (Level) 0.9993 0.9117 0.9999 0.9627 1.4575*** 0.3167***2.1131
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0001***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.4845** 0.0533
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(1)
CCN (Level) 0.8814 0.5761 0.9583 0.8124 1.3293*** 0.2125** 0.2858
(First Difference)0.0036*** 0.0199** 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1247 0.0771
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
MRP (Level) 0.9788 0.8914 0.9908 0.9617 1.4649*** 0.3075***1.3141
(First Difference)0.0011*** 0.0062***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.2521 0.1565**
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1)
MRN (Level) 0.9994 0.9516 0.9998 0.9695 1.4774*** 0.3248***1.0784
(First Difference)0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.4723** 0.0927
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(1)
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Table 8.22 – Unit root tests for New York (NY).
Variables ADF (P-value) PP (P-value) KPSS (Stat) QKS (Stat)
New York (NY)C C+T C C+T C C+T
HP (level) 0.0448** 0.0001***0.4909 0.6933 0.9671*** 0.1100 2.2059
(First Difference) 0.0376** 0.1095 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0986 0.0639
I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
IC (Level) 0.8008 0.7124 0.8016 0.6299 1.4655*** 0.2179***1.6610
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0958 0.0577
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
CC (Level) 0.2432 0.1685 0.5597 0.5446 0.9019*** 0.0803 1.4077
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0002***0.0000*** 0.0002***0.0651 0.0643
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
MR (Level) 0.6892 0.0003***0.5176 0.0006***1.2494*** 0.0721 2.5637
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0716 0.0474
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1)
ICP (Level) 0.9373 0.4185 0.9378 0.3557 1.5040*** 0.1616** 2.0556
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0509 0.0501
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
ICN (Level) 0.9888 0.7140 0.9890 0.6842 1.4657*** 0.2423***62.119
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1706 0.0620
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
CCP (Level) 0.8205 0.2917 0.8533 0.5260 1.4728*** 0.1843** 0.6075
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0001***0.0000*** 0.0001***0.0681 0.0514
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
CCN (Level) 0.8231 0.1075 0.8812 0.7648 1.4347*** 0.1157 0.3290
(First Difference) 0.0001*** 0.0005***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1020 0.0984
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
MRP (Level) 0.8574 0.5150 0.8583 0.4207 1.4939*** 0.2123** 0.6778
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1111 0.1147
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
MRN (Level) 0.9790 0.5644 0.9829 0.6225 1.4981*** 0.2254***0.8863
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0995 0.0562
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
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Table 8.23 – Unit root tests for Pennsylvania (PA).
Variables ADF (P-value) PP (P-value) KPSS (Stat) QKS (State)
Pennsylvania (PA)C C+T C C+T C C+T
HP (level) 0.0983* 0.0016***0.5988 0.5197 0.9289*** 0.0803 2.7819
(First Difference) 0.0388** 0.1437 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0649 0.0655
I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0)
IC (Level) 0.9329 0.2565 0.9383 0.3114 1.5068*** 0.1695** 1.2298
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0556 0.0582
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
CC (Level) 0.2432 0.1685 0.5597 0.5446 0.9019*** 0.0803 1.4077
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0002***0.0000*** 0.0002***0.0651 0.0643
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
MR (Level) 0.6892 0.0003***0.5176 0.0006***1.2494*** 0.0721 2.5637
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0716 0.0474
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1)
ICP (Level) 0.8898 0.7845 0.8890 0.7814 1.4883*** 0.2252***1.7496
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1211 0.0990
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
ICN (Level) 0.5695 0.6795 0.5818 0.6582 1.3656*** 0.1944** 3.1675
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.2491 0.1859**
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0)
CCP (Level) 0.8205 0.2917 0.8533 0.5260 1.4728*** 0.1843** 0.6075
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0001***0.0000*** 0.0001***0.0681 0.0514
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
CCN (Level) 0.8231 0.1075 0.8812 0.7648 1.4347*** 0.1157 0.3290
(First Difference) 0.0001*** 0.0005***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1020 0.0984
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
MRP (Level) 0.8574 0.5150 0.8583 0.4207 1.4939*** 0.2123** 0.6778
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.1111 0.1147
I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
MRN (Level) 0.9790 0.5644 0.9829 0.6225 1.4981*** 0.2254***0.8863
(First Difference) 0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0000*** 0.0000***0.0995 0.0562





The notion of bubbles has attracted considerable interest over time with a resur-
gence of following the recent global financial crisis. This thesis has investigated
the phenomenon of financial bubbles in different markets using extended period
of time from the early 18th century to the 21st century. The purpose of this
thesis is to examine a range of famous bubble episodes in history using some re-
cently proposed bubble detection tests. In particular, I consider the historical
house price series in Amsterdam, Norway and France, the Mississippi and South
Sea Bubbles in 1719-20, Japan’s asset price bubble during the late 1980s and the
US real estate bubble in the 2000s. The existing literature mainly focuses on
detecting some recent financial bubbles while few studies attempts to take into
account historical bubbles. This thesis, therefore, seeks to fill the existing gap
in the literature by testing for the empirical and robust evidence of some widely
recognised bubbles which have typically not been subjected to modern economet-
ric testing approaches. Empirical results for the above episodes are presented as
Chapters 3 through to 7. This thesis also considers the long-run relationship be-
tween US house prices and the relevant economic fundamentals using advanced
quantile cointegration approaches with the results presented in Chapter 8.
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9.1.1 Key Results
Section 1.2 and particularly between pages 10 and 12 identified six key questions
to be addressed in the thesis. Below, I consider what the work presented in the
thesis concludes in relation to these, and other questions related to bubbles. Since
the excellent work on exchange rate bubbles by, for example, Huang (1981), Evans
(1986), Meese (1986), West (1987) and Wu (1995), there have been many empirical
studies which focus on this topic. Chapter 3 explored the presence of bubbles in
some G10 and a range of emerging markets countries (including some Asian and
the BRICS). This chapter applied the popular and well-researched method of
PSY under different regression models to the widest and most extensive range
of exchange rates currently undertaken. Empirical results from Chapter 3 seem
to suggest that emerging market economies are more likely to exhibit bubble-
like behavior. Moreover, date-stamping results are sensitive to different model
specifications.
Unlike most existing studies on housing bubbles using a short period time se-
ries for few decades, Chapter 4 investigated the bubble-like behavior in several
well-constructed and regarded house price series; the Herengracht index for Ams-
terdam (1649-2010), Norway (1819-2014) and Paris (1650-2012). These historical
series comprise the few long-term house price series in the literature and represent
different types of real estate markets in terms of their coverage. Chapter 4 con-
firms no explosive behavior in the Herengracht index for Amsterdam (1649-2010).
This finding is perhaps not surprising as Shiller (2006) concludes that Herengracht
index doesn’t offer very positive real returns, suggesting an annual average price
increase of only 0.2% a year. Chapter 4 also presents evidence of explosive behav-
ior in historical Norwegian house price at the aggregate and disaggregate levels.
Perhaps more importantly and interestingly, the identified episodes generally co-
incide or overlap with several major financial crises in Norway as discussed in
Grytten and Hunnes (2010), who conclude in favour of nine ‘devastating finan-
cial crises’ in almost 200 years of Norwegian history. Moreover, empirical results
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also suggest that the house price episodes identified from four Norwegian main
cities (Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim and Kristiansand) are generally in line with those
episodes obtained from the real house price index at the national level. The real
house price index of Paris exhibits significant evidence of exuberance under a par-
ticular model specification only. Bubble detection results from PSY are generally
in line with those obtained from long memory models based on the mean value of
d.
US real estate prices have drawn a lot of attention as it is widely regarded as the
most speculative housing market. Chapter 5 finds evidence of housing bubbles
in several US States in the 1980s (i.e., California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New
York etc.), which coincide with some existing studies that investigate housing
bubbles or booms and busts using a range of alternative approaches. Moreover,
Chapter 5 also identifies, for the first time, the existence of a housing bubble that
originates in the early 2000s and collapses in the mid-2000s in more than 20 States
and the District of Columbia (DC). This finding seems to be in agreement with
the talk given by Alan Greenspan in 2005, who suggests that there was no sign
of a nationwide housing bubble. Moreover, the bubbles of the 2000s were more
widespread than the 1980s, which is of special interest and importance.
The Mississippi Bubble and South Sea Bubbles are widely believed to be most
speculative episodes and earliest examples in stock markets. Chapter 6 focuses
on the famous Mississippi Bubble in French and the South Sea Bubble in Eng-
land in the early 18th century. This chapter investigates bubble-like behaviour
in the Mississippi Company and South Sea Company, and a selection of other
financial organisations in England during the period 1719-20 using the PSY ap-
proach. In particular, evidence of explosive behavior (exuberance) in share prices
is confirmed for the South Sea Company for the first time, and also established
for a number of other 18th century British financial organisations, for example,
East India Company, London Assurance, Million Bank, the Royal African Com-
pany and the Royal Exchange Assurance. However, there is little evidence of
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exuberance for the Bank of England. The South Sea Company was not the only
company experiencing exuberance in its share price for this particular period in
the British share market. The timings of these bubble episodes show signs of
possible contagion during the South Sea episode.
Japan’s asset price bubble of the late 1980s to early 1990s is widely regarded
as one of the most famous bubble episodes in the history. Chapter 7 provides
empirical evidence to support Japan’s recent asset price bubble in its most in-
flated stock and real estate markets during the 1980s-90s. For both markets, this
chapter reports the origination and collapse dates of so-called ‘double bubbles’,
which coincide with the traditional view of the well-known Japan’s asset price
bubble. By utilising a recently developed time-varying regression based contagion
methodology of Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016), such a new contagion
procedure clearly demonstrates signs of bubble migration from the stock market
(core market) to the real estate market for the first time in the literature. The
greatest contribution of this chapter is that the bubble-like behaviour from the
stock market not only migrates to, but also fuels the booming real estate market.
An important question has been researched extensively in the literature is whether
US house prices reflect economic fundamentals. Chapter 8 tests for a long-run
cointegration relationship between house prices and economic fundamentals (e.g.,
personal income, construction costs, mortgage rates) using the US aggregate and
disaggregate data employ by both conventional cointegration tests based on con-
ditional mean models of Pesaran et al. (2001) and Shin et al. (2014) and quantile
cointegration models of Cho et al. (2015) and Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2011).
Firstly, this chapter reports no cointegration between house prices and funda-
mentals at the national level based on both conditional mean- and quantile-based
cointegration tests. Secondly and more importantly, empirical results show, under
certain cases, that cointegration may be established based on conditional mean-
based model (e.g., ARDL-M model of Pesaran et al. (2001) or NARDLM model of
Shin et al. (2014)) but there is no overwhelming evidence of cointegration based on
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the quantile-based model (e.g., QARDL model of Cho et al. (2015) or NARLD-Q
model of Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2011)), and vice versa. Thirdly, several exam-
ples show that there is no long-run relationship based on both conditional mean-
and quantile-based cointegration tests. The main contribution of this chapter is
to provide further evidence of a cointegration or non-cointegration relationship
for the US and several selected states based on new econometric approaches.
9.2 Future Work
There are several possible avenues for future research related to this thesis.
First, an alternative approach to exploring the presence of bubble-like behaviour
for historical bubble episodes is of particularly interest and importance. This
thesis examines the presence of historical financial bubbles in the 18th and 19th
centuries using the right-tailed unit root tests of Phillips, Shi, and Yu (2015,
PSY). Conclusions from Chapter 6 provide econometric-based evidence to support
the existence of the Mississippi Bubble, the South Sea Bubble and the British
Railway Mania. Despite these novel contributions to the literature, there have
been few studies to examine those well-documented bubble episodes. The PSY
testing procedure is often applied to a price-fundamental ratio to assess explosive
behaviour. However, the fundamental series is rarely available for these historical
episodes. Markov-switching unit root test for detecting historical bubbles will be
a great addition to the growing literature. For example, the Markov-switching
unit root tests of Hall et al. (1999) van Norden and Vigfusson (1998) can be used
for identifying bubbles. The two-regime Markov-switching augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test of Hall et al. (1999) assumes that the error variances of the two
regimes are identical. On the other hand, the model of van Norden and Vigfusson
(1998) assumes time-varying error variance. Shi (2013) suggests some empirical
guidelines for the practical implementation of the Markov-switching unit root test
proposed by Hall et al. (1999) for detecting explosive bubble behavior. Interested
readers may refer to this article for details.
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Second, research on bubble contagion across markets has been relatively scarce.
Chapter 7 documents overwhelming evidence in Japan’s stock and real estate
markets between the 1980s and the early 1990s and signs of spillovers from stock
market to its real estate market for the first time in the literature using the right-
tailed unit root test of Phillips et al. (2015) and time-varying regression method-
ology of Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips (2016). A potential future topic is to
apply Greenaway-McGrevy and Phillips’s (2016) approach to other applications.
China’s real estate market is widely believed to contain a bubble. House prices
in China have achieved rapid and remarkable growth. For example, average real
housing prices have grown at an annual rate of around 17% over the past decade,
which was higher than the average income growth rate of 11% across the thirty-five
major cities and the nation’s 10% average GDP growth (Chen and Wen, 2017).
One may consider identifying real estate bubbles in China at the city level and
look for evidence of bubble migration from four first-tier cities (Beijing, Shanghai,
Guangzhou and Shenzhen) to the surrounding areas. The price-income ratio and
price-rent ratio in these cities are extremely high.
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